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ABSTRACT
IN THEORY, THERE’S HOPE FOR THE FUTURE:
QUEER CO-(M)MOTIONS OF SCIENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY
SEPTEMBER 1, 2016
CORDELIA SAND, B.A., NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Eve Vogel

Given the state of the planet at present —specifically, the linked global ecological and
economic crises that conjure dark imaginings and nihilistic actualities of increasing resource
depletion, poisonings, and wide-scale sufferings and extinctions—I ask What might we hope
now? What points of intervention offer possibility for transformation? At best, the response can
only be partial. The approach this thesis takes initiates from specific pre-discursive assumptions.
The first understands current conditions as having been produced, and continuing to be so,
through practices that enact and sustain neoliberal relations. Secondly, these practices are
expressive of a subjectivity tied to a Cartesian worldview, which, therefore, needs to be
interrupted at its foundational roots. Thirdly, the scaffolding that supports this subjectivity draws
on Newtonian science and neo-Darwinian narratives deemed to be natural law and, therefore,
ontological, immutable reality. Contrary to modernist thinking, I premise that these two strains,
subjectivity and science, are neither autonomous nor ontological, but that they are materially and
contingently integral. Finally, this thesis presumes that life-affirming trajectories are, in fact,
desired.
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An integral framing of science and subjectivity provides a productive method of feminist
science studies analysis and theorization. Observing the capitalist Western social imaginary
through this lens reveals its philosophical and scientific infrastructures to be outdated and
deteriorating. Observing how emerging scientific narratives in quantum physics and systemsbiology intersect with marginalized theories in process-philosophy and subjectivity reveals a lifeaffirming imaginary of difference, one that arrests nihilism and sets ethical trajectories in motion.
Certain, though not all, percepts of feminist new materialism engage twentieth and twenty-first
century sciences successfully to show that ethicality matters. Though many questions remain, this
points auspiciously towards the possibility for a transformed politics of justice.
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INTRODUCTION
The whole universe depends on everything fitting together just right.
If one piece busts, even the smallest piece, the entire universe will get busted.
Mama, is that you? I’ve broken everything.
1
—Hushpuppie, Beasts of the Southern Wild Motion Picture

Preamble
When, following a presentation on the vulnerabilities of transcorporeal bodies to toxic
environmental conditions– intubated and bubbled people with multiple chemical sensitivities,
dissolving shells of marine life in an acidified ocean– a scholar of 19th century German
naturphilosophie, questioned the speaker, Stacy Alaimo, on how a feminist post-human
materiality committed to a Baradian “ontology” of intra-action and flow arrives “naturally” at a
leftist politics and political activism, he was drawing lines in the sand. Her talk chafed against his
credo, common to Western philosophy, of the implausible rationality of direct connection
between theory on one hand and ethics and enaction on the other. His question intended to
challenge, to corner, to diminish, to discount, but he was also mystified, for he could muster no
mooring in the feminist logics of embodied experience, and found himself uncharacteristically
immersed in a strange and intellectually foreign zone with no handholds, no fixed points, where
his terra firma was not, instead it moved and undulated without transcendental idealisms of
capital N-Nature and capital T-Truth, where queer desires disrupted purities of what he had
always known (expansive, essential, and timeless) but was turning out to be seeming passing
straight and narrow and largely blind. And this gave rise in him to anger, to fear, but at what?
That was the worst part, at what exactly, I cannot say, he thinks, not even knowing the words of
his thinking or the object of his rage, just that curious affective mixed-up rise in the chest that
must find form, make sound, aim old familiar words at the “catty and indecorous” to wrest the
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rules back to those of his own domain and regain the higher ground of composure, control, and
authority and find along with Robert Browning again, that “God’s in his heaven, all’s right with
the world.” It’s obvious. It was a rhetorical question. A philosophy of materiality does not and
cannot unfold a leftist ethics, he knows-knows-knows this, the thinking is wrong, for it is not
thinking, because it is not logical, linear, and deductive like a mathematical proof, all (w)holes
barred. And yet there he was, exiled in an abyss of acid radioactive sea of chalky tests, meant to
shelter, but disintegrating.
Stacy Alaimo quickly responded, “I have no idea, but it is already happening in the
environmental movement and in community economies.” (February 3, 2014 Rice University).2
Another chafe! She answered that she takes activism seriously academically, that this as an
academic practice has been legitimized within cultural theory, and that citizen science engages
the politics and ethics of theory. Plastic, formless matter, inorganic biogenic product of millions
of years of sequestered decomposed photosynthetic and marine life, once extracted, cause what
could not have been predicted, global toxicities (woops, there is no putting it back in the ground,
no turning back, no not breathing its airborne forms, no genetic or cellular isolationism, no
absenting corpuscular sentience and systemic learning).
Another lacuna gapes, how do feminist post-human and new materialist projects, which
rescript the Western thinking about embodiment and the world in their hopeful envisioning of
collective ethical subjectivities, anticipate heading off detractors and attackers on various fronts–
intellectual, theoretical, structural, and in praxis? How does this radical feminist vision of lifeitself (Life) and Earth and world— however soundly reasoned, evidenced, and inspired—confront
thousands of years of dualities, hegemonies and exclusions, kept in place to service a status quo
of patriarchal and economic power? Could healing the long genealogy of rifts between body and
mind, nature and human, adequately lay the foundation for ushering in a new paradigm of
affectively grounded life-affirming political values? Would ridding the Western mind of its
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compulsion to predictive certainty and obsession with control ease the terrors and shames of the
unknowable and uncertain, and make space for ethical enaction? The response cannot be “I have
no idea.” As much as the feminist vision for posthuman and new materialist possibility inspires
and makes urgent ecological and economic sense, its hopes must also be strategic and tactical, the
project must critically engage what it is up against, ivory tower isolation is no shelter. While I
have no answers to these questions in this project, nor do I lay out a war room strategy, it is in the
spirit of these framing questions that my project reflects on Western thinking itself, specifically to
arrive at a deeper understanding of the intaglio of scientific thinking and subjectivity in the early
twenty-first century, as if all lives depend on it.
The telling interchange between Stacy Alaimo and the scholar of German philosophy
encapsulates scholarly tensions both within feminist new materialisms and over its reception in
wider academic circles. Critics of new materialism charge that these thinkers fail to show, as they
claim, a natural ‘ontological’ link between its theoretical positions and its politics. The ‘material
turn’ in feminist theory has been driven largely, but not only, by literary and cultural theory
scholars, and these new materialists do suggest this link, but they largely fail to make their case
for reasons I will show. I aim to explain the intransigence of this debate, and make a case for how
new materialist theoretical positions, if grounded in particular approaches to science, and
differently argued, do incorporate ethicality in a way that directly informs possibilities for a
transformative politics.

Segue: Defining terms (enaction)
I’m recording my story for the scientists in the future.
–Hushpuppie

Initially, Francisco Varela explains enaction in the context of bioneurology, “perception
and action are embodied in self-organizing sensorimotor processes” (Varela, 1999, p. 15). The
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body, environment, and consciousness––defined as sentience and awareness as it arises in the
interaction of affect and cognition–– act and enact in concert to produce novel functional
structures.
…the essence of cognitive intelligence…resides only in its embodiment.
When cognitive intelligence is approached from this self-situated
perspective, it quickly becomes obvious that there is no place where
perception could deliver a representation of the world in the traditional
senses. The world shows up through the enactment of the perceptuo-motor
regularities (Varela, 1999, p. 59, italics in the original).

Varela here rejects the common view in science and philosophy that ‘nature’ or the ‘worldout-there’ can be represented as one objective reality, a theme also central to fifty years of social
and feminist scholarship of science. Varela later develops his earliest strictly science-bound
concept of enaction to an expanded sense of enaction as skills-based radical embodiment, whether
political, scientific, economic, etc. The delicacy of his stance relates to embodiment. Enaction is a
cognitive function of embodied entities living in a ‘context’ (its environment), but, as he
emphatically makes clear, the enactive dynamics of radical embodiment are not transferrable to
how social systems–which are not autopoietic (living biological entities)–function or should be
modeled. Enaction is a cognitive function of the embodied subject, not to be confused with
agency. While there is advantage in a metaphoric application of autopoiesis and enactive
cognition for understanding the interactions of social and living systems, that is quite different
from engaging biological science as a social model.3 Social living for Varela is a product of
epistemology, which is itself a form of enaction, it brings into being forms of social living, and,
on that ground, epistemology matters politically. (Protevi in Clarke & Hansen, 2009) By
extension, because epistemology is a cognitive function of embodiment, the body, too, is a
political event. Enaction projects a subject’s worldview onto a world that responds, and, in a
reciprocal dialogic ricorso, subjectivity responds, but its form is not one of call and response. The
form of enaction is engagement, improvisation, and emergence (bringing forth).4 There is no
4

linearity or cause and effect, there are no hard borders (and thus no categories or binaries), no
telos. What emerges does so by virtue of interactive energies without definable origin, cause, or
source. Enaction may be envisioned as a dance, not a choreographed dance but a structured
improvisation by subject(s) and world, the dance arises as an emergent property that is the whole
of the motions of “a network of interactions of components” (Maturana, Varela, & Uribe, 1974, p.
187) “without discrete origin or finite goal” (Angerer, Bosel, Ott, & Gatens, 2014, p. 251).

Dear Reader
This project aspires to be an experiential read, somewhat out-of-the-ordinary.
Accordingly, I invite you to adjust your stance as a reader, to rest from disciplinary academic
critique, and to suspend expectation, even disbelief. I echo Gibson-Graham in inviting you to read
for “difference rather than dominance” (2006, p. xxii). The technique of reading for difference
has a number of effects. It produces “interventions that unravel and dissolve this structural power,
imagines specific and yet context-shaping dynamics, and enlarges the space of agency of all sorts
of actors – noncapitalist as well as capitalist, disorganized as well as organized, non-human as
well as human” (2008, p. 626). It produces recognition of the always already diverse, and, by
bringing together things from different domains, it “excavates”, “spawns” and “proliferates”
possibility (p. 625). Gibson-Graham’s technique of reading for difference borrows from Bruno
Latour’s “learning to be affected” rather than to critique (2010, p. 322). I have attempted to
embrace these approaches myself in the writing of this project, rather than challenge arguments
(which I also do) I pay attention to patterns, I notice errant capillary variations on dominant
themes, and wonder about them. Questions emerge not necessarily to be answered but to orient
inquiry. The contemplations of this paper cover a large and broad swath of time and themes, it
necessarily moves loosely and necessitates a similar looseness in its reader, some give, much like
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the tolerances a builder leaves between the meeting of planes, gaps that make space for tools and
fingers to twist and shape and create, gaps for coming back later for repairs and changes.
Dynamic interdependence defies precision and requires a bit of mess.
Another invitation for my reader is to go with the jumps and transitions and gear shifts as
one might read a poem. The sequence of chapters and their internal organizations might be read
as sequences of verse, and to grasp the meanings of the whole demands of its reader to leap along
side the writer. My aim is to evoke in my reader a fresh imaginary, one decoupled, for a fleeting
moment, from the ‘Cartesian-capitalist’ worldview, one that leans into ‘bringing forth’, inspired
by insights of feminist new materialisms. If successful, I see this experiment in reading as a
resource for political hope in the confrontations with the global violence being done economically
and environmentally to wellbeing. The text on these pages is no more than tactic in a strategy to
tease out surprise, to shine a light on what we know and see nothing known. I invite you to take
the space . . .

... quiet
... breathing
... and, then, proceed
with imaginative, inquisitive engagement as we ‘learn to be affected’ together.
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Framing the Context
Everything is part of the buffet of the universe.
Anyday now, fabric of the universe is comin’ unraveled,
ice caps gonna melt, water’s gonna rise, and
everything south of the levee is goin’ under.
Y’all better learn how to survive, now.
—Bathtub Teacher

Figure 1. Scylla, daughter of Poseidon. She was a many-headed, tentacled monster
who fed on passing sailors in the straits between herself and Charybdis.
Figure 2. Charybdis, daughter of Poseidon. She had once been the beautiful daughter of Poseidon,
but she stole some of Heracles’ sheep, causing the angry Zeus to turn her into a monster.

Scylla and Charybdis
Stemming from the social relations and conditions of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries organized around capitalism, anthropogenic harm to the planet proceeds with gruesome
alacrity. Unlike at the turn of the twentieth century, humans now understand the myriad
anthropogenic violations perpetrated on ecological interdependencies, to such an extreme as to
render imaginable and certain the unimaginable, that given its present trajectory, Life, Earth, and
humans hurtle towards a pyrrhic Homo sapien victory that annihilates that on which many species
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depend, and in so doing, also gives witness to its own self-annihilation. This auto-immune
behavior refutes any vestigial credibility of the economic axiom of the individual as a rational
actor of his own self-interest. Alternatively, these path-to-extinction energies might be analyzed
as group selection– a darkly ironic manifestation of altruism played out on a planetary scale,
either a Gaian event or, perhaps, some supreme extreme Malthusianism. The twentieth century
planet, as an epiphenomenon engaged by humans empirically, experientially, rationally,
materially, and affectively, is at stake. The scientific uncertainties surrounding the present and
imminent quotidian betrays (or befits) the rapturous promises of capitalist mythologies. An
affective subtext, ranging from desperation, urgency, poignancy, exasperation, anxiety, and denial
to hope and possibility suffuses multilogues about power, the posthuman, globalization, critiques
of capital, embodiment, and the politics of knowledge. Earth provides habitus for much more than
the human, a fact that serves to erase the legitimacy of myopic anthropocentric orientations.
A critical social theory asks why hunger, poverty, and other forms of human, animal, and
planetary suffering persist despite the technological and scientific potential to mitigate or
eliminate them altogether. Seeing freshly, seers abound. According to Theodor Adorno, the root
cause lies in how capitalist relations of production have come to dominate society as a whole,
leading to extreme, albeit often invisible, concentrations of wealth and power (1973). This nexus
of production and power, he states, prevails in an exchange society. In this kind of society, nature
as a static given obscures social relations, which, according to Donna Haraway, congeal into
decontextualized things-in-themselves (1991). A capitalist exchange society is constructed on a
philosophy that insists on misunderstanding relational processes as fixed, simple abstractions
(1997), or as Alfred North Whitehead would attribute the error, on the fallacy of misplaced
concreteness. This confusion, perhaps conveniently intentional, is not only philosophical, but at
the turn of the millennium fundamentally both scientific and ethical.
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Framing the context: Science
Relativity and the quantum era have has not yet manifested in fundamental change to the
social imaginary; paradigmatic intellectual change at the hands of science last happened in the
seventeenth century when Copernicus reversed the places of the sun and the earth and Galileo
substituted motion for rest as basics in physics. At this particular temporal moment, the
ecological, environmental, and biological/genetic sciences have re-described nature as resourcelimited, non-linear, messy, and leaky. Advancements in evolution theory and physiology since
Darwin have dispelled myths of autonomous individuality and essentialism, replacing them with
narratives of emergent and interdependent self-organizing systems that explain and are explained
by autopoiesis, symbiogenesis, hybridities, chimeras, cellular biology and genetics, the
maintenance of an unlikely atmospheric composition, ocean pH, Earth. “Nature hates a purity”
(Margulis aphorism, personal communication). Paleontologists, climatologists, earth and life
scientists have redefined brinksmanship according to the limiting parameters of Holocene
systems of Earth and life, and they have waved the Anthropocene warning flag, a term of
coterminous power and vulnerability that ironically matches human immobilization in response,
marking the challenge that accountability presents for our species.5 We know now what was not
known at the turn of the twentieth century, or at mid-century, that the environmental conditions
on Earth that make life possible are regulated by living systems, and that life and the environment
co-evolve. We know from Darwin that forms of life evolve from other forms of life as fit to
environmental conditions, and that Life and matter become other than they once were, these
stories of evolution and Earth history are endless. We know that individual protists, plants,
animals, and fungi are in fact living co-evolving communities of multiple cell types and bacteria
that function indivisibly as an ensemble. Physics and complexity theory have undone certainty,
revealing that claims to ‘know’ merely feign false arrogance, while also opening ‘reality’ to
contingency and the poised realms of possibility at the edge of Chaos. With the collapse of the
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guiding authorities of certainty, rationalism, and reductionist science, what’s left is a realm of
questions, liminal zones of Life and not-Life without clean boundaries or entire edges. We have
learned that categories don’t hold up, they dissolve and leave in their wake an affective,
becoming-in-community; nature is anything but fixed, but it opens possibilities for actuality if
conditions are favorable. Quantum ‘reality’ with its dark matter, dark energy, quark theories,
Higgs boson, etc. is totally different from the ‘reality’ of 1900 or 1960. We also now understand
that Life and environment, as familiar to us now, are at risk of collapse caused by anthropogenicswho-know-better. The paradigm change in science is indisputably well underway, a new set of
references re-orient Life and its productions as emergent properties of a historicity, one that
becomes in natureculture-context-matter community –contingent, wildly exceptional, and hardly
expected.
It is the disjuncture between the above given ‘state of affairs’ in the social order of advanced
capitalism and the above given ‘state of affairs’ in science that contextualize and premise the
political question that motivates my project– knowing and accountable to all of that, what next?

Segue: defining terms (science, imaginary, social imaginary)
I address ‘science’ as a particular narrative structure that tells the tale of a modern, Western
inquiry-driven practice that constructs particular sorts of knowledge about the objects it studies. It
observes, measures, experiments, interprets, and communicates in specialized, discipline-specific
languages. Science, for this project, is a highly structured way of thinking and doing, one that has
its own history, philosophy, and communities. Applied, it affects all facets of Western worldview,
subjectivity, and social life, as well as all facets of Life and Earth systems.
The social imaginary, as theorized by Cornelius Castoriadis, is constituted of an
animating web of meanings that “permeate, orient, and direct the whole life of the society”
(Castoriadis & Curtis, 1997, p. 7) and of bodily individuals. They form a ‘magma’ of social
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imaginary significations, such as spirits, gods, God; citizen, nation, state; commodity, money,
capital; taboo, virtue; thing, tool. The feature that classifies these items within the magma of the
social imaginary is that they are posited through creation, and not through the “rational” or “real.”
What Castoriadis presents that translates to my meaning of the imaginary in this project is the
immediacy of connection between the social imaginary and the human imaginary, tethered by
subjects who “are what they are by virtue of [embodiment and] the social imaginary significations
that make them that” (Adams, 2014, p. 71). My meaning of imaginary in this context has nothing
to do with ‘fictitious’, it has to do with the imaginary as the ‘open interval’ (see Method section
of this introduction) that produces the subject as a body, and as a socially defined individual, and
as affective (see below), these misleadingly separate phrases in fact describing something
heterogeneous and indissociable. The materiality of the imaginary shapes the subject. I follow
Castoriadis in his attribution to the imaginary of a capacity for reflectiveness and of will (desire),
as a source of creation that ultimately leads to enaction. The imaginary is the initiating source of
political enaction:
One must be able to imagine something other than what is to be able to will;
and one must be able to will something other than what is to liberate the
imagination. … When one does not will anything other than what is, the
imagination is inhibited and repressed; in this case it only represents the
eternal perpetuation of what is. And if one cannot imagine something other
than what is, every “decision” is only a choice between possible givens––
given by life as it existed beforehand and by the instituted system––which
can always be reduced to the results of a calculation or some form of
reasoning (Castoriadis & Curtis, 1997, 160).
Recent and present history presents horrific cases of the social (political) institution eradicating
the last traces of subjects’ secular desire (will of one’s own) and reflectiveness. Castoriadis sees
reflectiveness as a key creative project of human subjectivity, to make and challenge itself and,
since the social imaginary and subjectivity connect directly, the world brought forth in
‘worlding’6. In the absence of engaged and reflective subjectivities, states Castoriadis, “not only
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does every attempt at truth and knowledge collapse but every ethical effort disappears, since all
responsibility vanishes” (1997, p. 169). Subjectivity and the social imaginary each frame the
other, through stories told and experienced, through personal meanings and those structured in
social conditions. These narrations function as myth, engaging metaphor to make sense of the
world, to make and change (and resist changing) knowledge. For these reasons, the subject
imaginary is also the battleground of propaganda and marketing, of military and religious
training, of economic coercions, it is a target of persuasion tactics, and so it can be or be made to
be vulnerable and shut down. I engage the imaginary of Castoriadis’ vision, the one that questions
conditions and laws of closure, and that initiates ethical enaction.

What my project does.

Knowing and accountable to all of that, what next how?
Similar to how the mechanistic, teleological thinking of 19th century science imprinted
the 20th century social imaginary (Goldman, 2008), the temporal lag between the process thinking
of uncertainty and contingency that 20th century scientific revelations engender and their as yet
largely absent expressions in a revised social order has generated a political and social vacuum
where fools and techno-capitalism rush in. How would a different social imaginary, grounded by
and inspired by current scientific understandings of Life and Earth, bring forth a world we might
hope for? What collective imaginary provokes a subjectivity that makes space for the possible
and enacts conditions for ethical practices? Of course, that question embeds its reciprocal, what
subjectivity provokes a collective imaginary that makes space for the possible and enacts
conditions for ethical practices? I am interested in ethical enaction as a political and
transformative strategy, and in the use of narrative and metaphor as one of its tactics.
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In the literature
Political and ethical questions of memory and desire have been the mainstay of feminist
science studies that focus on critiques of androcentric scientific knowledge used to legitimate
social atrocity, and racial and gendered subjugations. Feminist scholars in the humanities and
social sciences currently celebrate a ‘new’ and ‘post-human’ thinking beyond binaries, beyond
nature-culture (J.K. Gibson-Graham, Vicki Kirby, E. Wilson, Haraway), borne, say more feminist
theorists affiliated by a loosely categorized scholarship of ‘new materialism’, which re-conceives
matter and bodies (living entities) not as tethered by binaries and essentialized within hard edges
and entire boundaries but as ‘vibrant’, ‘becoming’, ‘transcorporeal’, ‘nomadic’, ‘intra-actively
entangled’ and transtemporal (Bennett, Grosz, Alaimo, Colebrook, Braidotti, Barad). Issues of
subjectivity formation as social and political construction is well-worn feminist territory; a
vantage that uses social and political conditions of capitalism as ways to read subjectivity are also
present in the literature, but less so (Stengers, J.K. Gibson-Graham, Haraway, Braidotti). Seldom,
however, do the literatures of science studies and the philosophy of science cross-pollinate in
feminist literatures on subjectivity (at the micro-political scale), while holding a critique of
capitalism and the political at center. This is the intersection within which this project works, and
I follow Haraway, Barad, Braidotti, and Varela, each of whom put their em-phá-sis on a different
syl-lá-ble of the science-social-subject triad.
Epistemological analysis by feminist scientists and scholars of science from Sandra
Harding to Evelyn Fox Keller to Donna Haraway and Karen Barad have rightly situated scientific
knowledge claims as bearing responsibility, as accountable to the world. With the social relations
of science closely yoked to sustaining the power and profitability of global and American
capitalism (Werskey, 2007), some material feminisms respond by addressing political change
through subject politics. “We need to devise new social, ethical, and discursive schemes of
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subject formation to match the profound transformations we are undergoing. That means we need
to learn to think differently about ourselves” (Braidotti, 2013, pp. 11-12). The literature of
feminist new materialisms extends deeply, and unfolds robust visions and epistemological
arguments for those visions, but once it gets to a certain point it stops, failing to ask the “what,
then?” question, by what pragmatics might visions be made actual and what are they up against?
One exception is the academic-activist work of the community economies collective organized
around the economic geography scholarship of J.K. Gibson-Graham, and my project is largely
inspired by their affective politics of the ethical subject as an intervention on capitalism, however,
their project’s focus targets economic subjectivity and practices, while I invert that, my project’s
focus targets subjectivity, the stories that narrate the subject’s and the collective imaginary of Life
and Earth, which bear directly on well-being.

Ricorso: What my project does (asks questions).
What narratives of what science, then, move subjectivity from affirmative, hopeful theory
to strategy and useful tactics, or are we lost? This project interrogates science, in order to re-think
its possibilities for a twenty-first century world. What is an affirmative and hopeful politics of the
subject up against? What tools are there to use? I claim that questioning the Earth can tell us
about the social and the subject, in that it allows us to reflect on how we imagine and question the
Earth and cosmos, and to observe how we respond to those questions. As social beings, we
question and respond to what we have brought forth and, therefore, to what we are accountable.

Framing the context: Science as iterative narration
Wetland ecologist Erik Kiviat’s large study of the New Jersey Meadowlands wetlands
restoration project found profit-driven corruption by the academy, NGOs, and political
institutions writ large on the landscape of the restoration project. His research as an ecologist and
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botanist also found that one taxon does not predict another at any scale. These two facets of his
findings, the one experiential and the other ‘hard’ science, demonstrate how teleological and
taxonomic thinking, which characterizes both conventional science research and the subjectivities
of advanced capitalism, both produces political and economic corruption and is inadequate as an
epistemology for explaining ecosystem function. According to science historian Steven Goldman,
the contemporary knowledge problem in science over the ontological divide between experience
and objective ‘reality’ (the world-out-there) has its roots in the origins of Western philosophy,
namely the war between the Gods and the Earth Giants. The Gods are represented by the eternal,
good, and just of Platonic realities, and Earth Giants, as represented by the Sophists, are
experiential, uncertain, contingent, and particular. This battle over Greek rationalism gets
perpetuated in the ambivalences within the scientific community, even as the rhetoric of the
community acknowledges its own temporal character, that science is never done. To resolve this
dilemma, Goldman, drawing on John Dewey, suggests that experience is the “greatest warrant”
for both, experience is literally about a “world out there,” which he calls actualities (‘reality’
being too controversial and emotional a term) and all experience is uncertain and particular. We
don’t experience necessity or certainty or truth or any other intellectual construct. Science— as
the only truth— cannot be defended, and the same applies to other ‘truth-telling genres’ such as
religion, or social construction, or philosophy, etc. No theory ever achieves the status of empirical
fact. Science is continually changing at the levels of data, physical instruments, analytic and
conceptual tools (Heisenberg used matrix algebra to inform relativity theory), assumptions (e.g.
definitions of the atom or matter), and theories. Scientific changes are unpredictable (Kepler did
not anticipate Newton, who did not anticipate Einstein, etc.). He underscores Mary Hesse’s
dictum that we need to keep in mind that the theories we hold to be true are just as likely to be
falsified in the future as the theories that have been falsified up to the present. The overriding
message is that claims to scientific knowledge are always influenced by the collective process and
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language by which it gets produced, and is always corrigible.
For all these reasons that Goldman articulates, I concur that one of the keys to
understanding science as a knowledge-making practice is an understanding of the logics exposed
by the history of science, as was the focus of William Whewell, Thomas Kuhn, Marjorie Greene,
Lynn Margulis, and many feminist science scholars. The history and development of evolution
theory and its progeny, cellular genetics, for example, provide a series of narratives about how
humans think about Life, and how lives live with other lives. Evolution tropes– survival-of-thefittest, descent by modification, competitive struggle, symbiogenesis, inheritance of acquired
characteristics, self-organization, emergence– become the descriptive metaphors that saturate
political perceptions of whether, what, and why choices and possibilities of Life do or do not
exist. These narratives, moving through the imaginary, shape social relations and conditions.
What is at stake in scientific method, then, in its premises, assumptions, and expectations, is
fundamentally a way of being, the kinds of people we want to be, and the ways we live
(Addelson, 1994).
Science provides but one of many stories, and its mode of deductive reasoning obscures
its temporal and corrigible character and fosters false expectations,7 such as for precise certainties
relating to the future mechanisms, temporalities, and manifestations of global climate change, or
the laboratory synthesis of oil from synthesized bacteria, but, Goldman states, it may be one of
the best tools available for dealing with the mysteries and vicissitudes of experience. As much as
my project draws on Goldman’s scholarly observations about science and society, it lands on one
critical disagreement with him. I passionately object to his absolution of scientists and the
scientific community from political and social accountability for their work, he places that
responsibility instead on an informed democratic citizenry, and in the same breath agrees with the
Aristotelian notion that human action is non-rational. Goldman’s position does not hold up.
Erasing the feminist science literature altogether, this position of his, in odd contrast to many of
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his lectured arguments, represents what this project tries to move on from, an outdated and
fictitious perception of science that pre-emptively sanctifies its working community with an
innocence from social and political influence. Given corporate and state sponsorship of academic
scientific research and its commercial applications, given competitive funding and publishing
pressures and the risk of skewed and negative results, given that capitalism produces subjects
driven by growth and profit motives, and given the uninformed citizenry of an undemocratic
American society, Goldman’s political stance dangerously obstructs engagement and
accountability.

What my project does (asks questions and makes claims).
Science incompletely shapes meanings; something is missing. Though, on the largest of
scales, scientific knowledge may be considered as one kind of metaphor we use to make sense of
the world, the discourse of hard science does not trade in metaphor, and it is metaphor that
functions as the catalyst that makes possible shared meanings and imaginaries. If a re-oriented
science is to ascribe meaning, to engage and be accountable, then a revised approach to the
practice and function of science can no longer pretend to exile metaphor. But do we expect
scientists to also be poets? This thesis treats science as narrative, and attempts to weave a story of
meanings from scientific theories of embodiment and subjectivity, and therefore my project is
also about making metaphor, and never about ontology.
I show how the ethical takes on a scientific materiality that cannot be quarantined from
processes of unknowing and a generative world. Can methods and practices and players of a
scientific inquiry based on deductive reasoning alone explicitly incorporate ethical accountability
into their methods? In other words, can a science based on an Enlightenment ideology, ruled by
its conceits of explanatory power, predictive success, and control of nature, accommodate non-
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Euclidean insights about nature and reality made since the early twentieth century, or has the time
come additional tools for needed for doing science?
This project attempts to imagine what it might be to rethink science in ways better
equipped to deal with the mess, confusion, and relative disorder of current global economic and
environmental challenges.8 The phrase ‘better equipped’ refers to the reductionist scientific
research methods characteristic of the Enlightenment which seek the definite, and, according to
Law, have produced a nature in the image of its limiting methods, because linear determinate
thinking and methods fail to capacitate understanding the ‘natural’ world. Though scientific
methods, “orchestrate themselves hegemonically into purported coherence” (Law, 2003, p. 6),
they cannot describe the complex, impossible, and almost unthinkable world that exceeds our
capacity to know it. Law asks how are the social sciences– and I amend this to ask of all the
sciences – to represent mess, the “deliberate imprecision … of private emotions that open us to
worlds of sensibilities” (p. 3), what I describe as the realm where affect and sentience and
surprise connect in all-of-a-sudden, creative, and indistinguishable ways that elude definition and
direct verbal articulation. I look at the interplay, at the co-(m)motions of science and subjectivity,
to question the status quo of dominant scientific practice and ways we think about scientific
knowledge claims and how those claims imprint subjects. I make a case for demanding a broader
epistemic and ethical accountability from the informing and, regrettably, discrete hard and soft
science disciplines.

Framing the context: Science in terms of the social
Advancements in science lead slowly to changes in thinking and the collective imaginary;
early twentieth century scientific insights have yet to find their analogues in a cohesive new
worldview, though as Alaimo points out, as do J.K. Gibson-Graham, there are rumblings in the
jungle from ubiquitously dispersed radical environmental and economic movements. Resurgent
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faith movements, climate change denial, political and economic opportunism of environmental
disasters, and creationism evidence that the former, unquestioned social authority of science has
been lost. Is it, perhaps, because the ‘new’ science is contingent, probabalistic, interdisciplinary,
and too complex for confident assurances of simple teleologies? Is it because the W.E.I.R.D.9
mentality of 19th century science still prevails to legitimate imperialistic “benefits from
atrocity”(Dimock, 2012, p. )? Astrophysics professor Adam Frank observes that in current
society, “it is politically effective, and socially acceptable, to deny scientific fact” (2013, p. A27).
Referring to the lack of collective consensus and political action on climate change, Slavoj Žižek
quotes environmental writer Ed Ayres,
We are being confronted by something so completely outside our collective
experience that we don't really see it, even when the evidence is
overwhelming. For us, that 'something' is a blitz of enormous biological and
physical alterations in the world that has been sustaining us (Ayres, 1999, p.
141). ... In order to cope with the threat, our collective ideology is mobilizing
mechanisms of dissimulation and self-deception up to and including the
direct will to ignorance (Žižek, 2012, p. 997): ‘a general pattern of behavior
among threatened human societies is to become more blinkered, rather than
more focused on the crisis, as they fall’ (Ayres). Catastrophic, but not serious
.... (Žižek).

Though academic and science communities retire former ‘truths’ when, as Kuhn,
observed, anomalies aggregate sufficiently to displace previous ‘knowledge’ with new
knowledge, the rate of social change, while directly connected to the scientific, moves
independent of revisions in thinking within scientific communities. Even as ‘reality’ may be
fundamentally changing for some, dominant inertias persist, inside of which different realities and
imaginaries gestate, foment; latent energies find ways to push cracks wider, possibility is actual,
that the implicit may transform into the explicit. Bacterial symbionts bring forth the chimeric
eukaryotic cell (symbiogenesis). Hybrids, like Geosiphon periforme,10 cyborgs, and the
reproducing Mycoplasma mycoides,11 transect biological and technological kingdoms. These gaps
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lacunas, foster both creative tension and opportunity to influence the kind of paradigm shift
inevitably underway. Rationalism’s hard line that had delineated ontological separation between
self and other gets blurry. It turns out that what is Life and what is not Life is not so clear-cut;
making sense, a new and different sense of these animations demands that humans re-think and
re-know life all over again, a project that is as political as it is scientific and technological.
The intellectual legacy of science in the Euclidean-Cartesian-Newtonian-capitalist worldview
functions rhizomatically,12 its reach extends from its origination centuries ago to twenty-first
century subjects. This worldview, explored in greater depth in Chapter 3, dominates early twentyfirst century Western notions of success and power, and consequently, leaves the larger structures
of the neoliberal world bereft of effective means to address the crises it generates. These
structures socialize the populace, who in turn are deprived of tools to avert the certain
catastrophes at which their trajectories orient. Historically, extinction is a relatively recent
concept, it hasn’t sunk in; this controversial revelation is at odds with the still-active 19th century
understanding, as an example, that species are fixed, eternal, and immutable entities of nature. A
worldview so enmeshes its subjects as to render its calamitous normativities invisible and without
hope for escape, this is the Foucaultian disciplinary power of hegemony that a radical science and
politics of collective well-being exposes and destabilizes.

More Pre-Discursive Givens (philosophical ricorsos)
Against this backdrop, and within its context, germinating in relatively obscure niches of
the history of natural science and philosophy, another enmeshed narrative quietly unfolds13.
Going against the reductionist grain of their Cartesian / teleological counterparts, scientific and
philosophical energies surface which are based on process thinking that builds on contingency,
relations, indeterminacy, and sentient experience. This minoritarian narrative, explored in Chapter
4, also constitutes a legacy that the late twentieth century inherits, however nascent and scattered.
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It finds new form in some ideological structures of late 20th century science, philosophies of
science, and feminist critical theory. Accordingly, I pay attention in Chapter 5 to the historicity of
concepts that posthuman / new materialist discourse (they are not synonymous but there is
significant overlap) puts forth, because ideas come from somewhere (e.g., see Chapter 4), and
significantly, the social and intellectual context of a particular scholar or philosopher gets
embedded in the meanings of his (the usual gender) ideas. Periods of history engender particular
affects. When relocated to new theory, the idea’s initial import, as well as the thinking style and
conditions that originally contextualized it, continues to reverberate in the meanings of its new
engagement. The originating philosopher’s mark remains a presence critical to the locus of its
new life (e.g. Hegel in Žižek, Spinoza’s monism in Braidotti’s new materialism), requiring a
scholar’s sensitivity to the former setting and disciplined practice in its re-engagement.

Segue: Defining terms (affect / affective).
The “affective turn” has proliferated a great deal of literature exploring the connection
between affect and politics that cuts across post-structuralist, materialisms, and technology and
media studies thinking, initially re-energized, perhaps, largely by a conversation between Brian
Massumi and Eve Sedgwick in the early 1990s. But times are different now. Inspired by
Francisco Varela’s neurobiological explanation of cognition, I locate affectivity in the autopoietic
flux of the organism.14 I understand thinking and feeling and creating as affective practices. I
reject the Massumi/Sedgwick framing splits between experience and processes of materiality,
between perception and experience, between sensation and sentience, between sentience,
cognition, and consciousness, between affect and emotion. Instead, I engage affectivity in this
project more in the interest of what affect does politically and less about what affect is (Bargetz,
2014, p. 302), although I like Kathleen Stewart’s open-ended understanding of affect as
“individual and collective forces that have gathered to a point of impact to instantiate something”
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(as cited in Bargetz, p. 302). Brigitte Bargetz distinguishes between a “politics of feeling” and
“feeling politics” (italics in original) to “make explicit how power and politics materialize
affectively within subjectivities and everyday practices and, therefore, how they affect political
agency” (Bargetz, 302). Mark Hansen’s material approach to affect effectively, for me, pulls
together my affinities with Varela and Braidotti, that affectivity is “the fundamental mode of
operation of the energetico-material universe in itself” (and of experience in individuated living
entities)… Affectivity, in short, is the relational force of process as such” (Hansen in Timing of
Affect, 86). I pay attention to affect, as one element of materiality by which to reflect on
imaginaries and subjectivities that either impede or potentiate meaningful interventions and
destabilizations to hegemonic practices of neoliberal power.

Ricorso: what my project does (makes claims).
I argue that these perpetuated inflections (monism) in newer theory (new material
feminisms) by its old meanings, associations, and affects risk sustaining the very conventions that
‘posthuman new materialisms’ wish to end, and, rather than lending support, they serve to
undermine important projects. I claim that an open interval directly connects scientific thinking
with subjectivity and operates through the imaginary, both of the subject and the social. I take the
imaginary seriously as that which generates and challenges processes of ethical subjectivity and
power. This space is, therefore, a fiercely contested political site. Discourses in support of what
Hannah Arendt called the ‘love of the world’, however, are not enough to effect fundamental
political change. Visionaries of new theoretical models of ethical subjectivity must also think
strategically, and in terms of tactics and trainings.
How we think and imagine and act on this connection between science as narrative and
subjectivity affects (pun intended) lives and environment, and, therefore, demands ethical
accountability. This feminist critical theory looks at the processes by which subjects are
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“environmentally based, embodied, embedded, and in symbiosis with each other” (Braidotti, 2011,
p. 92) and reflects qualitatively on the politics and poetics of these inter- / intra-actions. I explore
how dynamic, process understandings of science and subjectivity matter in a feminist politics that
aspires to the transformation of planetary productions of inequality and toxicity through ethical
relations of collective card and well-being.

Segue: Defining terms (subjectivity, politics, poetics, and ethical)
Subjectivity is a process of materiality, an epistemological, not ontological, process of the
imaginary. It is a dynamic, constantly becoming embodied relation to, in, by, of, and with worlds,
it references the subject’s experience, actions, narratives, the social imaginary, and discourses that
generate and are generated by the subject, inclusive of worldview, affect, beliefs, and desires. The
subject enacts. Enaction is affective. Rosi Braidotti carries subjectivity further, to mean the
historically contingent “conscious, willful form of political resistance” (2011, 157).
To build a theory of subjectivity specific to my project, I follow Francisco Varela’s lead,
starting with his concept of the autopoietic, enactive entity and of cognition, which is
topologically connected (see Method section of this introduction) to Lynn Margulis’s concept of
symbiogenesis and to quantum notions of consciousness; drawing on Varela, Margulis, and
others, I re-orient a material meaning of ‘self’ (or ‘subject’). I then layer this with J. K. GibsonGraham’s politics of affect. These foundations provide for an enriched understanding and critical
analysis of subjectivity in Braidotti’s critical theory of the posthuman, zoe-nomad. It requires all
the chapters of this paper to construct this palimpsest of subjectivity, to allow the foundational
ideas to be explained, contextualized, and built up. It comes together in the end in Chapter 5.
It is this extensive and politicized feminist sense of an expanding subjectivity that I look
at in conversation with sciences and scientific thinking. I call the reciprocal dynamics between
science and subjectivity, each already independently dynamic on their own terms,
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‘co-(m)motions’, full of contingent, unpredictable, improvisatory movement that generates
pattern and shape.
By politics, I mean the space of tension in the development of ideas and practices that
impact collective life, a space open to deliberation and questioning and struggle in working
through choices, innovations, transformations, practices, and reproductions. Gibson-Graham
write that “politics is a process of transformation instituted by taking decisions in an undecidable
terrain” (2006, p. xviii). Effects of anything that affect others, Life and Earth, as such are,
thereby, political and demanding of ethical accountability, such as knowledge.
By ‘poetics’ I mean structures and points of view. I apply the term to science as a way to look
at it in terms of narrative function and metaphoric devices that provide a way to interpret science
and its history qualitatively. Qualitatively framed, it becomes possible to look at science as
operating in the imaginary and at its discursive strategies. By looking at science as a poetics, it
becomes possible to question and re-narrate scientific thinking, its practices, findings, and effects,
its subjects, its social context, and its scientific objects.
To explain what I mean by the ethical, here I simply follow Gibson-Graham, “ethics is the
continual exercising in the face of the need to decide, of a choice to be/act/think in a certain way.
Ethics involves the embodied practices that bring principles into action” (2006, xxviii). By this
definition, ethics is active; like a verb, it moves, as in its own motion and as in other things. It
does things in a context of relationality, like thinking, feeling, writing, and creating, becoming
with others. In these ways, the ethical is closely tied to affect, with the added action of decision
making in the face of choice for a “certain way”. The ethical, then, in the context of postCartesian process and new materialist thinking emerges, it is brought forth through skilled
practices. The ethical, then, is not a feature of dogma, command, control, or power-over, it is a
feature of possibility.
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The Stakes
If you can fix the broken piece, everything can grow right back.
It didn’t matter that the water was gone.
Sometimes you can break something so bad that it can’t get put back together.
When you’re small, you gotta fix what you can.
Everybody loses the thing they’re made of.
That’s even how it is in nature.
—Hushpuppie

The question of how to enact ethical becoming-in-community gets much attention from
practicing Buddhists Francisco Varela, a scientist, and J.K. Gibson-Graham, feminist economic
geographers. They are theoretically joined by feminist theorists committed to an unknowing that
fosters a collective well-being by relinquishing control and committing to processes of
emergence. Nothing could be less Cartesian, less Kantian. There are many forces that resist these
directions. If cultivation of ethical subjectivities that resist a dominant context of advanced
capitalism’s “blissed-out, techno-sublime euphoria” (Haraway, 2004, p. 324) is serious, then
theory and possibility alone, while constituting a necessary form of activism on their own terms,
are insufficient and lack tools to generate fundamental social change. A counter-hegemonic
politics of possibility necessarily invites and engages struggle; to effect new and particularly
visioned subjectivities requires skills, training, and assessment;15 as a social movement it must
prepare strategically and enact tactics, however unconventional and resourceful these may be.
The initiative must be deeply informed about the thinking behind what it takes on, what it is up
against.
One presenting challenge is the politics of a global response to climate change, for example,
what imaginary does the subject’s attachment to life and extinction get measured against, 3.5
billion years of life on Earth, 600 million years of eukaryotic life, or a few human lifespans? Each
of these possibilities shapes a response to the driving anthropocentric desperation that, perhaps, in
the grand scheme, ‘my life’ may mean nothing? Humans are not so wise –“Next time no big
brains” (McHarg, 2005) – we will not be here forever. From a posthuman Gaian perspective, that
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human life has no more meaning than the life of an amoeba is not necessarily highly threatening
or a source of terror. Living, then, in relation becomes a matter of ethics. I propose that there is
value in mobilizing a deep time perspective to look at narratives of past crisis, change, and
emergence that arrive at current and foreseeable Earth conditions and social relations. The natural
sciences constantly reveal realities-out-there that surprise and exceed our capacity to imagine
(Levin, 2014).

Motion
From the perspective of geologic time, Homo sapiens occupy a momentary blip of time, yet the
change to planetary conditions proceeds at an unprecedented, anthropogenically-induced
exponential rate, too extreme to remain within the set points (or ‘tipping points’) by which life
regulates environmental conditions conducive for life, and too rapidly for co-evolutionary
processes, by which Earth and life systems produced over a span of 3.5 billion years the planet as
we now know it, to adapt. How and why these pieces –Life, Earth, geosphere, biosphere,
noösphere (see Chapter 2)– move potentiates radical forces and energies. In the current quantum
age, both science and subjectivity are in rapid motion. I am interested in how we, as Western
subjects, might choose to embody these transitions. A response to the ‘what next’ question hangs
on affect.
If we accept, as I suggest in this project, that we may now be enmeshed in a transition away
from a fundamental set of dominant paradigms, then we understand that we are living within the
cracks and fissures of an historical transformation; this may be a threatening place of terminal
fear and it may also be a space of creativity, a place of temporal/ spatial gaps from which shadow
stories, new meanings and possibilities come to light.
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What my project does not do.
Outside the scope of this project is an envisioning of what a radical revolution to the
Western imaginary might look like. While the abstractions I outline in this project deserve
translation to strategic practices and tactics, I get as far in this project as to provide a context for
this next phase. I do not make claims as to what might be the skill-set of this new imaginary, or
where such skills and practices that would cultivate or (re)train subject imaginaries might already
be modeled. Nor do I make claims as to how a change from marginalization to substantive power
might come about temporally (saltation, gradualism, catastrophic, etc.), materially (activism,
violence, attrition, collapse, emergence, etc.), or affectively. I make no claims of how a new
subjectivity might perform new social conditions, or be performed by new political practices of
ethical secularity and difference. Transformed social realities are not to be defined in advance,
only might emerge from conducive, fostering conditions.
I hope that issues I identify here may be explicitly interrogated and leveraged in work
that recognizes various praxes that develop skills of a new subjectivity, such as those exemplified
by alternative community economy practices, the young farmer movement, environmental
activisms, and the training of fine and performing artists, that these might become more
effectively and meaningfully interconnected in strategic and skilled movements. Conceivably, an
exploration of this phase of the project could follow later! Accordingly, I stay with the co(m)motions between science and subjectivity as a politics and philosophy with critical effects, to
which feminist scholarship is particularly qualified to advance.
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Methodology
Oil rig ferry driver: Want a chicken biscuit? It’s good for ya’.
I’ve been eating these all my life. I keep the wrappers in the boat
cuz they remind me who I used to be when I eat each one.
The smell makes me feel cohesive.
Hushpuppie: I want to be cohesive.

John Law’s description of the goals for alternative methodologies initiate from his
premise that method is performative, it enacts and produces realities, and so he addresses both
their process and politics:
Other possibilities can be imagined, for instance if we attend to noncoherence” (2004, p. 85). The task is to imagine methods when they no
longer seek the definite, the repeatable, the more or less stable, when they no
longer assume that this is what they are after (p. 6). …We need to unmake
our desire and expectation for security (p. 9) … to find ways of living with
uncertainty…ways of making methods without accompanying imperialisms
(p. 12).
Law romanticizes in theoretical sloppiness, overlooking the performative problems he creates by
dividing method, defined by him as the ‘enaction of boundaries’, from the emergence of ‘realities
of presence, manifest absence, and Otherness’. Ultimately his slippery and imprecise language
cannot support his arguments, and though, in contrast to a premise of my thesis, he separates
relational assemblages from materiality, his objective to foster politically responsible imaginaries
elucidates my goals. In this project I experiment with two separate but, nevertheless, paired
qualitative methods of my own invention, which I engage as a particular approach to re-narration
that, I hope, accommodates movement, unknowing, and uncertainty. I call these two methods
topological and technê.
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Topological
I borrow ‘topological’ from the mathematics discipline, but put it to conceptual use
metaphorically, dictionary defined as:

Figure 3. Definition of topology

While I embrace both meanings metaphorically, the specific reference to patterns of computer
and artificial intelligence networking has no application within my use of the term. To explain
how I engage topology as a methodology in this project, I begin from an elementary description
of its mathematical meaning. In a topological imaginary, if a cube gets pulled askew, it is still a
cube, a sphere that gets dented, twisted, or deformed is still a sphere. A circle is topologically
equivalent to an ellipse, gender differences would be topological equivalences, too. Topological
edges and points, whether in two dimensions or three, potentially, may be flexibly defined,
variously constituted, and multi-functional, depending on the shared features that contextualize an
entity’s structure and relations. Depending on the situation, light behaves either as a wave or a
particle. The bioluminescent endosymbiont Vibrio fischeri mimics moonlight in dark waters to
mask the shadow of the night-feeding bobtail squid, Euprymna scolopes, from shadow-seeking
predators, the same endosymbiont’s luminescence in the fish Monocentris japonicus functions to
attract mates. The bacterium’s systems of quorum sensing (bacterial cognition) allows V. fischeri
to recognize whether it is in the open sea waters, inside the M. japonicas, or inside a light organ
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of the bobtail squid, and its behavior changes accordingly. Topology is always, necessarily about
interrelatedness.

Figure 4. Types of topology.
http://www.esri.com/news/arcnews/summer02articles/summer02gifs/p1p2-lg.gif

A strip of paper with its ends joined with a twist becomes a Mobius strip, two planes
becomes only one continuous surface. But it does have edges. A three dimensional Mobius with
no edges is a Klein bottle, the inside is the outside, a form with no volume. The marketing
brochure of the Acme Klein Bottle Company calls it "the finest closed, non-orientable, boundaryfree manifolds sold anywhere in our three spatial dimensions".16 Not being a mathematician,
following is the description of topology from Wolfram Math World:
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Figure 5. Klein bottle. image credit: Torolf Sauerman, Bathsheba, Satgnu: darkroastedblend.com

Topology has to do with the study of spatial objects such as curves, surfaces,
the space we call our universe, the space-time of general relativity, fractals,
knots, and manifolds (which are objects with some of the same basic spatial
properties as our universe), phase spaces that are encountered in physics. …
Topology can be used to abstract the inherent connectivity of objects while
ignoring their detailed form (Weisstein, 1999-2016).
One of the ways topologies may be built up is from open intervals, the space between a and b that
does not include its end points a and b:

Figure 6. Open interval.
An open interval is an interval that does not include its end points (Weisstein, 1999).

To me this concept is significant in providing a conceptually clear tool for focusing on the gap as
a material potentiating space of change and innovation, of epigenetic sentience and regulation, of
consciousness, of synaptic leaps, of creative enactions liberated from (un-anchored by) node-
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centric thinking.17 It is not Bergson’s or Massumi’s temporal, affective space. I think of the open
interval as a phase space or as Kauffman’s space of the poised realm of the adjacent possible (to
be explained later), and as Vico’s chaos (explained in Chapter 4), and as the empty spaces for
breath and juxtaposition and complexity by which poetry structures and evokes its can’t-be-putinto-words meanings. The open interval is the realm of limitless possibility that pre-exists
actuality. For my methodological interests, then, topology is about the connectivity of qualitative
properties and characteristics across spaces (inclusive of temporalities) and their inter-/intrarelationships.
I engage this topological method by analyzing qualitative traits, both descriptive (e.g.
deterministic, conflicted, iconoclastic, linear, diffractive, patriarchal, minoritarian, conforming to
dominance, unpredictable, etc.) and affective (e.g. melancholic, hopeful, anxious, caring); noting
these, I observe the patterns they form as a sort of connective (or disconnective) tissue across the
organs and fluid systems and skeletal structures of thinking about biosphere, noösphere
(explained in Chapter 2), and geosphere, and across the historicity of living / once-lived / and tobe lived bodies. As a method, topology allows for porosity, layering, a closure that is open (or
v.v.), for paradox and self-dilation, for interaction, for motion.

Technê
My second methodology, technê, the Greek word translated usually as ‘craft’ or ‘art’,
works in tandem with my topological method.18 In this project I engage one specific mode of
technê, weaving, as a process to assemble and pull apart identified topologies in order to create
something new, a life-affirming ethical subjectivity, and/or deconstruct something old, CartesianNewtonian thinking. This methodological weaving, as technê, draws metaphorically from the
literal practice of the craft, the skilled process that makes (poiesis) one fabric from many
disparate threads in science, philosophy, and feminism.
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Technê is the know-how (as opposed to knowledge, in this case the topologies) that
brings into existence products separate from the technê itself, the carpenter builds a table, the
weaver makes a cloth. As a methodological technique technê breaks down the divide between
theory (‘theôria’-looking) and practice, to dismiss from right out of the gate any pretense to
value-free philosophies of knowledge and reality. While my project finds problems with the
teleologies and binaries of hegemonic Western thinking that were seeded by classicism, I find
Aristotle’s sense of technê in the Nichomachean Ethics, the praxis (or action) that deals with
change and everyday contingencies, and Plato’s sense of technê, that which accounts for and
seeks the welfare of its object, to be consonant with a contemporary feminist politics of care and
well-being that places value in what gets brought into existence, whether that be the health of
humans or animals, laws for the ethical governance of a city, or a garden. From technê, something
advantageous to collective well-being emerges. Technê refers to the achievement of a skill that
gets taught and practiced. My engagement of this concept as a feminist methodology by which to
evaluate contemporary contexts and possibilities allows me to identify ethical enaction as an
embodied and skilled form of materiality. I incorporate in my methodological precept of technê
what the Stoics integrated into the concept: technê expresses and generates feelings that lead one
to act, and to be held accountable, and so technê deals with the subject’s affect, described by
Zeno as, for example, the love of music and the arts. Technê is the skill that makes possible
creating and innovation. For Zeno technê represented the “systematic collection of cognitions
unified by practice for some goal advantageous to life” (Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta I, 73).
Plotinus develops Zeno’s affective technê further, similarly found in process thinkers, as the
capacity to enact paradox, the skill of blending contrasting elements of the universe, commonly
practiced, as Plotinus notes, in dance, music, drama, and as I note in Chapter 4, in Vico’s Chaos.
As a topological trait, paradox characterizes Karen Barad’s onto-epistemologies (Chapter 4),19
Francisco Varela’s autopoiesis and ‘ethical know-how’ (Chapters 4 and 5), Rosi Braidotti’s zoe-
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nomadic subjectivity (Chapter 5), and quantum physics. (Newtonian physics works, but the more
accurate quantum physics proves energy and matter to be controvertible.) Transecting the
chapters of this project, I intend the reader to follow such tropes as paradox, monstrosity,
tensions, affect, motion, and bringing forth.20 These form the long threads of material for this
weave, that in its weaving traces ricorsos, layerings and knottings that lengthen, fold back, repeat,
change, and which, along with unravelings, mark new patterns, new fabric in the becoming of
shifting topologies, like Penelope at her weaving and unweaving to stave off the offending,
predatorial interests and effects of a too-long patriarchy.

Motion
The methodological pairing of topology with technê reveals movement and energy,
creative-unchoreographed-emergent-observable motions. If one imagines this dance of rhythms
and events placed on a proscenium stage, observed against a backdrop of chronological moving
images (in reverse) of the historicity of the moment, patterns emerge that inform a task of this
project, the political and ethical radical act that asks, how and why do we come to know, and by
what worldview? How different was the male bourgeois subject of Victorian England (Darwin)
from a Žižek or a techno-savvy American urban millennial? How different was the planet Earth
in 1950 from Earth in 2015? The atom in 1900 was a very different particle from the atom after
the Higgs boson. Genetic determinism as understood in 1960 bears little resemblance to the
understandings after 2000 of the cellular mechanisms of genetic modification by either epigenetic
processes or laboratory synthesis. Tensions between convention and change characterize
transition, and the old adage–the more things change the more they stay the same– shows up.
Craig Venter, credited as the inventor’ of a bacterium with a computer-synthesized genome,
exemplifies neo-Darwinism taken to a digital extreme; frighteningly, he defines Life as “DNA
software-driven machines” (Freeman, 2013). This we know not to be true, life is not a machine,
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but myths retain great power long after their origination. Stuart Kauffman points out we will need
new myths, new narrative resources, new imaginaries.21 Ultimately, transformations of the
imaginary change social and economic conditions, and in another grand ricorso change
subjectivities. These dynamic timespace topologies between context and entity equally pertain to
the micro-political level of the affective subject. Such transitions, though, are not neat or
necessarily permanent.22 As research methodologies, topology and technê may be engaged as
tools in the navigation of the perilous, life-threatening channel between Scylla and Charybdis,23
between environmental and economic cataclysms, between neoliberal utilitarianism and
patrimonies of power.

Picking a course between Scylla and Charybdis
Hushpuppie (in chair next to oil rig ferryman, looking out at the gulf):
Which way we goin’?
Ferryman: It don’t matter, baby.
This boat’ll take you exactly where you need to be.
It’s that kind of boat.

A self-reflexivity that considers How and why do we come to ‘know’ what, and by what
worldview? opens space for ambiguity, flexibility, complexity, and for changes to worldview.
Such curiosity drives the spirit, if not the practice, of scientific, philosophical, and feminist
inquiry. Serious attempts to respond to the question immediately render disciplinary divides
between politics, science, philosophy, feminism, and art moot, and inevitably break with the
norms of institutionalized academic inquiry, for the discursive productions that result can only be
unwieldy and incomplete, and these traits certainly characterize this project. My retort, however,
is that large questions still need to be asked, and the judgmental expectations of academic
convention, which effectively serve to sanction reductionist inquiry, must be resisted, however
partial and incomplete the product. Large questions lead to expansive and interconnected
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discourse, which in a frame of feminist desires gives access to and hope for fundamental change
to normative Western subjectivities.
Much like sending a stone (flat, weighted, edges soft and rounded, slate is best, not larger
than your loosely cupped hand, not too small) jettisoning across a vast liquid plane, a large flat
plane-of-immanence lake just after a hard rain, skipping first in large leaps, progressively smaller,
until it just skims along the surface tension, then appears to float momentarily before it gently
sinks from view, I have had to pick my narrows to manage broad dangers. Because my incentive
is to study the co-(m)motions between science and subjectivity as a matter of political and ethical
significance, even as a process of materiality, I steer clear of psychoanalytic and psychological
dimensions of subjectivity in my analysis. This choice has caused me to steer clear, as much as is
feasible, of post-structural thinkers, because the “linguistic turn” of this ‘school of thought’,
which privileges language over embodiment, draws directly on psychoanalytic theory and on the
metaphysics of representation and the sign, and in so doing reinforces a gendered Cartesian split I
don’t accept, namely between body/substance and mind/thought/form (in word as deed). This
means that I do not take the path of Althusser, Lacan, Freud, Saussure, Butler, Sedgwick, Irigaray
(less post-structural as essentialist), Grosz, and Elizabeth Wilson. And while Vicki Kirby
positions her arguments about the body as framed to enable possibility and to deny such discrete
splits (nature/culture, matter/representation, self/other), her allegiance to a Saussurian poststructuralism leaves her in the awkward position of having to modify metaphors of the body as
inscribed by culture by inverting the claim, presenting an awkward pseudo-biological metaphor
that flesh and matter speak to us (Kirby, 1997). I reference J.K. Gibson-Graham more for their
attentions to the politics of affect in cultivating post-capitalist ethical practices than for their poststructuralist positioning in, for example, performativity. The post-structural privilege given to
verbal text necessitates the wearing of blinders that channel and center its academic gaze on
humans, leaving thinking about the subject and Life as all life entities, as the phrase ‘more-than-
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human’ suggests,24 corporeality, and the non-verbal as remainders relegated to the margins, to the
effect of constraining the imaginary within anthropocentrism; the human, like the sun, centers
others’ orbits. While a full evaluation of human subjectivity could not be complete without an
acknowledgement of the psychoanalytic, many scholars do this work, and I needn’t. Additionally,
I have intentionally steered clear of what is also important work that focuses on the co(m)motions between technology, specifically, and subjectivity, and the related cyborgian,
formalist, and computational questions that go along with this. Luciana Parisi does this well. She
argues based from her sophisticated understanding of computational algorithms to make claims
congruent with what I argue here about uncertainty as a material space of possibility for political
change.25 The stakes for my project concern planetary processes of Life, in its broadest
conceptualization, from bacterium to complex eukaryotes. While technology and Life admittedly
are neither functionally discrete nor autonomous, the field opens a vast forum of investigation
that is also already done well by others, setting it aside allows me to constrain my thematic focus
to matters of Life, which at this point in the history of science and technology, according to the
definition of Life that autopoiesis provides, computers and laboratory syntheses are not.
Another criteria by which I have limited my scope in order to make a point, is that I am
primarily concerned in this project with pursuing questions of Life, materiality, and subjectivity
as framed by the philosophy of science and science, as opposed to by anthropology, sociology,
political philosophy, cultural studies, and contemporary literature. That, too, is well-covered
terrain by the impressive likes of Myra Hird, Butler and Grosz (again), John Protevi, Carey
Wolfe, Claire Colebrook, and Vicki Kirby (who also grounds her work in psychology). This does
not mean that I reject the relevance of the concerns of such disciplines, and I especially embrace
the qualitative emphasis of these modes of inquiry, and I find they importantly contribute to a reconception of what science does, only that a focus on their literatures would hijack and confuse
my look at the generation and assimilation of narratives from the history, philosophy, and
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practices of science. That said, to emphasize the contemporary political relevance of my topic, I
do engage the work of interdisciplinary scholars whose works transect critical, philosophical,
scientific, and feminist scholarship in critiquing capitalism and/or locating affirmative, embodied
and embedded political possibility. After all the filtrations mentioned above, the primary models I
engage come from Giambattista Vico, Charles Darwin, Francisco Varela, Lynn Margulis, Stuart
Kauffman, Suzanne Langer, Karen Barad, and Rosi Braidotti. I also take great fun in using the
Hegelian Slavoj Zizec as my poster child of affective despondency and Waiting for Godot that the
conventions of three hundred years (minimally) of patriarchal capitalist domination produce. By
setting these limiting parameters, my project becomes not as unwieldy as it might at first seem.
Surely I have missed some critical contributors and threads [I still need to incorporate Sara
Ahmed], and simply chosen not to take on others,26 in the way fine silk textiles in India or fine
Turkish rugs might leave sections of its base fabric unadorned, imperfections are expected and
obligatory.

What my project argues.
This’s the most important thing I can teach y’all.
You gotta learn how to take care of people
smaller and sweeter than you are.
—Bathtub teacher

I argue that, having debunked the myths of objectivity, the legitimacy of patriarchal
power, rational individualism, and the divine exceptionalism of the human (a euphemism for the
white European male), we need to reinvent science and discover for the first time secular
thinking. Current planetary conditions mandate that scientific practice come out of its reclusive
refuge in the timelessness of solitary confinement and acknowledge its relationality and
embeddedness in a complex, embodied world. Knowledge, being of, by, about, and in the world,
is inherently political, it has real effects in the world and on others, and so all knowledge
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obligates accountability. The ethical is at the center of, entangled in, knowledge practices. This
premise of feminist epistemologies exposes the thinking of the scholar of German
naturphilosophie looking for a linear deduction that would legitimize feminist theory of
materiality (he used the same argument to object to Barad’s argument for an ethical politics), as
archaic, patronizing, defensive in its offense, and melancholic27 about the obsolescence of
intellectual power structures that had ‘brought him forth’. One of the most salient and to-becelebrated properties of science as a discipline, irrevocably established by Thomas Kuhn, is that
scientific revolutions reflect and generate fundamental changes in worldview and philosophy and
change how worlds get lived. Acknowledging that we may be in the midst of some sort of
transition, a quantum/techno-scientific revolution, contemporary debates about embodiment,
subjectivity, life-itself, and materiality are not idle concerns of the elite, but integrally entangled,
politically prescient practical issues.

Outline of thesis to come
I see that I’m a little piece of a big big universe and that makes things right.
When I die, the scientists of the future, they’re gonna find it all, they’re gonna know.
Once there was a hushpuppy and she lived with her daddy in the bathtub.
—Hushpuppie

I observe stories told by the interaction of science and worldview, which reveal patterns
not only of domination but also of radical possibility for change to Western subjectivity and its
collective imaginary. To contrast the modern tale of Cartesian dichotomies and teleologies, I also
trace patterns that reveal a paradigmatic move in the offing, one that moves toward selforganization and possibility, a shadow story that is rich in political possibilities for gathering a
movement that resists economic hegemonies and environmental utilitarianisms integral to
advanced techno-capitalism. Tracing these stories is useful for making sense of current
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conditions, processes, and hopes, and sheds light on how the historicity of contemporary energies
either inspire or immobilize, depending on which narratives incite what actions.
Chapter 1, Why Žižek Is Miserable and Rosi Is Not, establishes the significance of affect
and intellectual moorings to a subject’s worldview. By contrasting Žižek with Braidotti, I
emphasize the subject’s imaginary as a critical site of political contestation. At issue in the
contrast between these two subjectivities are very different narrations of how imaginaries of life
and materiality interconnect to either foster or foreclose political possibility. At stake are the
human praxes that such opposing subjectivities confer, which make critical differences to a planet
in crisis as inscribed by twin anthropogenic events, ecological and economic.
Chapter 2 What is Earth? looks more closely at these stakes in scientific terms of the
planet as a scientific object of study, as a system of systems that provides the habitus of life-itself.
This chapter responds to the question, What is Earth in the twenty-first century as a scientific
object of new and politicized knowledge practices? as simultaneously a question of science,
subjectivity, the imaginary, and ethics. I connect the systems-thinking by Vladimir Vernadsky
(biosphere, geosphere, noösphere), Lynn Margulis (Gaia, symbiogenesis), and Francisco Varela
(enactive cognition) to the embodied process feminisms of Alaimo’s transcorporeality, Baradian
intra-actions, and Haraway’s beings-as relatings. The intended function of this chapter is to
contextualize the need for an expanded imaginary of the planet, and to deepen an understanding
of the interconnections at play in articulating the stakes of a Western subjectivity incited to
account for a human ethics of life and planet.
Kant asked, what may I hope?, and this question frames the explorations of Chapters 3
through 5. In Chapters 3 and 4, Memory I and II, I look separately at two opposing
scientific/philosophical genealogies of a contemporary Western subjectivity: the organizing
premise of the first is that science narrates subjectivity, the premise of the second is that
subjectivity narrates science. The first, Chapter 3, focuses on the philosophical assumption of
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telos as the expression of a patriarchal and deterministic worldview tied to Cartesian-Newtonian
convention; the second, Chapter Four, uses the trope of Vico’s Chaos to trace an anti-Cartesian
minoritarian thread of process-thinking. These two orientations set the stage for my analysis in
the last chapter of recent feminist (mostly) scholarship on science and subjectivity as mattering
political hopes.
The merger of Enlightenment science with Cartesian rationalism in the 17th century
continues, in my opinion, to narrate the contemporary “genetic social imaginary,” a phrase used
by Sarah Franklin (2000) to describe advanced capitalism and its Western subjects. Chapter 3,
Memory I: The Monster in Our Midst, science narrates subjectivity, looks at the historicity of
what I see as explaining this contemporary immobilization. To make this argument I put Kant and
Darwin in conversation on the topic of telos. I show two things simultaneously. I show that the
dogmatic precepts and qualities of monotheistic church power were merely appropriated by the
men and institutions of so-called secular science, and, secondly, that these constraints imposed a
great weight of social normativity on Kant and Darwin, to different effects. In the end, Kant got
stifled and Darwin broke free, but neither Kant nor Darwin resolved what for them was an a priori
dichotomy of reason and the imaginary. While the dominating charismatic of monotheism
remains a monster in our midst, and largely explains what an alternative politics is up against,
Darwin’s contributions to scientific thinking may be just coming into focus.
Because of the negative effects associated with the subject positions produced by the
Cartesian/ rationalist/ reductionist genealogy of the genetic social imaginary, process thinkers
prior to the late-20th century attract renewed attention. Chapter 4, Memory II: Vico’s Chaos looks
back to a counter-hegemonic memory that contrasts the tale told in Chapter 3. With the
displacement of telos and objectivity by process and engagement, whole new approaches to
science open, other worldviews are made possible, and subjectivity, in the not-always explicit
richness of its social, cultural, political, and gender attachments, narrates scientific inquiry.
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Understanding life-itself, the imaginary, cognition, and experience as embodied processes of
materiality fundamentally affects subjectivity. I negotiate this vast terrain thematically by using
Vico’s science of history, the Ricorso, like Ariadne’s thread to guide a way through crosscurrents
of chaos, myth, the social, and the scientific in an Other twentieth century subjectivity.
Chapter 5, Desire: The Queer Co-(m)motions of Science and Subjectivity, puts into
conversation new work in theoretical and evolution science and feminist theories of matter and
subjectivity. These are not distinct one from the other. The theoretical constructions of new
materialist feminisms articulate new understandings of matter and politicized visions of
subjectivity, drawn from Memory (the contrasted thinking styles, telos and process, presented in
the previous two chapters) and from more recent scientific and technological developments, in
imagining the bringing forth of an Other and ethical world / planet. After introducing new
thinking in science, I look at how the works of scientists and theorists Varela and Barad illustrate
a very different paradigm in which scientific understandings of ‘natureculture’ inextricably
entangle the social and the subject. Rosi Braidotti explores from her perspective as a critical
theorist the political implications and possibilities of this radical change to the imaginary through
a focus on her theory of nomadic subjectivity. I review and critique Braidotti’s work in light of
her aspirations for new materialist feminisms as a political project of transformation within
academia and for subjectivity in an era of advanced techno-capitalism.

42

Notes
1 Hushpuppie, a character in the film Beasts of the Southern Wild. Each epigraph in the
Introduction has been taken from this film.
2 This exchange bears striking resemblance to Lynn Margulis’ response to Richard
Dawkins: Dawkins: “[The standard story for (the evolution of) ordinary animals (by selection
pressures)] is highly plausible, it's economical, it's parsimonious, why on earth would you want to
drag in symbiogenesis when it's such an unparsimonious, uneconomical-?” [35:01]
Margulis, “Because it’s there.”
3 Varela was extremely conscious of the political dangers of this in leading to eugenics,
war, and fascism. He analyzed the Chilean civil war as a “wrong epistemology” (recording,
1978).
4 Varela does not love the word emergence, saying we need a new one. He prefers
bringing forth, as a whole that leaves behind no parts.
5 Lynn Margulis reminds that Homo sapiens are irrelevant and superfluous to Gaian
function.
6 My surprise neologism, I kind of like it so I did not delete it. Subsequently, I’ve
discovered the neologism has been coined by the likes of Heidegger, Spivak, and many others.
7 Goldman lectures, Science, Technology, and Social Progress, 1989.
8 This statement is an adaption of sociologist and STS scholar John Law’s After Method:
Mess in Social Science Research (Routledge, NY 2004).
9 White European Intellectual Rationalist Democratic
10 A fungus (a eukaryote with intracellular motility) latches on to a cyanobacterium,
Nostoc. They merge; the fungus engulfs the Nostoc. This parasexual fusion produces a little green
bladder organism.
11 This is a bacterium generated by transplanting a computer synthesized laboratory
genome into, and replacing the genome, in an existing living cell. Craig Venter gets the credit for
this accomplishment in the field of ‘synthetic genomics’, his reward being a $300 million deal
with EXXON for research and design of an algae that produces diesel fuel. Industrial techno-lifecapitalism at its finest.
12 Rhizomatic growth is a mechanism of cell motility. It potentiates indeterminate
growth of a genetic monoculture, it is not a mechanism of reproduction. It is a common motility
mechanism of invasive species, such as in phragmites and Japanese knotweed in the Northeast of
the USA.
13 from the Greek, evolve
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14 This is also quite Whiteheadian.
15 The military and religions have long understood and modeled the effectiveness of
skills training.
16 Read more at http://www.darkroastedblend.com/2013/05/topological-marvel-kleinbottle-in-art.html#Tm2smR5IQRVaZKrE.99.
17 Node-centric thinking characterizes both the agencies of an actor in terms of what
I consider to be the limiting but very popular actor-network theory, and ‘ontologies’ of the
performative subject in Gibson-Graham’s post-capitalist politics that is at odds with their
visions for cultivating stances that produce embodied “new affective relations with the world”
(2006, p. 7).
18 I am indebted to Mary Ingle for this insight into technê as weaving, and to Steven
Smith for his reminder that without technê, there is no poiesis. The following is informed by:
Parry, Richard, "Episteme and Technê", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/episteme-technê/>.
19 Varela anticipated Barad in this concept, but she coined and popularized the term.
20 Bringing forth, less accurately referred to as emergence, is a post-Cartesian theme
underscored by Varela through neurobiological research, by Karen Barad in quantum field theory,
and in the zoe-nomadic subjectivity of Rosi Braidotti’s critical theory.
21 Given my objection to the lack of secular thinking in the sciences, explored in
Chapter 3, I feel Kauffman goes too far in calling for a reinvention of the sacred.
22 Pernicious books that argue for genetic explanations for racial behavior, Western
exceptionalism, and Caucasian supremacy still find mass-market publication, such as A
Troublesome Inheritance, Genes, Race and Human History, 2015. Perhaps equally horrific is that
its 19th-century-style British author, Nicholas Wade, was recently a long-term science writer for
two powerful publications journal Science and The New York Times, reflecting the newspaper
corporation’s five generations of 19th century style dynastic control by the Sulzberger family.
23 Perhaps the metaphor reaches too far or, perhaps, about right. Ulysses’ crossing
suffered great losses, the ship destroyed, but a few survivors, clinging to a raft, made it through
alive.
24 The phrase itself— more-than-human—is case in point.
25 I wonder whether the “blissed out techno-euphoria” of contemporary quotidian
computing is explained, in part, as a holdover of [reassuringly familiar] deterministic, linear
teleologies that buffer the disorienting nature of actuality that new insights in physics and biology
narrate.
26 I talk about ethics, but leave off at the gate of power, again because its discussion
would swell this body of themes beyond what could be managed. Discourses of power are
significant to subjectivity dynamics, and extensively covered in the larger literature.
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27 Walter Benjamin describes ‘left melancholia’ as “attachment to a past political
analysis or identity that is stronger than the interest in present possibilities for mobilization,
alliance, or transformation” (Brown 1999, p. 20). As opposed to mourning, which frees a subject
to move on, melancholia is stuck and isolated (Gibson-Graham, 2006).
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CHAPTER 1
WHY ŽIŽEK IS MISERABLE AND ROSI IS NOT

How different worldviews manifest different and particular affects in its subjects may be
shown by contrasting the subjectivities of two critical theorists of advanced capitalism, Slavoj
Žižek and Rosi Braidotti. The witings of the former, Žižek, are framed by the legacies of
patriarchal privilege that follow an education in Western philosophy (e.g. Less Than Nothing,
Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism); the latter, Braidotti, is allied with a radical
feminism built on Continental process philosophy (Bergson, Deleuze & Guattari). Exemplifying
feminist claims regarding the affective productions of advanced capitalism, Žižek is melancholic
(Gibson-Graham, 2006) while Braidotti remains affirmative and hopeful. At issue in this contrast
are, respectively, their very different narrations of how life and materiality interconnect in the
social imaginary either to foster or to deny political possibility. The juxtaposition of the different
affects in Žižek and Braidotti illustrates the imaginary, both the subject’s and the collective social
imaginary, as a contested site of political struggle; where Žižek identifies dialectical conflict,
Braidotti identifies engagement and paradox. At stake in their opposing stances is nothing less
than an ethics of human praxis as Earth encounters current twin anthropogenic crises, ecological
and economic.
In making my case I figuratively engage two representations, one of Žižek as the most
intelligent of dinosaurs, the Dromaeosauridae, whose fossil remains are found in Slovenia
(Žižek’s home country), and the other of an Australian (Rosi Braidotti’s home country) lichen,
the Baeomyces heteromorphus. Putting Žižek, as extinct dinosaur, and Braidotti, as lichen, in
contrasting relief depicts the clash of intellectual cultures these two critical theorists represent. I
make the point here that an embodied worldview that embeds transformation and emergence
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produces a fundamentally different subjectivity and affect than that schooled to the linear binaries
and taxonomy-driven traditions of Cartesian thought. Both Braidotti’s and Žižek share a desire to
reform or end unfettered neoliberal capitalism by tilting theory towards radical contingency and
emergence. Unlike Žižek, Braidotti’s project is not centrally one of philosophy; Braidotti engages
theory to support her centrally ethical project, which is one of political activism and feminism.
The ‘cartographic’ method Braidotti engages to define her ethical subject is far removed from the
oppositional methods of Žižek’s Hegelian-inspired dialectical thinking. Hers “is a map that draws
the trajectory of changes, transformation, and becomings … for these are strange times, and
strange things are happening” (2012b, p. 22).
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Philosophers’ Affect
Žižek is miserable.

Figure 7. Dromaeosauridae, a Slovenian dinosaur. Illustration by Michael Skrepnik (2005)

The dromaeosauridae ((meaning "swift lizards") were small (wolf-sized) to large (up to 30 feet long!) theropods which
had specialized features such as a well-developed slashing talon on their second pedal phalanx (toe), a stiffened tail
which possibly functioned as a dynamic stabilizer, and large grasping manus (hands). They were well-equipped with
claws, muscular toothy jaws, and agile bodies. These dromaeosaurs have been assumed to have been active, fierce
predators …Truly an example of evolution producing a killing machine (jrh & Smith, 2006). They were the most
intelligent group of dinosaurs (Dinosaurs and Paleontology Dictionary, 2005-2016). Fossil remains have been found in
southwest Slovenia (Debeljak, Kosir, Buffetaut, & Otonicar, 2002).
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Rosi is not.
Lichens are formed from a combination of a fungal partner (mycobiont) and an algal partner
(phycobiont) growing in symbiotic association on a solid surface (as a tree or rock).

baeo – small
hetero– a combining form meaning “different,” “other” (dictionary.com,
2002);
origin: combining form of Greek héteros: the other of two, other, different
morph– 1.Biology. an individual of one particular form, as a worker ant,
in a species that occurs in two or more forms. 2. to be transformed
(dictionary.com, 2016)

Figure 8. Baeomyces heteromorphus, an Australian lichen. Photographer: Heino Lepp
green thallus and apothecia atop 2-3 millimetre long stem (2011)
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thallus: a plant or plantlike body (as of an alga, fungus, or moss) that lacks
differentiation into distinct members (as stem, leaves, and roots) and does
not grow from an apical point (Merriam-Webster Science Dictionary, 2016).
apothecium: a fungal reproductive structure, in which the fungus reproduces
itself through the production of spores. These spores will disperse and
germinate into new fungi, but they will not produce new lichens. For a lichen
to reproduce, the fungus and alga disperse together (Regents of University of
California, 2016).
A lichen may absorb certain mineral nutrients from any of these substrates on which it
grows, but is generally self-reliant in feeding itself through photosynthesis in the algal cells.
Lichens growing on rocks, though, may release chemicals which speed the degradation of the
rock into soil, and thus promote production of new soils. Lichens are hardy creatures able to
survive in scorching deserts and frosty tundra. Their secrets of success are not well understood
however. Two key features suggested as having important roles are (1) their ability to survive
drying and (2) their complex chemistry.
Lichens manufacture a host of chemicals that presumably serve to reduce attacks by
predators. The most serious threat to the continued health of lichens is not predation, but the
increased pollution of this century (Lepp, 2011).
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Žižek and Rosi

My intention in engaging Slavoj Žižek, my favorite and entertaining provocateur of
theory, to initiate my project is not so much to critique or reject his work, nor to set him up as a
straw-man, but to illustrate the impossibility that a theory of transformative radical politics might
emerge from a subjectivity (e.g. Žižek’s Hegelian) that has been trained and disciplined, in the
Foucaultian sense, to Newtonian/Cartesian thinking conventions. Such logics of transcendent
causality, as I will show, engender not hope, but a fatalism that incapacitates action, aptly
described by Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson as “Cartesian anxiety” and ambivalence
(1992, 140). Žižek’s political affect as expressed in Less Than Nothing and in his 2013 article
Trouble in Paradise reveals him to be an exemplary victim of his own backfired education. Rosi
Braidotti's project, too, is overtly political. Her intent for her project is that it be seen not only as
“the creation of new ways of thinking” (2011a, p. 63) but also as a form of “ethical and political
practice of subjectivity suited to the task of actualizing qualitative dissonances to late-capitalism”
(2011b, pp. 20-21). In response to the treacheries of late-capitalism, both Žižek and Braidotti seek
a way out. To get there, Braidotti focuses on practices of subjectivity, while Žižek focuses on the
task of global structural transformation which, I claim, cannot both find form and simultaneously
sustain the logics of the Western worldview of, loosely, the last three hundred or so years. I do
not presume to say that Rosi’s vision, which eschews conventions of a Western worldview, stands
a more likely chance of success in transforming capitalism. Žižek’s reasoning, however, provides
a portraiture of radically-intentioned political impossibility, which I show in Chapter Three to be
a trope of modern Western patriarchy. Braidotti, on the other hand, locates political possibility
and hope by drawing from a different philosophical genealogy grounded in process thinking, as
well as in recent feminist critical theory, with a dash of science thrown in. Their respective
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worldviews fundamentally condition their subjectivities differently. As a result, Žižek gets stuck
in misery, while Rosi emerges hopeful.

Trouble in Paradise

In his article Trouble in Paradise published in the London Review of Books (July 18,
2013), Slavoj Žižek is up to his old quagmired tricks. The politically brilliant Slovenian
intellectual revolutionary, whose own Marxist politics position him in opposition to global
capitalism, commenting on the phenomena of promising but failed global protests between 20122013, abandons the sympathetic reader to wait for Godot in that timeless purgatory of No Way
Out. The reader is not alone, Žižek is there in Purgatory, too, abandoned and companioned.
None of the 2010-2012 protests in Greece, Turkey, Brazil, Europe, and the Middle East, nor the
Occupy Movement, he states, can be reduced to the pursuit of a single issue; rather they reflect a
“fluid feeling of unease and discontent that sustains and unites various specific demands” (2013,
p. 11). Collectively, they react against global capitalism as a system, which inherently produces
the excesses that its ideologies, cannot contain structurally. For Žižek, the “hegemonic ideology
of today” (Žižek, 2011, p. 408) is materialism. He supports that these protests resist the capitalist
marketplace where value gets located. But this is where Žižek gets tangled up. On the one hand,
he recognizes this kind of ‘materiality’ as the translation of universality and necessity to the
“monstrous mixture of living subjectivity and dead automatism” that produces capital, a subject
of alienated substance (2011, p. 222). At the same time, in his closer investigation of materiality,
he merges that of Karen Barad’s quantum field theory with his psychoanalytic attachment to the
vulgarity of the Lacanian Void of Reality (2011). This corroboration produces, for Žižek, a
conception of matter that conjoins Lacan’s conception of the death drive of impossibility as the
“immortal compulsion-to-repeat” (2011, p. 409) with “the much-decried ‘dissolution of matter in
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a field of energies’ in modern physics” [that] a true materialist should fully embrace” (p. 407).
Non-reductionist matter opens up to immaterial phenomena, “a specific positive non-being (p.
407)…material reality is non-all, not ‘material reality is all there is’ is the true formula of
materialism” (p. 408, ital. in the original). What Žižek’s blending of a Barad-ian ‘non-all’
materiality with a Lacanian “ultimate Void of Reality” produces for Žižek, is an Hegelian
dialectic, an ontologically incomplete paradox characterized by the death-drive of impossibility.
In his efforts to resolve this death-driven material Void with his political desire to thwart
neoliberal capitalism within a frame of Hegelian immortality and universality, Žižek can only
arrive at unsatisfying conflict.
This philosophical background helps to explain the affective stance Žižek brings to his
analysis of the globally distributed local resistances to the capitalist order of the 2010-2013
protests. What in the hands of economic geographers J.K. Gibson-Graham provides the grounds
for possibility and hope of a post-capitalist politics of the subject, falls into the domain of
impossibility and defeatism in the hands of a Žižek.
He strategically identifies cracks in the system where resistance might incubate…
To demand consistency at strategically selected points where the system
cannot afford to be consistent is to put pressure on the entire system. The art
of politics lies in making particular demands which, while thoroughly
realistic, strike at the core of hegemonic ideology and imply much more
radical change. … (2013, para. 9). This may mean coming to see that
democracy can itself be a form of un-freedom, or that we must demand more
than merely political democracy: social and economic life must be
democratised too (para. 13).

but that subjects cannot overcome their own identification with ideology, described as….
…the misapprehension of the condition of possibility … as the condition of
impossibility– the ideological subject is unable to grasp how his entire
identity hinges on what he perceives as the disturbing obstacle… the
immanent antagonism which generates the dynamic of the social system’s
instability (2011, p. 208).
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and yet Žižek radically states (in what might be good advice to new materialists), …
…after a true historical break, one simply cannot return to the past, one
cannot go on as if nothing happened – if one does it, the same practice
acquires a radically changed meaning (2011, p. 202).
He does imagine a way out for Greek and Turkish protesters,…
Leave behind the two countries’ historical enmity and seek grounds for
solidarity. The future of the protests [Žižek’s desire] may depend on it.
(2013, p. 12).
… but despite this radical imaginary that initiates the political movement, Žižek explains why this
will never come about:
Such demands, while feasible and legitimate, are de facto impossible.
…Humanity poses itself tasks it cannot solve, and thereby triggers an
unpredictable process in the course of which the task itself is redefined …
This realization—that failure may be inherent in the principle we’re fighting
for — is a big step in political education (2013, p. 12).

Žižek may desire political and social/economic democracy, but he is unable to lend hope to its
possibility. Why does Žižek back off from auspiciousness into resignation?
In Žižek, desire and memory uncomfortably comingle to produce an affective futility.
Taken out of his Hegelian context, Žižek might be misread as supporting the same political hopes
for transformative radical subjectivity as found, for example, in the affirmative posthumanism of
Rosi Braidotti. Each look to radical contingency, which Žižek locates in Lacan and Braidotti in
Deleuze, and emergence as the material framework within which to reform or end the ravages on
collective well-being of neoliberal capitalism writ large. For example, Žižek grounds hope for a
transformative politics as analogous to Stephen Jay Gould’s post-neo-Darwinian punctualism;
Žižek states “eminently ‘historical’ moments are those of great collisions when a whole form of
life is threatened, when the reference to the established social and cultural norms no longer
guarantees the minimum of stability and cohesion; in such open situations, a new form of life has
to be invented” (2011, p. 211). In the same interview, ironically reflecting his tendency to get
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stuck amidst irreconcilable tension, Žižek also references the science he misinterprets, evolution
as gradualism, not realizing that the theories of gradualism and punctualism are at odds
scientifically. In another reference to science, specifically quantum field theory, Žižek adopts a
non-reductionist philosophy of ‘non-all’ matter, and, in good Margulisian spirit, he spoofs the
hierarchical assumptions that humans engage to rationalize their own break from the animal
domain. In spite of these sympathies with feminist discourses, Žižek’s entrenchment in HegelianLacanian ideology prevents the theoretical realization of the radical theory of his desires, unlike
for example, Braidotti and feminist economic geographers Gibson-Graham. Where their
responses look to the affectively affirmative and to diverse, distributed micro-political practices,
Žižek asserted in an interview with Julian Assange that a strong, centralized, superpower wards
off the dangers of a Deleuzian multi-centered world (2012). He locates desire as externalized in
the marketplace, identified by Lebrun as the object of consumption that “contains the desire of an
other” (as cited in Žižek, 2011, p. 209). Žižek thus skirts the edge of transformation, and as much
as he would like, he just can’t bring himself to jump. Žižek’s political thought remains mired in
traditional categories rather than finding the radical space that opens by challenging the
categories themselves. Reluctantly he steps back form the edge, committed to the memories of
dialectical determinism and preformed necessity. He states that “classical change no longer
works” in today’s late-capitalist world (2012, p. 1010), but in Hegel’s words, “things become
what they are” (2012, p. 212); echoing Pythagorean and Aristotelian preformationism, Žižek
extends Hegel’s statement, “nothing emerges that was not already there” (2012, p. 220). The
Hegelian dialectic, in Žižek’s self-ascribed unconventional reading, fails to free him from, at best,
his own affective paralysis and, at worst, his commitment to the futility of action.
In his political analysis of the 2010-13 protests as necessary but ultimately abject, Žižek
(unconsciously?) voices the personal and political defeatism that his own ideological constraints
prove, and which conclusively lead to his view that war is necessary, and that:
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…every social reconciliation is doomed to fail, that no organic social order
can effectively contain the force of abstract-universal negativity. This is why
social life is condemned to the ‘spurious infinity’ of the eternal oscillation
between stable civic life and wartime perturbations (2011, 223).
Žižek’s own negativity and passivity careens not towards novel and innovative democracies, but
towards self- and other- annihilation. It is no wonder that Žižek despondently concludes his
recent tome, Less Than Nothing, with a nod to the history of all radical-egalitarian rebellions as
lost causes, and a quote from G. K. Chesterton’s What’s Wrong with the World, “the lost causes
are exactly those that might have saved the world” (p. 1010).
In a virtual self-mockery, Žižek claims that the “‘great underlying problem’ is how might
subjectivity fit into reality. We need a theory of the subject which is neither that of transcendental
subjectivity nor that of reducing the subject to a part of objective reality” (2011, p. 415). The prediscursive framing of the subject within the Lacanian Void of Reality constitutes the conflicted
imaginary of Žižek’s political and historical subjectivity, such that there can be no possibility.
“Know[ing] that his thought already is the form of reality, so it can renounce enforcing its project
on reality, it can let reality be the way it is” (2011, p. 209). Žižek can’t help but equate the “very
core of modern subjectivity” to his own positionality, an entitlement ordained by a white
European male educational legacy, a dominating hubris he coyly structures as the hero’s
heterosexual conquest between the “drink before” and the “cigarette after.”1 This androcentric
and cultural context also serves to frustrate and obstruct Žižek’s capacity for hope. His
subjectivity of impossibility is the emergent property of a historicity that privileges dialectics
over embodied becoming, of knowledge as certainty over affect and uncertainty. Žižek embodies
this Cartesian legacy, which finds one form in his particular worldview that sees as universal and
necessary the equating of the reproduction of life to the death-drive’s compulsion-to-repeat.
Žižek’s representation of Hegel describes himself, ‘contradiction’ is the core of ‘pure’ [self-]
identity (2012, 411). For Žižek, the “highest contradiction” is Being/Nothing, which gets resolved
by “Becoming, into oscillation between the two poles” (2011, p. 411), and by “the becoming (the
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gradual contingent emergence) of necessity itself” (2011, p. 217, ital. in original). Žižek
begrudgingly abandons himself to a purgatory of conflict and necessary misery.
This is in dramatic contrast to Braidotti, who emerges within the continental tradition of
Bergsonian/Deleuzian philosophy, and for whom Becoming dissolves fixed forms in an
affirmation of possibility. Deleuze bluntly states, “what I most detested was Hegelianism and
dialectics” (1995, p. 6). It is against the “gloomy and pessimistic” energy devoted to Thanatos2
and the technological propulsions of bio-power that Braidotti’s affirmative vitality of life rebels
(2006, p. 39). She rebels against the dialectic that “myopically” positions what we call life at “the
liminal state of non-life”, “the horizon of death”, and the “never-dead” … death is over-rated” (p.
40). Braidotti envisions subjectivities that reject dualisms and displace capitalist norms.
I take the posthuman predicament as an opportunity to empower the pursuit
of alternative schemes of thought, knowledge, and self-representation. The
posthuman condition urges us to think critically and creatively about who
and what we are actually in the process of becoming (2013, p. 12).
Braidotti means to extract linear, deterministic models from her understanding of life, being, and
change, reconceived, instead, as ‘forces’ of emergence, or processes of becoming. Where Žižek is
marooned in impossibility, Braidotti locates possibility.
Her vision of the subject as embodied, embedded, and non-unitary develops Deleuze’s
nomadic theory.3 The non-unitary subject renders the category of the “other” irrelevant, because
the subject is “a moving horizon of exchanges and becoming, towards which the non-unitary
subjects of postmodernity move, and by which they are moved in return” (2011, p. 246).
“Nomadic theory’s main contribution to this debate rests on the concepts of radical immanence
and nondeterministic vitalism, which unfold onto an affirmative ethics of bioegalitarianism”
(2012, p. 331). Here Braidotti ascribes to and derives from a non-centric, non-hierarchical view of
biological life an ethics that practices engagement, rather than confrontation. Vitalism, as ‘lifeforce’ displaces melancholia. Braidotti’s subject is a situated 'transformer' of complex affects,
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non-linear temporalities, memories, and flows of desires and imaginings. I show in Chapter five
that feminist thinkers, perhaps precisely because of their long-if-quiet objections to the social
structures of their exclusions and oppressions, have gained a better purchase from which to break
free of the deterministic confines of Western thought than is available, for example, to a Žižek.
Setting Braidotti as lichen and Žižek as dinosaur side-by-side, Braidotti attributes Žižek’s
negativity to his having given up on intellectual theory as socially productive, instead opting for
“violent antagonism if necessary” (2013, p. 5). Both theorists do, however, remain stalwart, if
reluctant, in desiring activism; if Žižek is the theorist of lost-causes, Braidotti pins her hopes for
economic and environmental change on feminist theories of desire and materiality. The tone
pervading each registers impatience, frustration, and urgency. Žižek, mourning a past
“desperately attached to the conditions of [his] own impotence” (2013, p. 189) responds with
intellectual defeatism; Braidotti responds with an insistence on the affirmative as a catalytic
strategy to mobilize change. In doing so, Braidotti foregrounds subjectivity.
The lesson to be reminded in reading Žižek in this way, though, is that, to some degree,
he is us too, us being any progressively thinking, radically inclined Western subject. By
happenstance of our 20th century births, you my reader, Žižek, Rosi, and myself are enmeshed in
a web of relations necessarily defined in large part by the hegemonic ideologies of growth and
profit that drive unfettered Western capitalist aspirations. We are similarly situated. We steep in
the same historicity of a dominant narration of the world in which we live. Keeping that in mind,
we more personally attend to how Žižek’s affect models the ‘melancholia’ ascribed by J.K.
Gibson-Graham (2006, p. 4) and by Rosi Braidotti (2012) to the ruling ideology of a dominant
capitalism. We see Žižek’s emphatic but defeatist political philosophy modeled in Braidotti’s
characterization of advanced capitalism as ‘schizophrenic’. Here she echoes Deleuze’s User’s
Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia to seed her affective analysis of neoliberalism as
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conditioning psychiatric dysfunction, which within the context of a sociopathic society gets made
legitimate – even inevitable.
Žižek acknowledges that he is at a loss, painted into his own despondent corner. Though
he would like to make a break with the confines of his own subjectivity, he can’t because he is it,
an out-of-reach a priori of loss and melancholy. What Žižek embodies is indeed on the brink of
collapse, disintegration or extinction. Rosi is not Žižek, a lichen is not a dinosaur. Misery is not a
necessary a priori condition. There are choices, ways of becoming un-knowing. Lichens are
perfectly cast for the job.
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Notes
1 The structure of Žižek’s work, Less Than Nothing, begins with a section entitled The
Drink Before, and ends with a section entitled The Cigarette After. These serve as bookends on
two sections entitled The Thing Itself.
2 In the ancient Greek, Thanatos is the personification of death.
3 Nomadic subjectivity is a "pursuit of practices of hope, rooted in the micro-practices of
everyday life, as a simple strategy to hold, sustain and map out sustainable transformations"
(Braidotti, 2012, p. 24).
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CHAPTER 2
WHAT IS EARTH?

(as a scientific object)

Figure 9. Surface of the Earth during the Hadean eon.
An artist’s illustration of the Earth of 4.5-4 billion years ago (Trappman, 1994)

BIG questions must be asked over and over. What is Life? What is Earth? What is Mind?
The conventions of modern Western thought have scribed these as discrete ontological categories.
However, prior to the establishment of those conventions, things were not so clear-cut. Ironically,
at the cusp of the 21st century, hard science itself reclaims –and points forward to –blurry post61

categorical space. Reductionism itself now mandates a holistic approach to the big “What Is”
questions. So to ask in the early twenty-first century, “What is Earth?” also necessarily asks
“What is Earth-Life-Mind” as a scientific object?. In doing this, I take as my premise Vladimir
Vernadsky and Lynn Margulis’s argument that the geosphere, life, and the noösphere (the sphere
of the mind) are functionally indistinguishable, even if these categories discursively help to make
provisional sense of a world fundamentally in transition.

What Is a Scientific Object?

Figure 10. Conceptions of Earth.
clockwise from top left: flat Earth (http://s158.photobucket.com); the geocentric universe (A.H., 1996);
ediacaran fauna 600-545mya (http://sciencesoup.tumblr.com/, 2013);
deep sea hydrothermal vents (livescience.com, 2012);
Earth and its satellites (European Space Agency, NASA, 2013)
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Let me clarify why I approach the question of “Earth” as a “scientific object.”
At the start of the third millennium, science as an academic discipline, is no longer bound within
its prior Cartesian / Laplacean comfort zones. As an epistemological social practice, we now
understand science to be historically and culturally situated–necessarily partial, conjectural, and
fallible (refs). This concensus of the later twentieth century compounds the early twentieth
century challenge from quantum field theories of energy and light to the intelligibility of how
science corresponds to reality. As energy and matter have come to be understood in radically new
ways, the determinist ‘God’s eye view’ of an ‘objective’ science, as a discipline, gets questioned
and starts to shift. Twentieth century physicists reveal a nature that is neither causally predictable
nor necessarily continuous, but discrete. Physicist Niels Bohr argued that science redefines
‘Reality’, not as “an observation-independent object, but [as] a phenomenon” (Barad, 1998, p. 94)
in which we are embroiled.1 Classical science—based in material determinism—gives way to a
science of experience, which sees matter as emergent from processes of uncertainty, probability,
relationality, and self-organization. What remains unresolved in the practice of science, according
to Science and Technology Studies scholar Steven Goldman, are the different conceptions of the
criteria for the intelligibility of experience. In effect, these challenges to the intelligibility of
science claims amounts to an attack not only on traditional science, but on Western rationality
itself, and thus, as several critical feminist science scholars have established, on the master
epistemologies of ontological certainty.
Against this backdrop, a ‘scientific object’, such as the Sun, or atoms, or black holes, ceases to
be a fixed entity but, rather, exists as an object of knowledge whose terms change with each
iterative narration. In the 1400s, for example, the Earth was known to be the center of the
universe; in the 19th century the Earth was known to be between 20 and 400 million years old, in
the early 20th century, Earth’s continents were known to be fixed in place, and in late twentieth
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century theory J. Marvin Herndon hypothesizes a nuclear fission georeactor at Earth’s core, a
theory that meets ridicule in the geosciences establishment. So it is in this shifting of the light that
I ask: What story of Earth is 21st century science telling? Of course, there is more than one.
British literary/cultural theorist Timothy Clark in his paper What on World is Earth?: The
Anthropocene and Fictions of the World (2013) challenges and questions the intelligibility of
planet Earth as a ‘whole’. The 1968 Apollo photographs of Earth– that lone blue dot floating
without mooring in that vast darkness of a cold universe– functions for humanists as the ‘one
world’ emblem of the Anthropocene. The image, according to Clark, challenges the capacity of
both human knowing and the human imaginary. Each, he writes, is necessarily inescapably
constrained to anthropocentric terrestriality, which sets the scalar limit of ‘conceptual
articulation’ (p. 11) to inside the geographic ‘finitude of the biosphere’ that we “cannot genuinely
perceive from elsewhere” (p. 15). His perspective on Western knowing, then, situates an
essentialist context that cannot be either transgressed, transcended, or transformed; it pegs how
humans experience the ‘world’, in a conflation with ‘planet Earth’ to the narrow temporal frame
of one modern human’s life expectancy. That these limits are part and parcel of what Derrida
calls the necessary ‘fiction of the world’ – “the condition of meaningful life and
communication…arising from ‘the irremediable solitude without salvation of the living being”
(as cited in Clark, p. 19)– prompts what Clark astutely identifies as the anti-Copernican stance of
the humanist tradition. This newly revealed Earth, in philosophy scholar David Wood’s
description tends “towards certain forms of self-organization and boundary formation over aeons
of evolutionary time, a complex causality unlike that of caricaturing naturalism (linear, fully
determinate, and with certain automatism)” (as cited in Clark, p. 10). The Anthropocene, then,
performs the humanist’s taboo in exposing Earth, the taken-for-granted planet that suddenly
intellectually astonishes and frightens, as contingent. It also exposes humanism’s fictions, and in
so doing, makes a mockery of its acolytes.2

64

The obvious question arising here is who does Clark think is being astonished and why
does he read this as the ‘anti-Copernican’ surprise to Western normativity? Certainly not the
subject of, say, Donna Haraway’s late twentieth century vision, who seeks new and
‘blasphemous’ narratives that dismantle the binaries and totalizations that maintain systemic
practices of domination (1991). Clark dismisses meaning-giving micro-political ‘localisms’ as the
superficial construction of human possibility that is delusory, even a form of denial (2013, p. 12).
Clark’s response to the Apollo-inspired ‘whole Earth’ that prompts his demarcation of what lies
beyond the outer limits of the human imaginary and, thus, beyond its access, perfectly conforms
to the structuring default parameters of ‘unity’ that Haraway observes being faithfully maintained
by the “offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism" (1991, p. 151). Is it, as Yaakov
Jerome Garb states “a fantasy that we can somehow contain the Earth within our imagination” (as
cited in Clark, p. 15)? Is that fantasy, as Clark seems to suggest, part of Derrida’s fiction of the
world? I ask, rather, do we even need or want to imagine a contained, whole Earth in order to
change how we live in/on/with it? As a trope, the Apollo images, as Clark explains, represent the
humanist ‘un-prethinkables’; he tries to push back against them, but in my opinion does so
unsuccessfully because he relies on Derrida’s equally barren charge, that the ‘unity’ of a shared
world between organisms is never “given in nature … sentient life is in effect the temporarily
self-sustaining artifice in an economy of the non-living” (as cited in Clark, p. 19), a neutral nonevent. Derrida describes life, “the ‘material logic of boundaries’ according to Clark, as constituted
in the finite movement of temporalisation, of the would-be self-presence of living intentionality
as an emergent effect of the difference engine of a metabolism, the economy of the non-living”(p.
11). Leaving aside that ‘intentionality’ and ‘emergence’ are contradictory, in reading this
statement out of context, it is not clear exactly what Derrida means, of note, however, is the way
Clark presents it. He does not grapple with notions of the materiality of boundaries, emergence,
self-presence, difference, or metabolism – standard fare for critical feminist science scholars, new
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materialists, posthumanists, and notably, scientists like Lynn Margulis and Francisco Varela.3
Instead Clark’s presentation emphasizes the life’s function as secondary to and operating in the
service of inert matter. Observed ‘intentionalities’ belong not to life but to the ‘economy of the
non-living’. Clark claims this admittedly dark ground conditions a fresh questioning by humans
on ethics. Though essentially estranged from meaning and recognition, except through fictive
constructions, humans share with other organisms the same planetary climate-change threats to
life. Apparently for Derrrida, as Clark presents his stance, the shared threat of non-existence–
even if existence is necessarily a fiction of the imaginary– grounds an otherwise inaccessible –if
also fictive– ethics after all. Clark reads this narrative of the foreseeable vanishing of species not
in literary terms that accede the significance of ‘reality’ to fiction, but merely, as ‘uncanny’ – as a

Figure 11. Organism as a system in balance with
chaos. The organism is an organizational closure of
interacting subsystems. Depending on the dynamics of
its mutually embedded systems, the identity of a
system is always “operating at the edge of chaos.
Identity is intrinsically precarious and intrinsically
fragile” (Rudrauf, Lutz, Cosmelli, Lachaux, Le Van
Quyen, 2003).

peculiar affective event that is not one’s “own” and also not with others’, nor with the world (p.
21), merely an unremarkable event that happens (like rain or air) but can’t get told. Like Žižek,
Clark, too, abandons and is abandoned, and he, too, companions his own abandonment with
others-in-general.
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A feminist reading responds quite differently than Clark or Derrida (as Clark reads him)
to the provocations to the imaginary by the Anthropocene that the blue-dot-whole-Earth image
represents. Rather than reading it as subverting the epistemologies of terrestrial scale and
boundary, and I include Francisco Varela and the putatively feminism-recalcitrant Lynn Margulis
in my alternative reading, recent feminisms imagine the Earth as uncontained, contingent, notwhole (at least in Clark’s sense), not-all, discontinuous, and undecidable in its difference. In the
science of Margulis and Varela and in the feminisms of Haraway, Barad, Gibson-Graham, and
Braidotti, the imaginary, knowing, and ethical subjectivity are untroubled, even inspired, by
disjunctions and porosities in boundaries and scale. This I move to in greater detail in later
chapters. For now, to demonstrate by contrast that Clark’s ‘whole Earth’ narrative illustrates how
thinking in the confines delineated by a legacy of rationalist science conjoined with intellectual
humanism brings forth a despondent and passive affect, I turn to Francisco Varela’s work.
Varela was a Chilean biologist and neuroscientist interested in cognition and subjectivity;
though schooled (not only) in the Western canon, his work extends well beyond its conventions,
to quite different and more lively result. Varela’s iconoclastic notion of a ‘whole’ living system
understands the living system as autopoietic, that is, its defined ‘unity’ as a ‘system’ is ‘brought
forth’ autopoietically. Its apparent ‘wholeness’ is the illusion presented an observer outside the
system; ‘wholeness’ is the resulting (or emergent) stability of a co-dependency of parts in
ongoing particular processes that transform matter to self-produce its own organization of
operation. “Thus, it is more than a question of specific chemical components (carbon, hydrates,
protein, lipids, nucleic acids, etc.), but is fundamentally one of the relations which the
components must satisfy in order to constitute a living system” (1979). ‘Wholeness’, as in Clark’s
constrained imaginary of the Earth, though pedagogically informative, is scientifically
misleading, for it describes the interpretation of an observer outside the system and overlooks the
‘effective subjacent processes’, wholeness cannot describe a living system, and therefor, I would
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add, cannot inform either ethical or political praxes concerning it. What to Varela is critical in
envisioning a living system is that it be understand from the perspective of its operation, which
always unfolds in the present (1979), as enactions of immanence. Varela calls this ‘radical
embodiment’, which by definition negates any purpose, function, or intentionality. “The whole is
not the sum of parts; it is the operational closure of its parts” (Varela and Goguen, 1979, p. 35).
For Varela, organizational closure, such as of the Earth, a cell, the brain, or of the nervous system
is not incompatible with openness. Closure highlights the power of endogenous spontaneity and
self-organization between multiple ‘mutually embedded systems’ (Thompson & Varela, 2001). In
understanding living systems, dualisms of inside and outside, endogenous and exogenous fade
into nonsense, as do for Varela any material grounds for dividing objectivity from subjective
experience, or reductionism from holism, or cognition and consciousness from embodiment. “The
mind,” he would say, “is not in the head” (Rosch, Thompson, & Varela, 1992, p. 299). The mind
is a non-substantial, coherent whole that is “nowhere to be found. Because of its radical
embodiment, the mind neither exists nor does it not exist … it is and it isn’t there” (1992, p.
28)(1996b).4 Enactive cognition is the distributed autopoietic operation of mind and environment,
which is a structural, dynamic coupling of radical embodiment and its immanent way of being in
the world that continuously brings forth mind and world into consciousness, and to the subject’s
experience. This will become clear later in this chapter.

Thinking Noösphere, Sensing Consciousness
Brilliant iconoclast of his day, geologist Vladimir Vernadsky introduced his concept of
the noösphere in 1938 to account for the transformation of the lithosphere, atmosphere,
hydrosphere, and biosphere by human thought, inclusive of technologies. To the two elemental
units of biogeochemical process—energy and matter—he appended a third: that of human
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thought, which he synonymously refers to as consciousness, or reason. Not being energy,
Vernadsky asks, how then can thought change material processes?
Vernadsky’s response is that of a determinist, he champions that “Human reason, the
directed and controlled will of social man,” (2014a, p. 69) [is] “inextricably linked with the
totality of all biogeochemical energy of living matter” (p. 13) and has become a large-scale
geological force. He thus triumphantly celebrates the human introduction to the biosphere of new,
unknown chemical compounds and forms of animals and plants, seeing this as an early stage in
the evolutionary trajectory of humans from heterotrophs to autotrophs. He writes, “Through
agriculture, man was liberated – in his nutrition – from the natural living environment. … Relying
on this great conquest, man has annihilated ‘virgin nature’” (2014b, p. 76). Although his use here
of violent sexual imagery as an engagement of the virgin-cure myth in his utopic teleology
suggests Vernadsky’s blindness to gender oppression, he was a political activist on other fronts.
He actively critiqued resource depletion, racism, hunger, the unequal distribution of wealth, and
the barbarism of war. These he understood as global ethical failings that express how history,
philosophy, ethics, and biosphere intersect in one conceptual order of scientific practice.
More recently, another brilliant iconoclast, microbiologist Lynn Margulis, has also asked,
“How does living matter relate to evolving mind?” (2011, p. xv). Where Vernadsky saw utopian
possibilities in man’s exceptional mind (gender intended), Margulis’s perspective is staunchly
anti-anthropocentric. Human thought need not be privileged with a separate, independent
category, as Vernadsky does. She sees no hierarchy among species and admonishes human
arrogance, even suggesting that humans are of little significance to life on Earth. For Margulis,
who also thinks from a systems perspective,5 consciousness is always already an inherent
component of Earth’s biosphere, because life by definition is sentient. By ‘consciousness’,
Margulis means fundamental biotic sentience, which has evolved from bacterial sentience (for
water, salt, minerals, and touch) into a diversity of forms across all organisms. As a component of
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all life in the biosphere, consciousness is hardly exclusive to, but includes, humans. Endemic to
life, consciousness constitutes the most basic of life’s biospheric processes that produce and
sustain biospheric conditions necessary for life. In a refinement of Vernadsky’s noösphere and of
his theory of the co-evolution of life and Earth, Margulis incorporates into James Lovelock’s
Gaia theory her premise that biological life is an autopoietic geologic, lithospheric, and
atmospheric force. Her distinctive contribution to Gaia theory is the emphasis on 3.5 billion years
of micriobial interaction between life and environment. In other words, Gaia theory– that the
Earth’s biosphere is a dynamic, emergent ecosystem of complex feedback loops between
subsystems of living and inert matter (e.g. climate, oceans, atmosphere, etc.) such to produce and
sustain environmental conditions necessary to life– hinges on biotic consciousness. In the
language of autopoiesis, the theory by which Margulis’ frames her empirical work on Gaia and
symbiogenesis, Earth and consciousness are ‘structurally coupled’.6 To further explain Margulis’
response to the question, “How does living matter relate to evolving mind?” requires first a
review of autopoietic sentience.

Autopoiesis and Some Other Science
Varela explains autopoiesis as the process by which the ‘unity’ of a living ‘system’ is ‘brought
forth’ by virtue of:
the organization of the network of processes of production (transformation
and destruction) of components that produces the components that: 1)
through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and
realize the network of processes (relations) that produce them; and 2)
constitute [the living system] as a concrete unity in the space which they
exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a
network” (Maturana & Varela, 1979).
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Figure 12: The autopoietic machine. (Rudrauf et al., 2003)

Autopoiesis is a creative, responsive, self- making, self-maintaining recursive process that
continually self-produces and maintains its ‘self’ as ‘itself’ (more on that later). Autopoietic
sentience, then, drives motility, for example toward or away from sugars or magnetic poles, in an
open interaction with its environment to regulate flows of matter and energy. It is also the

Figure 13. The operational closure of the embodied system. (Rudrauf et al., p. 10)

Aliveness invents a mode of being which is inseparable from movement, going
towards, seeking in movement (Varela and Depraz, 2000).
“The body is the place of intersection…” (Varela and Cohen, 1999).
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means by which living matter organizes its own networks within its closed system. What
biologist Humberto Maturana and neuroscientist Francisco Varela named “autopoeitic sentience”
explains life’s capacity to perceive and to act. This capacity of the autopoietic sentient ‘self’
assimilates and is assimilated by others through symbiosis, endosymbiosis, and

Figure 14. Geosiphon periforme. (Schuessler, A.,2005)
A fungus (a eukaryote with intracellular motility) latches
on to a cyanobacterium, Nostoc (a protist).

symbiogenesis. Margulis writes, “The world as we know it, and sometimes love it, joins forces,
goals, and genes. …We merge chromosomes and chemistries within species, bodies and minds”
(2011, p. 4). Life, then, is conscious and chimeric. Far from the monadic, pure self of the
Cartesian individual, the sentient ‘self’ is, in scientific terms, a community, defined by Margulis
as, “a unit in nature composed of populations of organisms of different species living in the same
place at the same time” (Margulis, Matthews, & Haselton, p. 310). Understanding that
community constitutes the embodied and embedded ‘self’ illuminates, likewise, that
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Figure 15. Visual definition of community. A millipede gut community includes bacteria, arthropods, fungi,
nematodes, mastigotes and ciliates (Leidy in Margulis et al., 2000)

consciousness is collectively sentient and symbiotic. Thus, Margulis’s consciousness, like
Vernadsky’s noösphere, is a significant force of evolution, though having emerged ubiquitously
over vast stretches of time in over thirty million types of organisms distributed through myriad,
complex networks, hers is without teleologic agency or determinism.
Margulis’ death in 2012 cut short her work-in-progress in the area of consciousness. She
had just begun exploring Whiteheadian philosophy and her antecedent edited volume, published
in 2011, Chimeras and Consciousness, extended beyond her usual comfort zones, even into
human psychoanalytic space! Interestingly and unbeknownst to her, though, the way she co-
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imbricated consciousness, organisms, and environment resonates with some pre-modern
philosophies and posthuman critical theory notions of the subject. Also unbeknownst to her, but
not surprising –for they were personally acquainted– is how Varela’s theories of enactive
cognition and neurophenomenological subjectivity amplify the direction she was heading. His
work remains largely unexplored, except superficially, in the critical feminist science literature.
Over the course of his career, Varela developed autopoiesis into a robust theory of human
cognition and consciousness altogether different from Vernadsky’s ‘noösphere’, though it
responds to the same question, “How does living matter relate to evolving mind?” Following in
Margulis’ example, and prefiguring both feminist biologist Donna Haraway (“beings do no preexist their relatings (2003, p. 6)– and feminist physicist Karen Barad (given that ‘agential intraactions’ bring forth, or ‘enact’ iterative changes to particular practices that may or may not
involve humans, inherent characteristics of an object cannot precede its intra-action (2003),
Varela states,
The world is not something that is given to us, but something we engage by
moving touching, breathing, and eating. This is what I call cognition as
enaction, since enaction connotes this bringing forth” (1999, p. 8). Cognitive
intelligence resides only in its embodiment (pp. 59-60).
One of the sentient behaviors he associates with cognition and scientifically explores is
“responding to the needs of others” (1999, p. 23). Perception and enaction, being inseparable,
demonstrate great flexibility and no central supervision in generating neural narratives in ways
largely dependent on contingency and improvisation. As such, Margulis and Varela both contend
that ‘consciousness’ cannot be scientifically explored by “a science that emphasizes only
‘objective reality’, ‘incontrovertible evidence’ and ‘absolute truths’” (Margulis, 2011, p. 13).
Vernadsky, Margulis, and Varela refute Cartesian knowledge as adequate to describe and
explain current Earth. Margulis opens science to a view of evolutionary novelty as a process of
sentient, creative immanence, though she would not have used those exact words. Her chimeric-
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symbiont-symbiosis-community driven scientific perspective on the charade of individualism and
autonomous consciousness serendipitously hails the process philosophies of Bergson, Deleuze
and Guattari that undergirds the feminist new materialisms hailed by Rosi Braidotti’s nomadic
and Karen Barad’s diffractive thinking practices. Ideologically, these iconoclastic scientists and
feminisms are all of a set.
Embedded in these particular scientific configurations that narrate Earth– inclusive of
inert and all forms of conscious living matter– as an autopoietic Gaian object, very human politics
of global and local economies and environment critically play out. Vernadsky and Varela,
Haraway, and Barad model how to question scientifically the inter-/intra- enaction of
consciousness and Earth leads to reflections of human ethics and subjectivity. Given the current
state of global affairs, what’s at stake in matters of biospheric transformation are political matters
of life as currently familiar, and unfamiliar, to human observation–its persistence, distribution,
vanishings, and extinctions. These are the ethical contests the Apollo photographs of blue-dot
Earth put to the test of the human imaginary.
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Re-narrating Earth

Figure 16. Re-narrating sentience and entities.
Sentience is indeterminate; entities are transcorporeal communities.
(upper L to R: Margulis et al.,2000; Page, 1998; Freeman, 1978.
lower L to R: Malik, 2014; clean ambiente.com, 2016.)

In light of post-human, post-natural, post-modern contexts of 21st century science, Earth
as an object of knowledge, demands to be re-narrated. Margulis, Vernadsky, and Varela establish
that conventional science is not up to the task. However, the convergence of stories told by these
and other scientists with those told by certain feminist science scholars suggests that the search is
under way for adequate new knowledge practices, and thus new stories of the Earth that as,
Braidotti emphasizes, are accountable to the times (2006, 2013). It is illuminating to consider
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how the consonant understandings derived by Margulis from evolution and microbiology, by
Varela from neuroscience, and by Barad from physics dovetail, for example, with Donna
Haraway’s notion that “beings do not pre-exist their relatings” (2003, p. 6). It is illuminating to
consider how Vernadsky’s post-natural noösphere eerily presages the post-human of Stacy
Alaimo’s transcorporeality and Haraway’s cyborg. It is illuminating to note that process
philosophy undergirds the thought of hard scientists like Margulis and Varela, and, for example,
the nomadic thinking practices of Deleuze, Guattari, and Rosi Braidotti as well. It is illuminating
to note how Varela’s embodied inseparability of ethics, perception, and action stands him on
common ground with new material feminisms of Haraway, Barad, and Braidotti. In light of such
currents of thought, I propose that “what the Earth is” as a scientific object is this: it is an
emergent and dynamic phenomenon of contingent relationships, collectively enacted according to
the diverse and mutually embedded practices of biotic and abiotic matter. While the criteria by
which scientific experience becomes intelligible are themselves fluid, (Goldman, 2008), Karen
Barad notes that because science makes the world intelligible through certain practices and not
others, humans are in part responsible for the existence of Earth. How Earth exists for humans is
largely a product of human consciousness, which also suggests that to a millipede, or to a marine
microbe, the Earth might exist quite differently. Indeed, we are in desperate need of new
narratives—to help transform and guide how we look at and live in the world, fully aware that
this, too, will change.
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Notes
1 Note the correlation to the significant influence of phenomenology on Francisco
Varela’s work.
2 They (mostly male) populate sundry university departments and they are none too
pleased, responding accordingly by professionally dismissing upstart academic initiatives, such as
feminism, feminist science, and new philosophies and critical theories such as new materialism,
object oriented ontologies, etc. But this goes beyond the focus of this chapter.
3 Others include geneticist Steven Shapiro, physiologist Denis Noble, Antonio Lazcano.
4 The reader might note here that this sounds not unlike superposition in physics, or even
Clark’s literary ‘uncanny’, except that rather than being experienced as bleak, is kind of exciting.
5 In contrast to reductionism, systems-thinking looks at interactions between components
of dynamically complex systems with multiple internal or external feedback loops, over time, and
in relation to other systems.
6 Humberto Maturana’s and Francisco Varela’s concept of ‘structurally coupling’
correlates to the feminist vernacular, ‘embodied and embedded’.
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CHAPTER 3
MEMORY I. THE MONSTER IN OUR MIDST: SCIENCE NARRATES SUBJECTIVITY
To address the past, to speak with ghosts, is not merely to entertain or
reconstruct some narrative with the way it was, but to respond,
to be responsible, to take responsibility for that which we inherit,
for the entangled relationalities of inheritance that we are.
Karen Barad

Both feminist theorist Clare Hemmings and particle physicist Karen Barad, when
speaking of temporality, speak of hauntings, ghosts, and imaginings. Hemmings does so in the
context of an analysis of feminist academic literature, Barad does so in a material context of
quantum field theory and entanglement (hint: there is no erasure, no time outside of spacematter).
Hemmings and Barad intervene in standard, accepted constructs of the past to refuse a politics of
foreclosure, of immobilization and im-possibility. Both engage different narratives of past,
present, and future to re-vision ‘political grammars’ that ‘unmoor the here-now and there-then’
and the when-then of billiard-ball causality. Material discontinuities, in rupturing the before-after,
do not undo heredity but undo identity. “The past is always-already open to change” (Barad,
2014).
The term hauntings, as engaged by Hemmings, refers to that which is precluded by
dominant citational practices– ‘absent presences’, ‘affective investments’, the ‘half-forgotten’–;
‘imagining’ is her technique to open these hauntings to analyses of their ‘otherwise’ occluded
textures and affective states, to ‘otherwise’ excluded yet significant citations. Hauntings and
imaginings matter to the re-membering of patterns in historical claims and political possibilities
in telling those stories differently. She attaches such “attention to memory” as “central to feminist
practice and radical politics.” Qualitative methods crack open academic structures of critique and
collective knowledge production in order “that new formations might emerge between the cracks
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of what we think we already know (and feel) about one another” (2011, p. 26). Haunted
imaginings engage memory to put bodies of work back together again differently, to tell the old
stories in new ways with new meanings.
Barad, too, engages imaginings, and while her definition is strictly material– electrons
passing through synapses in the nonlinear enfolding and dis-continuities of different
temporalities– she, too, arrives at the significance of imaginings in reconfiguring bodies and
politics. The ‘hauntological past’ (“simply not there to begin with”) marks bodies, is memory, is
the material reality of the world we inherit. For Barad, memory and imagining entangle and
temporal im-possibilities may rework materially.
Only by facing the ghosts [those that are not yet born or who are already
dead] in their materiality and acknowledging injustice without the empty
promise of complete repair, of making amends, finally, can we begin to
move towards justice (Barad, 2014).
And so it is in this hopeful light of ghostly imaginings, the material iterative dynamic
rupture and reconfigurations that might move toward justice, that I make this inquiry into the
collective Western memory to find cracks and tangles in the familiar. Whether that be
monotheism, enlightenment philosophy and science, or the surfaces of current advanced
capitalism, a smooth topological trace connects each one to the other. Specifically, I identify
some tell-tale qualities indicative of a monster in our midst, an assemblage of traits that constitute
teleological thinking, the implication being that these properties qualitatively measure the
monster’s powers; the move towards justice hinges on denaturalizing these monstrous powers.
In this chapter, after locating the ‘genetic imaginary of advanced capitalism’ within the
Western legacy of telos, I put two of its still influential voices, Kant and Darwin, in conversation
on the subject, a conversation that encapsulates the philosophical problems that have long
attracted the focus of philosophers/ scientists belonging to the canon of Western, educated,
industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies. The tensions and struggles found in and
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between Kant’s and Darwin’s thought reveal complexities that undermine the very teleologies by
which the WEIRD world naturalized its own right to authority. These tensions also suggest
nascent cracks in the dominant that mark inherited spaces of possibility, hauntings for recentlyburgeoning narratives, memory’s ghosts of imagined futures that may yet unfold a different
political grammar.
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Figure17. Other worlds. Grassland #127 (Underdown, 2005)

Other worlds, that before they become into the new, wait in the interstices, stealthy
growth within the cracks of what will render as bizarre the outdated normal of before. Soaking up
and soaking in whatever nourishments fall into these recesses, here hope sustains hope; the
possibility of a life lived well, holding out for needed conditions, expending minimal energy,
gathering.
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Advanced Capitalism and the Genetic Social Imaginary

In her use of the descriptor genetic to explain the social imaginary of advanced
capitalism and its late twentieth century subjects, feminist anthropologist Sarah Franklin
summons not only the cultural flights of fancy inspired by the biotechnological capacity to make
‘life-itself’ in the laboratory, and the neo-Darwinian neo-preformation concept of inherited
recombinant biological traits that, coded in DNA, function to absolutely pre-determine the future
individual, but also, and less acknowledged by her, the whole of the long narrative of telos in
Western natural philosophy and science. Franklin emphasizes only the top layer of this
palimpsest, biotechnology’s commodification of life-itself, e.g the capacity to ‘modify’ the
genetic blueprint for desired effects, such as synthetic insulin production or weed and bug
resistant crops, Dolly the sheep, transgenic animals, patented genomes, gmo crops, animal
husbandry/breeding in the industrial food production, human reproductive technologies, the list
goes on. Building on Arjun Appadurai’s concept of the imagination as social practice, which he
means not in a way related to any psychoanalytic sense, but the imaginary as “central to all forms
of agency, is itself a social fact, and is the key component of the new global order” (as cited in
Franklin, 2000, p. 223), Franklin argues that the new genetics of ‘life-itself’ reimagine borders of
reality, and that this represents a redefining of the natural, the global, and the future in the
collective social imaginary of Western subjects:
…the borders of the undead and the unborn recede into an indeterminate
horizon of enhanced technoscientific potency, the challenges to the
imagination beckon irresistibly, uncannily, hopefully, and with enormous
popular appeal” (2000, p. 198, italics added).

The haunts of novelist Nicholas Royle’s ‘uncanny’ used by Timothy Clark, who engages
environmental criticism as a form of literary theory, resurface in Franklin’s identification of the
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imagination as beckoning (who and/or what?) ‘uncannily’. While Clark applies this descriptive
property to his narrative of the foreseeable vanishing of species, Franklin applies the term to her
Vernadskyian evolutionary narrative of the redefinition of nature /life-itself/ the world/ the Earth
(she is unclear how these terms do and do not conflate categories). As held true for Clark,
Franklin, too, experiences an affective peculiarity that is not one’s “own” and also not with
others’, nor with the world, merely an inevitable event that in its happening can’t get told, and
which prompts great social anxiety. This ambiguity only compounds the anxiety with which
advanced capitalism already infects its subjects (Braidotti, 2011).
I argue the importance of attending to an archaeological history of the ‘genetic’ character
of the social imaginary; in important ways, the biotechnological story of life-itself at the turn of
the millennium, which Franklin narrates as new, is not, but fulfills the trajectory of ‘business as
usual’ of, in the least, the last two hundred years. It is in this linear, determinant sense of causality
that the genetic social imaginary indelibly marks its progeny, advanced capitalism and its
subjects, with what Franklin describes as the “Baconian ur-text of the masculine philosophy”
(2000, p. 220). The traits and properties, and tensions, embedded in and stemming from this
Western intellectual history of telos, characterize what Franklin (mis)interprets as a reimagined
world reality. I claim that Franklin’s new world realities actually express the familiar telos of an
unchanged imaginary.
The term genetic that Franklin engages to modify a millenial social condition gained
clout as a scientific discipline in the postwar, mid-twentieth century, when telos, as a
philosophical concept found its penultimate material expression in neo-Darwinism, in the genetic
theory of evolution based on processes of recombinant cellular DNA as the blueprint or
mechanism of inherited traits and randomly accumulated mutations; this theory provided the
mechanism by which to explain Darwin’s evolutionary descent by adaptation, acted upon by
natural selection. The dominance that Neo-Darwinism achieved in the scientific community in the
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mid-twentieth century extended into social sciences, economics, political communities, and
remains ascendant in the popular concept of – in an also a misnomered, oxymoronic
colloquialism– scientific truth.
An interesting analysis of millenial Western subjectivity emerges from the exercise that
reads the phrase genetic social imaginary in terms of the properties and traits ascribed to the gene
in neo-Darwinist theories of evolution.1 This translation essentializes the subject imaginary of
advanced capitalism as inevitable, pre-determined and pre-determining; it functions and
reproduces virginally, that is in isolation and unaffected by conditions beyond the borders of its
cell wall. To describe subjects of advanced capitalism in the language of the neo-Darwinist
metaphor, the bearer of the Homo sapien genome holds the most superior of hierarchical
positions in the kingdom of animals (and, it goes without saying, life). Richard Dawkins
accomplished with the gene what Vernadsky performed with technology, the atheistic invocation
of the virgin-cure myth, but Dawkins’ narrative of the gene explicitly and, equally dogmatically,
models the Christian-narrative, by the power of the selfish gene vested in Richard Dawkins, it
holds within and bears “immortality” (2006, 2012). The purity and absolute control of Franklin’s
laboratory petri-dish gestations perfectly mirrors the purity and absolute control of the neoDarwinist gene, and the invisible hand of a Christian God. The neo-Darwinist gene resurrected
the body of the past, and the life of the world-to-come. Like the gene in its passivity to a
utilitarian, mechanistic nature, advanced capitalism becomes the WEIRDly fashioned expression
of a triumphant reductionist science. Dawkins’ universalization of an anthropocentric ethological
bias, reflects the logos of capitalism, which, in turn, mirrors genetic material determinism in an
eternal return of, for example but not limited to, limitless growth and profit passed down through
the determining genetics of the immortal individual, understood as extending to its current legal
sense, inclusive of the corporation/ institution). These genetic logics for the survival and
reproduction of advanced capitalism function like a policing panopticon – ironically, in
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opposition to the initial aspirations for the wedding of science to society–to foreclose possibility
of social change, especially and particularly at the level of the subject’s imaginary. J.K. GibsonGraham observed that capitalism totalizes the late 20th century’s monocultural economic
imaginary, to the effect of a foreclosure of economic possibility, diverse community alternatives,
and subjectivities other than those produced by capitalism (Gibson-Graham, 1996). These
underlying homogenizing compulsions that drive Franklin’s biotechnological imaginary, and that
Gibson-Graham’s economic imaginary resists, connect in a Fleckian thought style of 19th century
‘god-trick’ science that sees everything from nowhere (Haraway, 1988), and naturalizes the
worldview of a mechanistic, linearly causal, controllable Earth that sustains advanced capitalism.
These foundational narratives of the WEIRD-world discipline subjects to a telos that silences,
banishes, manipulates, and controls imaginaries of diversity and change.
It is not surprising then, given the co-(m)motion between science, subjects, and society,
that public education and popular media would be deaf and blind to alternative narrations that
work against the logics on which are founded the ever-ascendant capitalist marketplace. Its most
significant product, the colonized imaginaries of the progress-aspiring sub-altern citizen, sustains
its ongoing operations in a Fanon/Foucaultian paradox. The subaltern enact their own
marginality, reinforcing the very systems and practices that structure their own subordination. To
rebel would be a monstrous act of violence and self-annihilation, crazy. Normative scientific
methodologies and research funding procedures produce normative scientists with normative
skills and observations. Science-making produces both its subject and its object. Subjectscientists and their institutions display an addiction to the profits that commercial applications of
advanced technologies and biotechnology offer (Goldman, 2007). Many of these are based on
advancements in quantum physics and cellular biology, which, ironically, perpetuate the
mandated machinations and clockwork movements of a Newtonian-capitalist culture. While the
Newtonian and neo-Darwinian science that provides a foundation for the twentieth century zeal
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for ‘progress’ has since been eclipsed, the nineteenth century worldviews that generate the
structures and relations of the current social order have not. Neoliberal teleologies unseat
advancing scientific research as the limiting factor of social authority (e.g. the urgencies of
climate change do not, and it seems cannot, incite political action adequate to its impending,
gruesome realities). The lesson here is that any 21st century political/ social/ economic/
environmental movement for fundamental change must confront what it is up against, namely, the
push and pull of a long history of the West’s attachment to telos.
It becomes crucial to dig into the archaeological layers of meaning embedded in the term
‘genetic’. Its prior meanings, infused with the traits of their contemporaneous temporal and
cultural situations, have their own genealogies that mark subsequent narratives (like Franklin’s)
that move through the collective imaginary. The noösphere that situated the nineteenth century
imaginary, as I will show, and the Appadurai/Franklin millennial genetic social imaginary are
replete with tensions between forces of memory and forces of desire, between ‘business-as-usual’
and radical change. Situated connotations, associations, signifiers, meanings, and genealogies do
not so easily “fade far away, dissolve, and quite forget” (Keats, 1819).

Telos as Memory

And though she take a hundred lying forms, let her
not escape you, but hold her close, whatever she may
be, until she take again the form she had at first.
(Ovid, Metamorphoses 11.250)
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To dig down to the philosophical roots of telos, “an ultimate end” ((Merriamwebster.com/dictionary) eposes the push and pull of concepts that as an ensemble display a
restlessness, an inquietude, a shape-shifting, monster-wrestling of traits; when one settles another
rouses. For thousands of years, but to this project’s interest, for the approximately three hundred
years of the Enlightenment from the 17th century through the 19th century, the forces of tension
between reason and experience and the imaginary, between the creative and the mechanistic,
between living and inert matter, between theology and science duke it out, twisting and writhing
into one big tangled knot that defies the tidy nomenclature of its categorical threads. To pull on
one or two is to push on all the others, their constellations shift according to the particular mix of
attributes and meanings ascribed by each given thinker of a given time. The driving theme,
however, remains constant: to what constellation does human life belong, and how can this tale
be told2 in a way that conveys explanatory sense and motivates social justice?
In what follows, I argue that the Enlightenment and Rationalism, as the dominant
foundations of the modern era and of 19th century science, failed in their project to establish
intellectual secularity, by which I mean a thought-style that is free of the structures and confines
that characterize monotheism. There is much literature by those qualified to make this point,
which I am not, but I remind my reader that I present this argument as a premise and a situating
of the ensuing chapters. The creation of the secular stretches back to the Royal Society of London
in the 1660s to 1670s; I argue that the project failed, divine authority was not displaced by 18th 19th century science, but was merely replicated in British men of means, for they alone could be
trusted to be objective3 —to be God, the scientist speaks for nature and then modestly disappears
(adaptation of Law, 2004). Nature, as revealed by a universal and pure deity, became the
universal and pure nature that men of science revealed. I evidence here, if simplistically, that the
qualities that mark monotheism also mark the beliefs and attributes of the philosophers and
scientists who turned away from church doctrine.4 Notions of universality, essentialism,
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materiality, singularity, immortality, humanism and morality, monism, reason, and human
exceptionalism converge in the rituals and social practices that sustain(ed) the hierarchical and
patriarchal powers of theological institutions. While there is no need here to analyse ecclesiastical
doctrine, as pieces of a larger puzzle, these elements comprise a larger ideology of deistic telos,
end-directedness. Though the scientific worldview of the 19th century extracted deism from telos,
science, to which philosophy also belonged, held to the same ideology of telos, comprised of the
same theistic elements, reformulated in shifting relations and balances. The adhering
monotheistic thinking that a vestigial Western determinism propagates failed to dissolve.
Interestingly –or not– , as modern science took hold as the go-to discipline of authoritative
knowledge, its players assumed the patriarchal mantle of hierarchical power. I suggest that this is
no mere coincidence, but a direct effect of a link between monotheism and capitalism, arbitrated
by the ‘objective, reductionist’ science that neatly channels telos into its methods and taxonomic
thinking.5 The same descriptors and dynamics that characterized church hegemonies –naturalized,
lawed, the one truth, certain, necessary, sufficient, benevolent, ‘for the good of’, hierarchical,
singular, essential–have also been discursively engaged by the WEIRD to herald the social and
political products of material determinism, such as the global proliferation of colonialism;
exploitation of natural resources and labor; discriminatory racial and gender policies;
neoliberalism, regulation of poverty; i.e. the ‘coherence of effects’ in Edward Said’s terminology
which produces the unitary stable category. The subject imaginary of advanced capitalism could
hardly help but be trapped within the disciplining domains of a very long history of patriarchal
dogmas, whether of faith or of ‘scientific reason’, even if it may have wanted out.
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Figure 18. Definition of teleology. (Merriam-webster.com/dictionary)
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Slouching from Bethlehem
Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Feuerbach, Strauss –
all stink of theologians and church fathers.
Nietzche

This tension between processes of convention and processes of innovation bears out in
the Enlightenment and Rationalist thinkers who resisted church domination of social and
scientific thought, such as Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, David Hume, Isaac Newton, Immanuel
Kant, Baruch Spinoza, Charles Darwin, the list goes on. In short, the names that anchor current
hegemonies were the heretics of the social orders in their day. Here I explore these tensions and
dynamics in the making of the Western worldview through an emblematic focus on Kant (17241804) and Darwin (1809-1882) on the topic of telos, to show how in the end, despite their
inclinations, the irresistible charismatic of monotheism trumped Kant’s intellectual secularity, and
haunted Darwin’s.
The spectre of telos since Aristotle (see chart if I get to it) informed what both Kant and
Darwin confronted in the course of developing their concepts, respectively, the ‘purpose of
nature’ and the theory of evolution by descent from a common ancestor by modification and
natural selection. Kant and Darwin demonstrate, like Žižek, the depth of difficulty that faces
subjects, particularly men, of breaking free from the patriarchal, deterministic thinking
conventions to which they were trained and of their lived experience. Both Kant and Darwin
introduced contingency, that which eludes determinism, to the biological literature, though Kant’s
telos also contradicted his tentative dabbling with contingency.6 Both Kant and Darwin do away
with the divine maker, Kant, however, keeps the divine as the unknowable authority, while
Darwin wrestled to deal with intersections of the theological and social for decades before
ultimately abandoning his church attendance in favor of taking walks.
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The 18th century world understood telos as the hierarchical systematicity of a cause; “the
end, that for the sake of which a thing is done” was universally for the good, as ‘nature does
nothing in vain’. The end purpose preceded and explained the formation of the organism. In
Kant’s time, the ultimate end of nature was mankind. To this commitment, Kant appended his
own and, according to John Zammito (2014), Locke’s and Hume’s, heretical concept of an a
priori limitation to human knowledge of the world.
Humans cannot determine either efficient or final causes, or how even a
mere blade of grass is produced. Human beings cannot have the insight into
mechanical principles of nature of how organized beings are even possible
(Kant & Pluhar, 1987, p. 409).
Organized beings are the only beings in nature that, even when considered
by themselves and apart from any relation to other things, must still be
thought of as possible only as purposes of nature. It is these beings,
therefore, which first give objective reality to the concept of a purpose that is
a purpose of nature rather than a practical purpose and which therefore gives
natural science the basis for a teleology. (Kant & Pluhar, 1987, pp. 375-6).
Introducing an interesting twist on ecclesiastical telos, as represented by Thomas
Aquinas, the teleological principle, for Kant, laid both within a Newtonian paradigm and beyond
the capacity of the human to distinguish between necessity and contingency; it was a heuristic
construct that aided making whole sense of experience: telos and ‘the emergent sciences’
(biology), were not scientific knowledge (philosophy and physics).7 Uncertainty belonged to the
human while certainty marked the sacrosanct domains of religion and science. In this move, Kant
displaced the pre-categorical universality of Aristotelian teleology with a ‘regulative’ (pure,
abstract, theory based) systems-thinking of objective reality which unfolds according to an
unknowable, yet purposive telos. Kant differentiated between the ‘regulative’ and the
‘constitutive’ (subjective, empirical, experience based) role of the discerning naturalist, in what I
see as a gesture to the Platonic conception of matter as residing in an idealized exemplar form
while the individual object or organism was merely its imperfect, idiosyncratic and distant

92

representation. Scientific claims stemmed from the naturalist’s observation of commonalities
between this ideal form (the ‘regulative’) and the merely ‘constitutive’.
Kant navigated the Scylla and Charybdis of telos as contemporaneously theorized,
steering a course between mechanistic materialism and animistic vitalism (Zammito, 2014),
which was the dominant theory of his day to explain development in living matter. The problem
with vitalism for Kant was that it could not explain hybridity and that it competed with what he
supported, Harvey’s theory of epigenesis, a developmental model of the organism. Kant steered a
middle ground, he complemented the pre-existent germs and predispositions of the whole natural
organism with a concept of interactions and environmental contingency which constituted the
‘potential state’, and which preformed the individual (Grene & Depew, pp. 96-7). In Kant’s
‘generic preformationist’ view, the individual organism’s form arose gradually in a process of
complex interactions between the constants of the germ and the variables of its inner and
environmental ‘dispositions’. Generic preformationism aligned with ‘purposiveness’: everything
the organism contained was determined a priori, development in organisms was both goaloriented and part-whole ‘fittingness’.
The Kantian system was definitively taxonomic, reason was classified in opposition to
the imagination (Morris, 2011). In reaching beyond its own organismal limits, reason “finds a
system like itself that organizes itself in face of something beyond it, through a passive/active
relation to place that echoes the imagination as receptive/spontaneous.” Kant, according to
Morris, explained his categories as arising from a “system of the epigenesis of pure reason” (p.
187). In an odd, perhaps accelerated, yet interesting phenomenological reading, philosophy
scholar David Morris interpreted this to mean that in Kant’s categorical logic, systems (reason
and organisms) are inherently and dialectically open to something beyond their limit in a way that
involves the play of imagination that opens at the limits of organisms; the organism forms itself
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out of a place beyond itself, beyond reason. Imagination and the epigenesis of reason coconstitute in the a priori of Kant’s natural purpose.
In another navigation between Scylla and Charybdis, Kant’s natural purpose preserved
the all-important divinely-constituted purity of ‘species’, and with it the hierarchical
exceptionalism and moral destiny of man. This allowed Kant to evade the concept of organism as
artifact, to evade the charge of atheism, and to evade what was immoral, heretical, and outrageous
– the dreaded charge of materialism. As a self-identified transcendental idealist, Kant objected to
romantic observation and experience, traits aligned with materialists. Natural purpose, though,
introduced a concept of the contingent interactions of living matter, implicating surreptitiously
another taboo, cyclicity, in an ever-so-soft whisper towards a radical systems- and processthinking.
Between a rock and a hard place to preserve the certainty and universality of the
theological domain while simultaneously extracting the theological from science (philosophy),
Kant squirmed into an ambivalent reconciliation. He stated that the investigation of biological
matter comes about by means of an idea; natural purpose is the object of a concept that situated
human reflection within a context of the divine ephemeral of the living, ontologically divided
from the rest of the living. Though he distanced ‘the emergent sciences’ from Newtonian laws of
physics, he maintained the obligatory divine gulf between the human and other life; his generic
preformationism conforms to the linear (when-then) mechanisms of a universal telos to nature’s
purposes. Kant does away with the divine maker but keeps the divine – embedded in the
unknowable, determinant, purposive force that equates human morality with nature’s destiny. The
strictures of monotheism (the divine universal and certain, the natural purpose of man, the
transference of hierarchical thinking to taxonomic thinking pervaded Kant’s work. Like Žižek, he
leaned into the jump, but ultimately stepped back from the edge and couldn’t make the leap. The
combination of linear, mechanistic reason that endowed man with the divine autonomy to guide
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teleologic living-matter with a universal and deterministic ‘purposive nature’ resounded with the
chords of monotheistic dogma.
In summary, the configuration of ontological and methodological
commitments that constitute the standards of ‘objectivity’ for early modern
physical sciences explicitly relies on religious beliefs (Lloyd, 2008, p. 180).
Alfred North Whitehead, an ordained minister who had wandered away from Christian dogma
into the philosophy of science, had also expressed this sentiment in 1925. He suggested that the
concept of a personified, rational, and universal God laid the foundation for the “scientific”
conviction of unifying principles of nature that were universal and discoverable through reason
and empirical method (Tauber, 1997).
Kant’s thought also prefigured the obscure ideas of recursivity of subject-object relations,
the excess of boundary delineations, contingency, and the free-play of the imagination that later
came to the fore in feminist continental critical theory, but the Kantian naturalization of the
disembodied exceptionalism of patriarchal reason eliminated any chance of supporting citations
of his philosophies by feminists.
This did not inhibit Francisco Varela from citing his legacy in connection with
autopoiesis, nor Stuart Kauffman’s engagement of ‘Kantian wholes’ in support of his philosophy
of biology.8 Curiously, the Kantian legacy can be leveraged in support of conflicting arguments,
e.g. the universal, lawed imperative of transcendant moral duty and self-organization, a dynamic
metaphysics and the fixity of scientific taxonomies, the abstract purity of regulative reason and
constitutive contingency. A taxonomy of binaries allows for cherry-picking; Kant takes his swim
and does not get wet. John Zammito, whose explicit project is the rescue of empiricism and
scientific practice from the ‘fashionable discipline of postmodern science studies’ (2004) asks
“What was Kant’s philosophy of science?” (2014, p. 39).
Surely Kant was cognizant of having to tread a thin line strategically, as Darwin also did,
in presenting his ideas in a way that would be taken seriously, rather than summarily dismissed.
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Still, Kant’s philosophy of science expressed his subjectivity; embedded in and by the conditions
of his 18th century, Kantian thought genuflects to the monotheistic divine, even as it meekly
gestures in new and errant directions. Ultimately a Kantian teleology that ascribed rigid
taxonomies to nature strains under the pressures of explanation coming from advancing biology,
chemistry, and mathematics. Even within its own terms, Kant’s telos equivocated, even collapsed,
as it pushed beyond its own limits. Nonetheless, Kantian thought lays the groundwork for the full
transplant of the properties of the divine to men-of-science that took hold in the 19th century
conception of objective reality, which became, as Elisabeth Lloyd notes the standard for
knowledge itself (Science, Politics and Evolution, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008).
Though Kant’s categories don’t hold up, the tenacity of taxonomic thinking he modeled
explained, according to philosopher of biology David Hull, the concept of teleological progress
(as cited in Grene & Depew, p. 289) which, though flatly refuted by Darwin (1887, p. 315),
persist into the current twenty-first century. Kantian precepts neatly illustrate what John Law
summarized as five Euro-American assumptions of ontological reality (2004):
1. There is a reality out-there beyond ourselves;
2. This external reality is usually (except as our actions affect parts of external reality)
independent of our actions and especially of our perceptions.
3. Anteriority: external reality precedes us.
4. Definiteness: external reality is composed of a set of definite forms or relations. “The
world is more or less specific, clear, definable, and decided” (p. 25).
5. Singularity: the world is shared, common, the same everywhere.

Law concurred with scholars in the discipline of science studies, Latour and Woolgar, that this
“something beyond” of the anteriority and independence of reality crucially deleted subjectivity
in order to construct a reality of determinacy.9 It also echoed the subject-God relation of
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monotheism, and described what the scientific method produced, “a reality that is independent,
anterior, definite, and singular” (p. 37).
The Kantian noösphere situated the historical/social context that Charles Darwin entered
and eventually, ruptured.10 It also fostered the Hegelian world that Žižek inhabits, along with his
enamored lost-causes and Franklin’s advanced capitalism.
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Figure 19. Coal depositions exist in order to benefit the human race.
(William S. Gibson, 1840, p. 257)
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Darwin’s Subjectivity
Cousin to the amoeba, how can we know for certain?
Donald T. Campbell

Darwin’s narrative style, if not his thinking, straddled the conventions of his day and his
compulsion to have his radical concepts taken seriously. He explicitly acknowledged tension
between reason and imagination; understanding that his theory of descent and natural selection
would strike his times as unreasonable and beyond the imagination, and citing the complex organ
of the eye as an example of natural selection “insuperable by our imagination” (Darwin, 1859, p.
187). He cautioned against a dismissal of the unimaginable that may turn out to be reasonable,
“reason ought to conquer imagination” (1859, p. 373). ‘Ought’ suggests any of a tension, a
Kantian duty, a criticism, a conditional probability. This verb may also have pointed at Darwin’s
own struggle with his own Victorian subjectivity, initially to remain loyal to the dictates of his
wife’s devout Christianity and the beliefs common to his class, without alienating either, while
publishing his findings to the contrary that the evidence of his own research presented. Perhaps
this helps to explain why, though Darwin felt he had accumulated sufficient material evidence to
support his theories twenty years prior, The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection was
not published until 1859, after his colleague and competitor Alfred Russell Wallace published
“On the law which has regulated the introduction of new species” in 1855. In the first edition of
Origin, Darwin was consistently cautious and deprecatory, repeatedly engaging such phrases as
“for the good of” and “goodly nature,” phrases that would have reassured believers in an
Aquinas’ exceptionalism of the individual Man and in the parsimony of a causal Aristotelian
nature “that does nothing in vain,” or perhaps to buffer the sacrilegious rupture he struck to the
divine divide between Man and animal species. Indeed, it seemed that at the time of this volume’s
first publishing, Darwin was unsure himself how he fit into these considerations. Acknowledging
that his interpretations were still in flux, Darwin’s first publishing of Origins smacked of a
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hybridity wrought from his own natural science practice mixed with the mores and philosophical
inheritances of his English education and class, clearly present in the definition of natural
selection:
Whatever the cause may be of each slight difference in the offspring from
their parents – and a cause for each must exist (Aquinas/Kant)– it is the
steady accumulation (Lyell’s uniformatarianism), through natural selection,
of such differences, when beneficial to the individual (Aristotle/Adam
Smith), that gives rise to all the more important modifications of structure, by
which the innumerable beings on the face of this earth are enabled to
struggle with each other, and the best adapted to survive (Malthus).
Darwin 1859, p. 10 (parentheticals and italics added).

At first Darwin integrated the ideologies of his class; by the mid-nineteenth century, the
classical economic theory of John Stuart Mill, Adam Smith, and Malthus pervaded English
intellectual thought, showing up in Darwin’s initial theory of natural selection and later in
Richard Dawkins’ selfish gene {AND WHERE ELSE O WELL] as nature described as
parsimonious and competitive. Darwin mentions in an 1838 notebook entry the “oeconomy of
Nature” having “a force like “100,000 wedges …forcing gaps by thrusting weaker ones” as a kind
of “final cause” (Notebook D 135, 1838-9). Economics, religion, and science conjoined such that
what had been God became material in the WEIRD market; Adam Smith’s invisible hand bore
little difference from Aquinas’ divine archer who created the human hand, birds’ wings, and the
seal’s flippers as modifications of a single plan and from the Creator’s invisible hand of Cuvier’s
conditions of existence (“pour le role que l’animal doit jouer dans la nature”). In November of
1859 when The Origin of Species was first published, Great Britain prepared for a joint AngloFrench expedition that would lead to the occupation of Beijing and the burning of the
Yuanmingyuan summer palace. In 1862 Karl Marx remarked in a letter to Engels on the parable
of capitalist modernity of Darwin’s publication:
It is remarkable how Darwin has discerned anew among beasts and plants his
English society, with its division of labor, competition, elucidation of new
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markets, “inventions,” and the Malthusian “struggle for existence.” It is
Hobbes’ bellum Omnia contra omnes, and it reminds me of Hegel’s
Phenomenology, wherein bourgeois society figures as a “spiritual animal
kingdom,” while in Darwin the animal kingdom figures as bourgeois society.
(Marx, as cited in Jones, 2011, p. 6)

Scientific, economic, and religious doctrine heavily influenced Darwin, and though he ultimately
broke away, it was not without ambivalence. Well after the publication of Origin, in a personal
exchange on the matter of God the intelligent First Cause and Kant’s ‘natural purpose’, the Duke
of Argyll reported the following,
… in the course of that conversation I said to Mr. Darwin, with reference to
some of his own remarkable works on the 'Fertilisation of Orchids,' and upon
'The Earthworms,' and various other observations he made of the wonderful
contrivances for certain purposes in nature—I said it was impossible to look
at these without seeing that they were the effect and the expression of mind. I
shall never forget Mr. Darwin's answer. He looked at me very hard and said,
'Well, that often comes over me with overwhelming force; but at other
times," and he shook his head vaguely, adding, "it seems to go away” (1885,
p. 244).

The Kantian conscience weighed on Darwin, and found voice in a direct challenge to
Kantian principles, “Have we any right to assume that the Creator works by intellectual powers
like those of man?” (Darwin, 1861, p. 208). In a letter to Asa Gray dated May 22, 1860 on how
the role of chance in his theory of evolution directly contradicted the dominant and accepted
notion of deterministic natural law, he admitted “not that this notion [of chance] at all satisfies
me! I feel most deeply that the whole subject is too profound for the human intellect” (1888, p.
312). In this might be heard shades of Kant, applied not as Kant did as a way to preserve a
universal God, but in a way to explain Darwin’s ongoing personal conflict between his research
findings and the noösphere of his own political and social world.
Darwin remained ever the deferential Victorian English gentleman. He intended to soften
the blow to his readers by using hierarchical language, even as he insisted on their simian
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ancestries and of the relation of the ‘barbarous savage’ to ‘civilized man’ with the ‘god-like
intellect’.
The heroic little monkey, who braved his dreaded enemy in order to save the
life of his keeper, … man with all his noble qualities, with sympathy which
feels for the most debase, with benevolence which extends not only to other
men but to the humblest living creature, … man still bears in his frame the
indelible stamp of his lowly origin.
(1871, pp. 404-5).

With one hand Darwin removed the boundaries between humans and animal species, and with the
other hand he quickly reassured his reader of human exceptionality.
That disinterested love for all living creatures, the most noble attribute of
man, was quite beyond [the fellow-apes] comprehension. …
Senses and intuitions, the various emotions and faculties, such as love,
memory, attention, curiosity, imitation, reason, etc., of which man boasts,
may be found in an incipient, or even sometimes in a well-developed
condition, in the lower animals (1871, p. 105).
The subtext is unclear to me as to whether Darwin really believed in human exceptionality, or
whether these allusions to hierarchy were rhetorical devices of double-entendre, or expressions of
Darwin’s own ambivalence. Darwin attributed the development of morality in the human species,
specifically, to the evolution of language, by which the ‘general good,’ for humans, was
expressed in the golden rule and by natural duty, a logic that Darwin completes in an affirmation
of a Kantian instinctive moral sense in humans, and quoting Kant, Darwin writes, “I will not in
my own person violate the dignity of humanity” (1871, Chapter III, 86), or was he facetiously
playing it safe? Writing to himself in 1838, Darwin ridiculed such natural hierarchy, “It is absurd
to talk of one animal being higher than another” (Darwin, March 1838, as cited in Grene &
Depew, 2004, n.33, p. 183). His egregiously polite rebuttal to Dr. Abbott’s case for the enormous
importance of the ‘greatest of men’ represents Darwin’s reluctant, gentle resistance to the mores
of his England. “I have been accustomed to think second, third, and fourth rate men of very high
importance, at least in the case of Science, … having done and doing more for the progress of
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civilization than you seem inclined to admit” (1871, p. 316). Darwin gently ridicules Abbott’s
equivalence of ‘civilized’ with Caucasian races with the modest approbrium of the inserted
modifier, so-called, to describe ‘civilized’. Other frustrations with the dominant thinkers of
Darwin’s Cartesian education (Locke, Hume, John Stuart Mill, Lyell, Kant) surfaced. In his 1838
notes he wrote, “the mind of man is no more perfect than instincts of animals to all and changing
contingencies, or bodies of either,— Our descent, then, is the origin of our evil passions!! —
The Devil under form of Baboon is our grandfather!(1838, n.. 289). … “He who understands
baboon would do more for metaphysics than Locke” (1838, n. 84).
Whether explained by the inclinations of the Victorian English gentleman or by the selfdiscipline and curiosity of the natural scientist, or both, or ambivalence, Darwin, never quite fully
or easily accepted even his own findings as certainties. Darwin acknowledged that at the time he
wrote The Origin of Species, he could rightly have been called a theist. In a letter to Dr. Abbott
(Nov. 16, 1871) Darwin wrote “I gradually came to disbelieve in Christianity… but I was very
unwilling to give up my belief” (1887, n.309). Ultimately asked to explain his agnosticism,
Darwin demurred on atheism, opting for the more respectable agnosticism, and reverting to the
classed language of the elite versus the masses, stated that there was no evidence to support the
existence of a God. "Is anything gained by trying to force these new ideas upon the mass of
mankind? It is all very well for educated, cultured, thoughtful people; but are the masses yet ripe
for it?” (as cited in Aveling, 1883, p. 5).
Later in his life, Darwin became less conciliatory to political-correctness. Admitting that
he’d placed too much emphasis on Malthus’ survival-of-the-fittest in his first publication of
Origin, in his 1871 publication The Descent of Man Darwin applied his natural science lens to
The Comparison of Mental Powers of Man and the Lower Animals (Chapter 3). Here Darwin
cites evidence found in multiple species for altruism and the ‘social instinct’ that benefits the
general good of the community.
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The term, general good, may be defined as the means by which the greatest
possible number of individuals can be reared in full vigour and health, with
all their faculties perfect, under the conditions to which they are exposed. As
the social instincts both of man and the lower animals have no doubt been
developed by the same steps, it would be advisable, if found practicable, to
use the same definition in both cases, and to take as the test of morality, the
general good or welfare of the community, rather than the general
happiness… (1871, 98).

In a footnote reference Darwin directly refuted John Stuart Mill’s school of utilitarianism that
attributed morality to a form of selfishness, euphemistically called the Greatest Happiness
Principle. In the fifth edition of Origin published in 1871, Darwin acknowledged additional
driving forces of evolution such as group selection, altruism, sexual selection, adaptive changes
of structure, and the sudden appearance of vestigial organs (Geison, 1969); he questioned but did
not dismiss Lamarckianism, and he discredited the notion of ‘species’ as anything other than
terms to conveniently classify variation (Darwin 1859, p. 52). These were fighting words. In
Victorian England species were immutable and immune from extinction, the Creator’s separate
creations of instantaneous perfect adaptation. Most importantly, there was deep fear of materialist
metaphysics and theories of transmutation, such as Lamarck’s, which reduced the distance
between man and animal, this distance being the foundation of civilized society and the rock of
moral norms. Regardless, species for Darwin were without fixed “essence” but in constant flux,
and instead, species were arbitrary conceptual constructs used by naturalists and, therefore, void
of natural purpose.
Having dismissed design and divine sovereignty, as well as the concept of species as
located in nature, Darwin also ejected the Aristotelian good of ‘final cause’ from his earlier
theory of natural selection.
I probably attributed too much to natural selection or the survival of the
fittest. I have altered the fifth edition of the Origin so as to confine my
remarks to adaptive changes of structure. I had formerly not sufficiently
considered the existence of many structures which appear to be, as far as we
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can judge, neither beneficial nor injurious; and this I believe to be one of the
greatest oversights as yet detected in my work (Darwin, 1871, p. 152).

In sum, by the end of his life Darwin had rejected the properties of monotheism: hierarchy
(perhaps), anthropocentric exceptionality, linear causality, determinism, naturalized morality.
Darwin’s theories threatened 18th and 19th century worldviews of science as the political basis for
social reform, they were incommensurate with deterministic and predictive Newtonian laws.
They directly threatened the sanctity of mankind, reason, morality, even civilization itself.
Descent by modification and natural selection “dethroned God” (Mayr, 1988, p. 179), whether he
be Cartesian, Newtonian, or Christian, and there can be little doubt that Darwin was well-aware
of the stakes of his project.
It is not surprising, then, that such an attack on dominant ideologies provoked a
responsive wrath that called up a monotheistic God’s methods of reward, sin, and retribution, a
justified condemnation for committing the unthinkable: threatening telos with uncertainty,
chance, contingency, process, chaos, and complexity, a condemnation that has hardly paled since.
“A teleological force in nature was so firmly anchored in the thinking…that this belief had more
followers in the first eight years after 1859 than die Darwin’s theory of selection” (Mayr, 1988,
59). It is not surprising, then, that Darwin’s ideas did not hold sway in the scientific community
until Mendelian genetics provided natural selection with a mechanism, and until statistical
probability gained favor amongst evolutionary biologists in the mid-twentieth century, until a
confluence of conditions, euphemistically labeled neo-Darwinism or the Modern Synthesis,
would extract secular radicalism from Darwin’s work leaving in its place a new dogma of natural
selection consonant with ingrained monotheistic thinking. Darwin’s support for group selection
would be eradicated by the determinist genetics of neo-Darwinism.
Certainly by close of his career, Darwin had upended the legacy of telos, introducing
uncertainty and chance where, in a sort of war of the ghosts, 100 years later neo-Darwinist

105

genetic logics would later take them away, and 50 years after that cellular biology and epigenetics
would restore to scientific canon what Darwin had begun. Presaging findings in evolution science
and cellular genetics of the late twentieth century, for Darwin, affects impelled conduct, and this
he saw as central to group survival. In processes of hauntological evolutionary innovation
environment, variation, and heredity coincide. Ultimately, as Darwin’s thought became less and
less an expression of the patrimonies of his station, he seemed to never settle on the subject of
telos, or else it is the literature that cannot discern whether Darwin emerged from his doubts with
clarity on the topic. Writing in his journal between 1836-1839 what was never meant for public
reading, and posthumously published in 1887 by his son, Francis, Darwin rejects religion’s
appropriation of telos as divine design, “there seems to be no more design in the variability of
organisms, and in the action of natural selection, than in the course which the wind blows” (1887,
p. 309). Yet in an 1874 letter to Asa Gray, commenting on his published statement that Darwin
had brought biology “back to teleology,” Darwin wrote, “What you say about teleology pleases
me especially” (1887b, p. 267). It is impossible to know what may have been his ambivalence
over telos, and there is much evidence in Darwin’s literature to support this. In the context of his
later and private thought, and I would argue for this, Darwin’s remark might also be interpreted as
Darwin’s pleasure over a displacement of religion by biology, and thus an implied redefinition of
telos, as a concept, along the lines of natural selection as process philosophy. That said, Darwin
struggled to explain and differentiate his notion of natural selection within the languages of
causality, beginnings and endings, within the conventions of telos.

Putting Kant and Darwin in Perspective

The science of evolution [is] a child of the nineteenth century …
this theory has now become the sure foundation of our whole world-system.
–Ernst Haeckel, Die Weltrathsel (1900)
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The disruption of telos subverts determinism, but Darwin struggled to find language that
explained natural selection without the use of teleological or mechanistic vocabulary. This
struggle with existing language to explain radical thinking continues to face philosophers and
critical theorists who attempt a radical non-gendered process philosophy of emergence. Words
like ‘create’, ‘produce’, ‘higher’, ‘lower’, ‘function’ MORE show up in the work of Deleuze,
Elizabeth Grosz, William Connolly, Jane Bennett, and many more. Darwin’s theories routinely
get misunderstood and misinterpreted, even by these scholars. The English language itself
structures hierarchical, teleological thinking, challenging any project to release the concept of
‘progress’ from evolutionary thinking.
Monist interpretations of Darwinian evolution, such as Herbert Spencer’s social
evolution, Ernst Haeckel’s ‘cellular state’, and T.H. Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics, subsumed the
notion that the law of evolution singularly explained all phenomena, human and otherwise. As an
ideology, evolution remained entwined with economic progress and capitalist growth.
…Simplified into developmental thinking, [it] became a privileged way of
knowing and narrating the world and its history, … [as] unfolding according
to a set of universally applicable laws. … Colonization [and the]
extermination of native is understood as the playing out of the logic of nature
itself, and justified by way of examples from the animal and botanical
worlds. …Primitive life-forms are likened to “primitive tribes” and the
complex global division of labor characterizing nineteenth-century
capitalism is naturalized as the inevitable product of biological development.
…Evolutionary timescales and laws of heredity render our historical agency
moot. (Jones, 2011p. 20).

The ‘objective’ science of pre-Darwinian thought conveniently co-opted a misreading of Darwin
to fit imperial progress narratives. Following on its heels, ultra-reductionism triumphed in the
neo-Darwinian gene, seeing it as the causal agent of change driven by statistical molecular
biology. Teleological narrations of scientific determinism stand at a remove from bodies, from
accountability, from affects and effects. The prevailing science of the late nineteenth and
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twentieth centuries ostracized ecologists and natural historians, and delivered on Darwin’s
gruesome prediction, “Looking to the world at no very distant date, what an endless number of
the lower races will have been eliminated by the higher civilized races throughout the world. But
I will write no more…” (1871, p. 316).
Neither Kant nor Darwin resolve an a priori dichotomy between reason and the
imaginary. Reason as mechanistic telos was held in highest value, while attributes of the
subjugated described the imaginary –irrational, crazy, feminine. The Kant-Darwin tension is
emblematic of the absence of conceptual concensus about telos throughout western history: is
telos purposive, end-directed, linear cause, cyclical cause, final cause, social construction,
emergent, a variable of physics? While the philosophical relevance of the telos question to
biology came to the fore as part of the 17th century Enlightenment reaction against the immutable
knowledge authority of the Church, by the late nineteenth and twentieth century this initially
minoritarian science movement enjoyed hegemonic authority. At the turn of the twenty-first
century, tension over telos remains unresolved, categories have gotten messy, lost their
antiseptically drawn boundaries. The metaphysics of telos has become a material issue of
temporality, of life and well-being that is fundamentally consequential to a planet in trouble,
despite how Western science narrates the denial and othering of subjectivity, and to do so sustains
the ontological bifurcation of the imaginary and reason.
Marking that this hauntological past, represented by Kant and Darwin as ‘half-forgotten
absent presences’, brings into focus one of the meanings of the contemporary genetic social
imaginary, the organism as technological object emerges as an unsurprising telos of its own
history encapsulated in Kant’s commitment to objective reality, i.e. nature’s purposive ‘organized
beings’ which, in his view, gave science the basis for a teleology (Grene & Depew, 2004, pp.
104-5) and framed his systems-thinking of natural purposes. This served his larger discursive
project of providing scientific validation for mankind’s moral destiny according to God’s design
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and nature’s ultimate end. Kant vehemently opposed atheism and defended monotheism,
accordingly his natural purpose preserved hierarchical law. Taxonomic thinking, monotheistic
thinking, and teleological thinking wove together in a Kantian whole, the monster in our midst,
typical of ‘objective’ reductionist and economic narrations by dominant figureheads of Western
noösphere, of which Kant was one.
These stories slam into their own negative effects and subsequent contradictory
advancements in science; logics of ecology, care, interdependence, the posthuman, global climate
change, diverse and local economies, classed distributions of health and wealth, community wellbeing lay either outside or subservient within the purposive Kantian whole of man’s ‘objective
reality’ and the systemic nihilism of othered subjects. Science narrated subjectivity, and its
erasure.
Neo-Darwinism successfully resurrected within molecular and evolutionary biology a
nineteenth century atomistic, ‘objective’ worldview that conjoined economic theory (capitalism)
and ‘hard’ science as an agent, or engine, of social change in the name of ‘progress’ (civilizing
the uncivilized, imperialism, industry, commodification, more research, applied technoscience,
profit). Twentieth century society responded to this nineteenth century promise, as science
historian Steven Goldman explains (1989), by proliferating vast networks of educational,
governmental, military, and business institutions to translate scientific ideas (distinct from the
former practical know-how, apprenticeships, fieldwork, and craftsmanship). Funded by
government and private investments, the age of techno-science took off with centralized
electricity, the textile industry, meat-packing, cheap penicillin, and– lest we forget– the military.
Having begun modestly (the first engineering schools with a core curriculum in the ‘hard’
theoretical sciences were few until their post-WWII explosion), the cross-fertilizations of
universities, business, government, and hard science rapidly opened the door to the profit
potential in commercial applications of science. Further, the commercialization of technoscience
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continues to play out an addiction of economic profit to scientific innovation (Goldman, 2007,
lecture 27).
The grip of telos on biological thinking from Aquinas through Dawkins demonstrates the
tenacity and ferocity of what I see as an irresistible charisma of monotheism by which claims to
knowledge about life and nature, in filling discrete, absolute, and autonomous categories serve
political and social ends to assert power ‘over’. In a WEIRD conflation of ethics, applied science,
and economic power politics, the negation of secular thinking (free of monotheistic traits) deletes
and others subjectivity, a trait that describes and fosters neoliberalism. Even as stakes get higher
globally, this conflation sustains the status quo of power relations.
Kant’s living matter, understood as operating according to lawed, if unknowable,
purposive causality contradicts Darwin’s process theory of descent by emergent modification and
natural selection. The scientific method, by which claims to objectivity are legitimized by
concensus within the scientific community, presumes a priori that its object of study– the research
question– exists in the Kantian world of an external nature governed by autonomous, causallyfunctioning laws. Grounded in an Enlightenment conception of the workings of natural law, do
the standards of the scientific method inherently conflict with Darwin’s extraction of telos and
singularity from natural law, does the scientific method conflict with a theory of variations due to
differences in conditions and environments, contingency, and unpredictability. Darwin’s science
more closely resembles the properties of quantum uncertainty than of Newtonian physics. In a
thought experiment that privileges the scientific method, natural selection, then, is either not
natural or not scientific. On the other hand, however, accepting Darwin’s theory of natural
selection to be scientifically accurate prompts doubt on whether the scientific method imposes
standards incommensurate with natural processes, and, consequently, are possible knowledges
rendered invisible and inaccessible?
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Other philosophers and communities of ostracized scientists recognized the tyranny of
systematics and the limits of reductionism, and I briefly review some of these in the next chapter.
In many ways, the elder Darwin was one of these. Darwin self-identified as a materialist, though
only privately in his Notebooks, so heretical were the Romantics to the science of his time and
class. As Darwin observed in a letter to Charles Lyell in 1860, well in advance of Thomas Kuhn,
“Without the making of theories I am convinced there would be no observation” (1887, p. 315).
Observations must be tested against a theory, model, or hypothesis.
The In-between

Figure 20. Earth swallows up and transforms. Grassland #466 (Underwood, 2005)

111

The practices may be to pave over, and to cut, and ‘yet it still moves’. Earth swallows up
and transforms the crust that will have had been the visible, and what had been is no longer
hidden. The outside becomes the inside. The particularities of how this turnover happens to take
place will be surprising, unpredictable, and apparently random.

112

What gets overlooked in tugs-of-war over ideology are the tenuous ephemeral dark
matter of the in-between– of the actor and the network nodes, of the conditions that mark the
cusp, of what’s gestating inside the gaps, of the teeter between legacy, lived experience, and
desires, of spaces that cannot be reified or quarantined, measured or predicted– the spaces of the
imaginary. Given the imaginary’s capacity to weave new narratives of reality, and given the
potential of recent scientific practices and biological innovations to effect fundamental social
change, the narratives at work in the imaginary best be scrutinized, and their affective potencies
tended. Capitalism and patriarchy, the progeny of long histories of militarism and theology,
colonized the space of the imaginary.
As attached to Appadurai’s concept, the genetic social imaginary, that Franklin described,
defined a local/global practice of science that reimagined, and, then, (re)made a reproductive
reality. Put another way, Franklin’s exploration of the social imaginary as genetic argues that the
collective social imaginary directly enacts a reproductive telos of a previously nonexistent and
not yet narrated world. But does her ‘reimagining re-define’ and bring-forth an unfamiliar world
or, as I argue, continue the world as it had already been declared as a man-directed engine of
teleologies? The meta-interpretation of her cultural analysis accurately frames one premise of my
project: science and the social coalesce in the imaginary of the noösphere-embodying millennial
Western subject.11 The imaginary, then, locates where and how subjectivity becomes constituted
and conditioned; it locates the field (meant in the quantum sense) of narrative flows; spatially, the
imaginary is a heterotopia; it is the imaginary where reserve holds of potentialities, possibility,
and bringing-forth consolidate; both stasis and transformation require a mobilization of the
imaginary; as such, the imaginary sites political battle and ethical struggle, inspiring fear in the
power centers of the status quo, and hope in the radical desires for transformation.
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The challenge to contemporary science is to explain this space, acknowledging its
political and temporal materialities, a challenge taken on by Karen Barad and other marginalized
voices in science; theirs, too, briefly reviewed in the following chapter, follows from a legacy of
former narrations that haunted and queered the dominant of this chapter’s review.12

Figure 21. Paradigm shift. Grassland #394 (Underdown, 2005)

How long does it take for the drawn out effects of a paradigm shift to show? There won’t
be crisp edges to mark the end of one and the start of another, but we can take note that it is in
the process of ensuing, this mark of time and movement, is becoming altogether different than
what will be that which had been.
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Notes
1 While the topologies of the social imaginary that emerges from my brief, simplistic
exercise here might appear sophomoric, well-researched and scholarly-presented affiliations with
my description are found in recent critiques of advanced capitalism as tied to subjectivity in the
work of, for example, Margulis, Gibson-Graham, Haraway, Barad, Alaimo, Braidotti, and more.
2 …by whom and to whom become the obvious secondary questions that follow.
3 Women can’t be trusted because they are dependent on men, the judgment of men who
needed to work for a living also make unreliable witnesses (Shapin and Schaffer on Boyle’s airpump, as cited by Law, 2004, p. 120).
4 This is not a new idea, Richard Rorty critiques rationalism as “a secularized version of
the Western monotheistic tradition” (as cited by Braidotti, 2013, p. 175). There would be more
references for the same idea were I to do that research.
5 Philosopher of biology, David Hull, lays responsibility for the wars in ‘directional’
evolution between cladistics, phenetics, and evolutionary statistics in the 1960s and 1970s to
taxonomic thinking (1988, pp. 32-33); these computational methods are not Darwinian, they are
neo-Darwinian.
6 Richard Rorty: Nietzsche's charge that the philosophical tradition which stems from
Plato is an attempt to avoid facing up to contingency, to escape from time and chance. Nietzsche
thought that the test of human character was the ability to live with the thought that there was no
convergence.
7 “Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by
some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is directed by the archer.
Therefore, some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and
this being we call God” (Aquinas, 1485 Article 3, Question 2).
8 In a co-authored, posthumously published paper Life After Kant: Natural purposes and
the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality (2002), Francisco Varela acknowledges
that parallel directions in scientific ideas around autopoiesis and the philosophy of biology around
complexity converge in Kant’s introduction of the term ‘self-organizing’. Both Varela and
Kauffman (1995) acknowledge Kant in the genealogy of the idea of immanent teleology as a
biological feature of the living process. The notion of a Kantian ‘whole’ is difficult to pin down.
On one hand, “Kant’s precept that the organizing principle of a complex whole could not be
derived from analysis of the functional interactions among its parts” (Newman, 1995, p. 213)
confirms Kant’s limit to human understanding. Kant’s language suggests an intrinsic linear
hierarchy, “parts are possible only through their relation to the whole,” and parts are “there for the
sake of the whole (Ginsborg, 2014, p. 373)”. To my reading, this is a very different meaning than
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Kauffman’s citation of the Kantian whole as an organism whose cyclic functioning is without
hierarchical privilege: “the parts exist for and by means of the whole; the whole exists for and by
means of the parts” (2010, p. 58). Regardless, Kant is clear on the point that the qualities of this
latter formulation he saw as properties of ‘constitutive reason’, which he negatively identified
with materialism. In my opinion, expressed with a nod to Clare Hemmings’ language, the
narrative strand that serves as an invocation of authority– the inherently ambiguous Kantian
presumptions– reproduces a gendered monotheistic habit that does no favor to the scientific and
philosophical story innovations that Varela and Kauffman secure.
9 Ironically, Latour and Woolgar’s explanation of their claim sounds a lot like Kant’s
description of the concept/object order of living matter, but that observation falls tangentially to
my point here.
10 Ernst Mayr states that Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution does not find concensus
in the scientific community until the 1940s (1988).
11 Having already established this paper’s acceptance of the Varela/Margulis erasure of
the differentiation between entity and context, between self and community, and of the GibsonGraham notion of the dispersed ubiquity of subjects as, collectively, the local/global social, the
imaginary, then, as I use it, refers at once to that of both the subject and the social.
12 Another challenge that confronts the capacity of independently-thinking subjects to
break free of their own socially- and culturally-situating intellectual milieu, and to remain
uninfected by the blinding normativity that the noösphere to which daily life tunes, may to some
degree explain the twentieth century co-optation of scientific authority by economic power.
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CHAPTER 4
MEMORY II. VICO’S QUEER CHAOS: SUBJECTIVITY NARRATES SCIENCE
If we would have new knowledge, we must
get us a whole world of new questions.
Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (1941)

The structure of language structures thinking. To think differently, to think away from a
presenting paradigm, radical theorization requires leveraging existing vocabulary to explain and
move towards something new, it’s always awkward. To revise thinking itself, to undo ideological
norms and subjectivities ensconced in culturally dominant habits requires a new language, or new
uses of language suitable to innovation on a fundamental level. Only ideas that can be
‘languaged’ in some form of text, whether verbal, imagery, movement, etc., can be thought. For
Susanne Langer “language is intrinsic to thinking, imagining, even our ways of perceiving”
(1974, p. 318). Absent a language corresponding to new imaginaries, existing language can at
best only approximate, unsatisfactorily, new thought, or only gesture towards ineffable meanings,
and in this way “we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past”
(Fitzgerald, 1925, last page) that “was simply not there to begin with, and the future is not simply
what will unfold” (Barad, 2014). In Giordano Bruno’s language, the past and future are a
coincidence of contraries, “iteratively reworked and enfolded through the iterative practices of
spacetimemattering…All are one phenomenon” (Barad, 2014, 53:40). Bruno, burned at the stake
in 1600 for his anti-Catholic beliefs, objected to the Aristotelian tradition of Final Cause and
monotheism. He was a pantheist, his coincidence-of-opposites1 was less a unity of binaries than a
dissolution of the borders of duality, since each property coincides with, is equal to, its contrary
(minimal heat is also minimal cold). In Bruno’s philosophy the coincidence of contraries unites
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the rational and the irrational, and it prefigured what physics located materially four hundred
years later in quantum tunneling, entanglement, non-locality, and dis-continuity. It may be no
coincidence that Bruno’s thinking was influenced by 15th century Nicholas Cusa, whom 20th
century quantum physicist David Bohm cites, and whom, in turn, Karen Barad cites in her
quantum field theory of matter, history, and temporality. In Bruno’s materiality opposites are not
binaries, but co-constituting properties, “all things are everywhere in change and motion…” (as
cited in Singer, 1950, p. 109).
Our philosophy ... maketh contraries to coincide so that there is one primal
foundation both of origin and of end. From this coincidence of contraries, we
deduce that … contraries are within contraries; wherefore it is not difficult to
compass the knowledge that each thing is within every other -- which
Aristotle and the other Sophists could not comprehend.
(Bruno, as cited in Singer, 1950, Chapter 3)

Bruno’s coincidence of contraries influenced Vico’s Scienza Nuova published in 1726, in which
he rebelled against the dominant trajectories of Cartesian rationalism and Lockean empiricism,
and against the strictures on science imposed by Enlightenment methods. Vico objected to the
linear ‘progress’ narratives presented by evolutionary theories. Scienza Nuova is a cyclic science
of history; his vision was political– the eradication of rank and privilege.
The history of dominance (and its undoing) embeds shadow-stories of nascent
movements of resistances to power. The Enlightenment, that began as a heretical movement
engaging science to defraud the church of its doctrinal belief systems and social power, produced
its own radical elements. Analogously, current nascent social movements, having roots, might
possibly flourish. Indeterminate, unpredictable, but possible. Present meanings get carved from
genealogy, the past imprints its future in forms of memory that, like proteins, unfold and refold,
in the “materiality of imagining” (Barad, 2014). Political hopes for transformations ground on
such possibilities for noospheric and subjectivity/social transformation.
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An anti-Cartesian thread stretches from the Milesian monists to the recent new materialist
feminisms. Leading voices of minoritarian memory have been largely overlooked or dismissed by
an over-confident mainstream that ‘doth protest too much. Due to the negative effects,
conspicuously pronounced economically and ecologically in advanced capitalism, produced by
Cartesian/ rationalist/ reductionist subject positions, those who boldly queered their social order,
still largely overlooked, garner renewed attention. Heraclitus, Giordano Bruno, Giambattista
Vico, Jean Baptiste-Lamarck, Charles Darwin, Henri Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead,2 William
James, Merleau-Ponty, Michael Polanyi, and Susanne Langer, are some of those whose
philosophical thinking now finds support in recent advancements in the sciences (evolution,
cellular genetics, integrative biology, quantum physics).3 It makes for uncanny, out-of-linear-time
affiliations between academic disciplines and scholars. What distinguishes this group as an
assemblage is a notion of science and experience as indivisible, impacting and impacted by
notions of ethics, politics, and justice. In this lineage,4 affect figures centrally in knowledge
production, to scientific claims, to life-ing and nature. Concepts of materiality organize around
not telos but process, and by so doing the bifurcation of reason and the imaginary dissolves. My
entry point into this curious continuum of renegades is Giambattista Vico, one voice whose
echoes, temporal diffractions, resonate as overtones to voices that challenged objectivity and
transform concepts of subjectivity and materiality in science, science studies, philosophy, and
critical feminist theory. Their common denominator is a process systems-thinking, as opposed to
reductionism. Vico’s concept of Chaos, particularly, provides a thread by which to make tracings
of this counter-hegemonic worldview.
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Ricorso: Vico’s Chaos

One of the results is the downgrading of poetry itself.
The idea of the poet as seer or prophet now seems a distant memory.
Harry Eyres, 3/15/2014,
referring to the “objectivist, scientific view of the
world that still holds power almost everywhere.”

Influenced more by Egyptian than Western thought, Vico put forth a
societyhistoryscience5 theory of human civilization as a recursive pattern (ricorso) of three
consecutive stages, which historian Isaiah Berlin called a ‘science of mind’, each stage
corresponding to a political structure and to a linguistic trope by which that stage comprehends
phenomena.

Figure 22. Vico’s stage theory of the cycle of human history. (Sand, C, 2015)

Each phase of the cycle returns historical life to begin the “seim anew” (Joyce, 1939, p. 215, l.
23), and retains in memory the previous cycle. The return to the Theocratic stage from the Human
stage constituted Vico’s Chaos, a “barbarism of reflection” he associated with disorder and
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liberty, reminiscent of the Middle Ages, as contrasted to cosmos, to which he associated order
and rules as envisaged in the medieval Christian tradition.

Figure 23. Menelaus capturing Proteus. (https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com)

Vico described Chaos as a shape-shifting Protean pattern of forms:
1. its earliest “confusion of human seeds in the period of the abominable sharing of
women,” to
2. the misshapen monster that devoured all things and swallowing men into its void, to
3. the physicists’ prime matter of natural things, to
4. the hybrid of beast and man in the mythic god Pan, to
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5. the philosophers’ symbol of the formed universe, to
6. the poets’ matter in the sense of Proteus, the mythic form-shifting monster wrestled by
Menelaus.
Chaos ultimately collapses irony and the rational into poetic wisdom and metaphor.
Poetic wisdom, the first wisdom of the gentile [non-Biblical] world, must
have begun with a metaphysic not rational and abstract like that of learned
men now, but felt and imagined, as that of the first men must have been,
who, without power of ratiocination, were all robust sense and vigorous
imagination…This metaphysic was their poetry, a faculty born with them
(for they were furnished by nature with these senses and imaginations); born
of their ignorance of causes, for ignorance, the mother of wonder, made
everything wonderful to me who were ignorant of everything…; they, in
their robust ignorance, did it by virtue of a wholly corporeal imagination.
(Vico, Book II, Chapter I, para. 375-376 in Bergin & Fisch, 1948).

For Vico, the imaginary is memory, expressed in wordless thinking (‘mute language’), poetry,
and language. “Imagination is nothing but the springing up again of reminiscences, and ingenuity
or invention is nothing but the working over of what is remembered” (as cited in Rickard, 1999,
p. 264). Nothing is divinely ordained. Men make (there is no poeisis without technê [craft/art])
their own histories and their own categories by which they apprehend the world according to the
poetic wisdom and poetic physics of their historical stage. Myth and memory and language merge
in an embodied imaginary6 of the subject and in the code of history’s ricorso, without telos. In this
ricorso of language —not dissimilar from Haraway’s and Barad’s– men bring forth ‘nature’ and
‘gods’. What they can know is only what they have made.
The nature of things is nothing but their coming into being (nascimento) at
certain times and in certain fashions. Whenever the time and fashion is thus
and so, such and not otherwise are the things that come into being. (Vico,
XIV, para. 147, as cited in Bergin & Fisch, 1948)

Amplifying Herodotus and Heraclitus, and as a harbinger to Bergson, Whitehead, Deleuze,
Haraway, and Braidotti, Vichian matter becomes according to the situated possibilities of
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historical stage and its memory. Vico sets a standard for an indivisibility of cyclic temporality,
materiality, and the imaginary languaged in an historical ricorso of becoming of the subject and
event.

Echoes: Ricorso in Chaos
chaosmos presided over blankdeblank, god of all machineries
(James Joyce, 1939, p. 253, l. 33)

The recovery of history as a methodology to de-stabilize the linear and the dominant,
which Nietzche and Foucault and post-structuralists perform, traces back to Vico’s Scienza
Nuova and the entangling of myth, language, narrative, science, society, and history. Vico’s
Chaos, emergent from / between / to / before and after order, takes on iterative multiple meanings
across historical stages of artsciencephilosophy that diffract across post-modern and poststructuralist thought, as well as in the modern science of chaos (turned complexity) theory. Postcolonialist Edward Said appropriated Vico’s heuristics, as did Derrida (another favorite reference
of Karen Barad’s). Vico’s influence on James Joyce yielded the novelist’s origination of the term
‘chaosmos’ in Finnegan’s Wake, subsequently taken up by Gilles Deleuze.
Because, Soferim Bebel, if it goes to that, (and dormerwindow gossip will
cry it from the housetops no surelier than the writing on the wall will hue it
to the mod of men that mote in the main street) every person, place and thing
in the chaosmos of Alle any way connected with the gobblydumped turkery
was moving and changing every part of the time …the continually more and
less intermisunderstanding minds of the anticollaborators, the as time went
on as it will variously inflected, differently pronounced, otherwise spelled,
changeably meaning vocable scriptsigns. (Joyce, 1939, p. 118, l. 18-28).

While a deep discussion of chaosmos lies beyond the focus of this project, one observation
(consistent with the linguistic trope that Vico attaches to the democratic ‘human’ phase of
history’s cycle – ironic) rates mention. That Deleuze’s source for his term chaosmos (by way of
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Joyce) was Vico, not Spinoza (Vico’s contemporary rival and the oft-praised textual authority of
Deleuzian liberatory monism), informs one of my central critiques of new material feminisms that
I trace in the next chapter. Vichian diffractions spread to hard science (e.g. the chemistry and
complexity theory of Isabelle Stengers and Ilya Prigogine) and from hard science (ecology of
Gregory Bateson) to philosophy (e.g. Merleau-Ponty, William James), and, by way of those
influenced by Deleuze, to the new materialisms and feminist critical theory of Rosi Braidotti
covered in the following chapter. These examples illustrate the breadth of Vico’s diffractive, if
little acknowledged, significance to efforts to defeat the Euclidean-Newtonian-CartesianEnlightenment-neoDarwinian tradition.7 Taken together as a time-traveling assemblage, this
amounts to a counter-hegemonic movement in science, philosophy, and feminist critical theory,
to describe an altogether different model of world-view-making-becoming, one that I summarize,
for the convenience of a shorthand, as an embodied becoming without beginning or end in
constantly changing conditions. We are not in Kansas anymore.

Figure 24. Munchkin land. (https://thebestpictureproject.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/wizardofoz1.jpg)
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Paul Klee's 1920 painting Angelus Novus, which Walter Benjamin compared to "the
angel of history" in the ninth thesis of his essay Theses on the Philosophy of History presents a
Klee painting named Angelus Novus. “The painting shows an angel looking as though he is about

Figure 25. Angelus Novus. Paul Klee, 1920, the angel of history.

to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is
open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned
toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps
piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of its feet. The angel would like to stay,
awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise;
it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. The
storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which its back is turned, while the pile of debris
before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress” (Benjamin, 1969, pp. 257-258).
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Echoes: Ricorso in Language
For the last three hundred years the progress of science has increasingly
controlled the outlook of man on the universe, and how [CHECK] profoundly
modified (for better or for worse) the accepted meaning of human existence.
Its theoretic and philosophic influence was pervasive.
(Michael Polanyi, 1969, p. 64)

“The springs of European thought,” Susanne Langer wrote, “have run dry—those deep
springs of imagination that furnish the basic concepts for a whole intellectual order” (1942, p.
293). The conceptual forms that will emerge to replace them are still “in the mythical phase, the
‘implicit’ stage of symbolic formulation”, a particularly Vichian echo. For Langer, philosophy “is
mythical in origin and scientific in destination” (p. 178) –Vico interpreted language as signals,
poetics, and science– a description that her friend and former teacher, Alfred North Whitehead,
subsequently shared— that philosophy, like mysticism, affords “direct insight into depths
unspoken (1938, p. 174). “All men enjoy flashes of insight beyond meanings already stabilized”
in language. It is the role of philosophy—along with literature and the sciences—to find
“linguistic expressions for meanings as yet unexpressed” (1933, 291).
Langer believed what was required was “a new conceptual vocabulary—not a
metaphysical use of old vocabulary—to make a new frame” (1967, p. 316) for thinking about
“the problems of life and mind in nature” (1967, p. xvii). Navigating between actualities and
possibility, the philosophical and biological cannot be separated:
Whenever an act is induced by a change in the vital situation, such as the life
process itself constantly engenders (thereby motivating an endless stream of
acts), it is likely that not only the impulse of that act, but also one or more
conflicting impulses or alternative potential acts are formed, which are
doomed to speedy abrogation. This play of impulses forms the dynamic
matrix of life, a plexus even more involuted and compounded than the
metabolizing, differentiating, ever-changing structure that is the material
organism, because the latter consists only of actualized events,8 but the life
comprises also all the potential acts which exist only for milliseconds or less.
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(1967, p. 304)

Though known primarily for her contributions to theories of art and language, Langer also gave
extensive, if overlooked, attention to the philosophy of science and biology, directly connecting
the relevance of language to temporal concepts of materiality. Anticipating the late twentieth
century science wars over objectivity, Langer acknowledged the challenge of putting into words a
revisioning of biological systems, “the subjective aspect of experience, the direct feeling of it,” is
an “aspect of the intricate web of life [that] defies discursive formulation, and therefore verbal
expression” (1957b, Problems of Art, p. 22). In Laboratory Life: the Social Construction of
Scientific Facts, Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1979, 1986) argue that logistical procedures in
conducting experiments dealing with equipment and data require multiple subjective decisions, to
such an extent that scientific facts are, in large part, culturally constructed. They observe that
inscription devices in scientific research have empirical results of their own. Analogously, Steven
Goldman states mathematical theories, such as those pertaining to structures of molecular
relationships, function like languages. The meanings of their terms are a contingent function of
the relationships internal to the theory. Latour’s and Woolgar’s and Goldman’s observations
appropriately impute the language as an inscription device that produces its own empirical results.
Daniel Lehrman shows this to be true in his comparison of the effect on opposing scientific
claims in animal behavior, pathology, evolutionary biology, genetics, and evolution of various
and imprecise meanings of words as innate, acquired, inherited, learning, normal, abnormal,
experience (1970). One of the results of this semantic and conceptual disarray are battles between
scientists over matters of teleology and preformationism, largely organized according to whether
the scientific discipline’s point of view privileges mechanisms that move toward functional form
or an ontogeny from a preceding stage. Despite a conceptual transformation of biological life and
quantum materiality as process, the methodologies of research in the biological sciences
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reproduce a linear model of Cartesian thinking, even though this has been proven inadequate to
deliver descriptions of phenomena, and often delivers ‘knowledge’ that is flat wrong.

Echoes: Ricorso in Poetry
If they could be surprised on the higher side of the said,
would they not reveal another meaning?
(Levinas, 1991, p. 35)
I shall reconsider human knowledge by starting from the
fact that we can know more than we can tell.
(Michael Polanyi, 1967, p. 12)

According to Bruno, Western science began with the emergence of the definite article in
the grammar of early Greek language. The placement of the definite article with an adjective or
verb, (the cold), (the good), (the act of thinking), transformed a property to a substance, and
afforded abstraction. Heraclitus spoke of the universal and the logos, which served as stable
objects of thinking. The horse, the thought, and the just afforded concepts of the generic and
permanent. The abstract noun, Snell says, “references the non-physical – alive, animate,
intellectual, dynamic.” Swaying between Platonism and a Heraclitus’ view, with a dash of
exceptionalism thrown in, he states “Both the metaphor and the personification necessarily put an
anthropomorphic of physiognomic interpretation on the non-physical, i.e. they present it as a
product, or an embodiment, of animate reality” (p. 231). The definite article defines the abstract
and connects a particular to the universal, generating an object of thought about which we make
knowledge claims. The new product for the early Greeks was the rational, i.e. the logical
expression of thought. New modes of using prepositions (through, because), not only to connect
parts of speech as designations of time and space, as causality gave way to the “abstract
conception of the human mind or spirit as it was brought to fruition by Heraclitus” (Snell, 1960,
p. 235). Though his reading of Heraclitus is conveniently partial (Heraclitus, early author of the
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concept of ‘becoming’, was dismissed by historians of a science defined by LaPlacean parameters
of objectivity), Snell credits the early Greeks with the linguistic ancestries to CartesianNewtonian humanism, the mind/body split, and the grammar of scientific thought.
Might grammatical structures of the English language serve to embed linear causality and
substance metaphysics in Western thinking, structuring bias and inequality into scholarship and
leadership, to real and disastrous effects for the daily living of world and planet? Might we need a
function of language precluded by correct scholarly structure to express a process worldview?
Snell’s grammatical trope that explains the rational mind is the definite article and the use of
causal prepositions; for Vico metaphor, synecdoche, and irony constitute tropes for apprehending
phenomena in a becoming world. Have we come stutteringly full circle, from the early Greek that
seeded substance metaphysics to the awkward phrasings of process sciences of immanence and
emergence found in the recessed corners of discourse at the start of the twenty-first century? To
step aside from the bifurcations, binaries, dichotomies, teleologies, and dialectics of the
intervening two thousand four hundred years, do we have a language to not-think categories and
telos, instead to think co-becomings and co(m)-motions? According to the dictum of Italian
linguist Giuliano Bonfante who followed Vico’s influence, “all language is poetry” (Larissa
Bonfante, personal communication, 2012); language is always-already ever-not-quite becoming.
Theoretical physicist of non-locality and quantum potential, David Bohm, writes in 1980:
Thus the ‘atomistic’ attitude to words has been dropped and instead our point
of view is rather similar to that of field theory in physics, in which particles
are only convenient abstractions from the whole movement. Similarly, we
may say that language is an undivided field of movement, containing sound,
meaning, attention-calling, emotional and muscular reflexes, etc. … The
word ceases to be taken as an ‘indivisible atom of meaning’ and instead it is
seen as no more than a convenient marker in the whole movement of
language … (This means that giving attention in this way to the components
of words is not primarily an attitude of analysis but, rather, an approach that
allows for the unrestricted flow of meaning).
(p. 52).
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By reading scientific terms and philosophical concepts as a form of poetry, might “the strange
fact that language means something” (Polanyi, 1967, p. 192) foster a more capacious stance
towards knowledge- and meaning-making in science, one that relaxes the border controls of
acceptable ‘academic writing’ and makes space for thinking improper ideas that bolt from
academic corrals?
Alfred North Whitehead’s process metaphysics responded to his criticisms of Cartesian
foundations of scientific materialisms as inadequate to account for the nature of things given
advancing scientific realities. “Time, space, matter, material, ether, electricity, mechanism,
organism, configuration, structure, pattern, function, all require reinterpretation” (1925, p. 16).
Compelled in part by the development of quantum theory, Whitehead stated in 1925 that the
scientific ‘situation’, having become too narrow, especially in biology and psychology, needed
“to revise all our notions of the ultimate character of material existence” (1925, p. 35). This had
been happening within physics since the late 19th century when discoveries of electromagnetic
fields, the aether field, and field theories of gravity undermined the discipline’s own own
LaPlacean worldview.
Contrary to substance metaphysics, the intangible became material, and the initiation of
modern process metaphysics ushered in a fundamental challenge to material determinism
(Goldman, 2007). A cascade of ‘immaterial realities’ was discovered – radio waves, cosmic rays,
x-rays, gamma rays, neutrinos, dark matter, dark energy. I mention here only a very few of the
many milestones that contributed to a repositioning of the discipline of science from that which
reveals external and passive laws of natural truth, to the discipline by which a particular sort of
inquiry leads to a particular sort of explanation, or failing that, depiction of phenomena. With the
discovery of intangible forces and fields, science described an experience of nature, but how
energy acts, for example, defied explanation.
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In the late 19th and early 20th centuries with the discovery that spatial arrangements of
atoms within molecules determined molecular physical and chemical properties, relationships
became physically real. Molecular biology decoded DNA; in network theory and information
theory the properties of relationships, independent of the terms they related, caused their own
effects. Relativity and quantum mechanics redefined causality. In mathematics symbolic logic
broke from Euclidean-Newtonian confines, making possible Claude Shannon’s founding of
digital computer design theory. Differential geometry and topology, the study of freeform spatial
relationships, became important to quantum theory, cosmology, and biology.
In mid-century algorithmic information theory reduced physical objects to information
representations. Genetic research discovered that the sequence of bases differentiated one life
form from another. Information as sequence took on ‘insubstantial’ material reality. The idea that
information structures constitute black holes and the entire universe took shape, for example, in
the holographic principle. The quintessential science of process, evolution, established time as a
fundamental feature of reality. Regardless of Darwin’s articulation that causative processes of
individual variation were ‘spontaneous’ (as opposed to random), his physicist contemporaries and
evolutionary biology descendents interpreted ‘spontaneity’ to mean ‘random chance’. Ironically
to the exclusion of spontaneity, chance and statistical probability became inculcated into the list
of rational attributes of nature.
Reality had ceased to mean material ‘thinghood’, instead it referred to structures and
relationships, and information, identified according to intra- and interactive properties and
processes. This revision to scientific reality opened up to new applications of systems-thinking to
such phenomena as weather, climate, atmosphere, Earth. These complex systems interact,
modify, and adapt, in a quasi-Darwinian sense of fitness, in interaction with other systems
(examples: hurricane, living entities, cells, genomes) and were found to be exquisitely sensitive to
small variations in critical parameters (the ‘butterfly effect’). Complexity theory described these
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stable non-linear systems that, far from equilibrium, bore none of the prior identifying traits of
19th century reality: autonomous, passive, deterministic, and predictable. Matter itself emerged as
complex, dynamic, and self-organizing.
The discipline of explanation was forced, again, to re-articulate its function. Scientific
knowledge became a particular sort of depiction of phenomena, in the sense of Vichian poetics
and phenomena. “Poetry always has to have both content and memory, without describing it too
explicitly” (Libbrecht, 2007). Vico’s poetics argued that science/history could not be dissociated
from the subjects or from the culture of its historical setting in which science and subjects are
embedded, a concept with energies for long temporal diffractions.

Echoes: Ricorso in the Social
While the early history of Western science was one of the subversion of authority, an
aspect of the scientific revolution supported by Vico (if not its Cartesian and Rationalist terms),
by the early twentieth century the whole outlook of man on the universe was conditioned by an
implicit recognition of the authority of scientific opinion (Polanyi, 1969, 57). The project, then, as
one might imagine Vico’s analysis of modernity, would be the subversion of Cartesian/LaPlacean
science, specifically, as wielding political authority, and, if seen in terms of his theory of
historical ricorso, inevitable. Interestingly and ironically, that destabilization initiated from within
the conventions of authoritarian science. This pattern emerged from the many disruptions to
material determinism, and contributed to the rejection of pure objectivity in scientific research as
either viable or rational.
The effect of quantum theory and relativity on shifting the language of science from its
prior status as revealing nature’s truths to, ultimately, the depiction of phenomena– definitionally
the object of what the senses or mind of a person observes– necessarily opened scientific practice
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to scrutiny as a social practice of sentience and experience. With that began the unseaming of the
politically conjoined Newtonian twins of modernity, authority and objectivity.
Inspired by the quantum revolution in physics, Ludwik Fleck published a series of papers
in the 1930s based on medical ‘ways of thinking’ that claimed scientific ‘facts’ get constructed by
collectives that exchange ideas within a frame that conforms to a shared and particular thought
style, and this epistemological social process constitutes ‘objective reality’. The publication of
Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962 cemented the notion that scientific
‘truths’ reify social processes of consensus within the scientific community. All ‘objective
conclusions’, he states, are ultimately founded on subjectivity and worldview. Lynn Hankinson
Nelson, too, affirmed that social beliefs and values inform theory, but she argued her point
politically, from a feminist perspective on knowledge as produced by dominant community
processes (1993). Sandra Harding, also sounding much like Vico, observed that the content of
scientific thought is shaped (but not determined) by its historical location, and that throughout the
modernist history of science, the scientific worldview is in fact a view of dominant groups’
modern western society, and that (1993). These voices echoed with new meanings, not only
Vico’s insinuation, but also Darwin’s assertion that without theory, there would be no
observation, a premise supported by historians of science such as Thomas Kuhn (1962), Israel
Scheffler (1967), Michael Polanyi (1969), and Lynn Margulis (classroom refrain), with an
important distinction. This clarified understanding of theory, that the values and subjectivities of
a time inflect the theories of that time, and that theories are value-laden, exposed the political
underbelly of scientific knowledge, a facet especially explored in feminist scholarship, and posed
a risk to science that undermined its authority. Polanyi observed that one danger of a value-laden
authority was that it caused science to argue against theoretical possibilities that would not appear
scientifically conceivable” (1969, 95). Another danger was that attacking objectivity in science
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amounted to an attack on the very trait that legitimized the authorization of power to institutions
and structures of Western society.
To be a member of the scientific authority meant to submit to its values. Evelyn Fox
Keller (1985), Donna Haraway (1988), Nancy Tuana (1989), Ruth Hubbard (1990), Sandra
Harding (1991) demonstrated that claims to scientific knowledge reflect the values and biases of
those who ‘make’ science happen. Feminist scholarship revealed an androcentrism as the
‘normal’ default status of scientific claims. Exposure of gender bias and a masculinist orientation
inherent to the historiography of science and to standard research methodologies further
challenged scientific ‘objectivity’ [Audre Lorde (1982), Evelyn Fox Keller (1978, 1985), Nancy
Hartsock (1983), Longino and Doell (1983), Harding (1986), Sandra Harding (1995), Elisabeth
Lloyd 1996, Tuana (1996)]. Carol Gilligan (1982) made visible the persistent ascription of
amorality to ‘feminine forms of reasoning.’ Evelyn Fox Keller critiqued the “force of the concept
of predetermined centralized control as a ‘natural’ model of ‘relationship’ among components of
living systems or populations” (1985, pp. 150-157). By virtue of work by minoritarian scientists,
social scientists, and feminist scientists, any claim by a scientist-subject or discipline to freedom
from values, biases, commitments and ideologies became implausible, but cultural practices fade
slowly. Despite the indisputable role of subjectivity in the formation of ‘objective’ knowledge
claims, and despite the fundamental revision to the scientific conception of reality, familiar habits
of thinking in terms of causal relations get attributed to systems that seem to be complexly
interactive, “imposing on nature the very stories we like to hear” (Keller, 1985, p. 187), or, to
modify that quote, the very mythologies a former scientific thinking likes to perpetuate.
With the threatened erasure of ‘pure’ objectivity, charges of relativism hovered over its
challengers. Israel Scheffler defended ‘objectivity’ in science by redefining the term so as to be
unrelated to its Newtonian sense of fixity of observation and meaning. He situated objectivity
between the knower and the known in a semantic flux between meaning identity, ways science
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gets absorbed by different political and cultural frameworks, and meaning constancy (1982, viii).
Scheffler rejected the inevitability of each. Neither did feminist science and science studies
scholars reject ‘scientific objectivity’ wholesale either, nor did they promote the caricatured
position of scientific facts as mere constructions of social processes and political interests. Quite
to the contrary, but one of the outcomes of feminist insight into science was a demand for paying
attention to the embodied, situated ‘ever not quite’9 processes by which shifts in language and
science intra-act, a practice of critical reflexivity sensitive to nuance and complexity. To
acknowledge the social and the subjective as inherent elements of ‘objectivity’ advanced not only
feminism, but scientific knowledge-making, as well.

Echoes: Ricorso in Science and Philosophy
As Whitehead predicted, the replacement of the Cartesian foundation of scientific
materialism by more adequate modes of abstraction “[did] not fail to have important
consequences in every field of thought” (1925, p. 36). With the pearly gates of objectivity rent
asunder, the dragons of epistemology rushed in. Themes of inquiry in the ‘hard-sciences’
included consciousness, cognition, mind, neuroscience, and experience. Systems science looked
at bodymind interactions between organism and environment, self-organization and emergence,
immanence, dynamical systems, and complexity. The scientific study of these newly focused
realms required hybridization with humanities and social science scholarship and philosophy
schools of phenomenology and pragmatism. In a cyclic ricorso, these disciplines fell back on the
sciences, such as biology, evolution, cognition, and neuroscience. These disciplinary shifts also
mapped to changes in the concept of materiality itself. The resulting discursive re-conceptions of
matter, experience, and reality laid bare a long unresolved dilemma: how to articulate the coimplication of materiality and subjectivity scientifically. While my treatment of these patterns in
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these chapters is a gross simplification in order to satisfy brevity, given a generous reading, I
think, and hope, my summations are not generally inaccurate.

Echoes: Ricorso in Prehensions

If there is no before and after by which to order cause and effect,
has causality been arrested in its tracks?
The open-ended becoming of the world resists
acausality as much as determinism.
Karen Barad

A prehension, in Whitehead’s terminology, is a coming together of different parts of reality that
develops from the present and reaches into the future “like tentacles” (Klose, 2007, p. 9). Modern
process philosophy, which conceptually integrated scientific re-imaginings of reality, may be
seen as a prehension of subsequent scientific theorizations of systems and materiality, elements of
Whitehead’s and Susanne Langer’s serve as prescient preludes to late twentieth century theories
of Gaia, autopoiesis and cognition, complexity, feminist new materialisms, and quantum
consciousness. In Langer’s philosophy ‘Acts’ are “articulated elements,” distinguishable “within
a dynamic whole (i.e., a whole held together only by activity),” which are “indivisible in
themselves, and inalienable from the whole, if they are not to give up their identity” (1967, pp.
272-273). Her language prefigures the paradoxical and dynamic autopoietic notion of apparent
permanence of a living entity’s identity, minus an articulation of the exchange of matter and
energy with the entity’s context (immediate environment).
[The persistence of a form] “made and maintained by complicated
disposition of mutual influences among the physical units (atoms, molecules,
then cells, then organs), whereby changes always tend to occur in certain
permanent ways” [is] “always, at every moment, an achievement, because it
depends entirely on the activity of ‘living’ [which] “is itself a process of
continuous change.” Hence, “permanence is a pattern of changes” (1953, p.
66).
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Autopoiesis provided the theoretical frame Lynn Margulis adopted to frame her empirical
work represented in her 1967 paper On the Origin of Mitosing Cell, her 1981work Symbiosis in
Cell Evolution, Acquiring Genomes (2002), and for her work on Gaia theory (1974). Writing in
the 1940s-1960s, Langer’s antecedent philosophy of biology captured more of the nuance,
emergence, and complexity embedded in these theories and in Darwin’s theory of natural
selection than most critical engagements of these concepts grasp. Langer concluded that the
principles governing both evolution and development…
“spring from the nature of acts, [for the patterns of developmental and
evolutionary processes are] inherent in acts, and in all the complexes they
form: lives, populations, stocks, and finally the whole history of life on earth
that we usually mean by ‘evolution’ (1967, p. 371). “The causes of
evolution lie in the dynamic properties of acts and act-engendered entities.
… [Hence, evolution is primarily] “a pattern of acts rather than of the
anatomical changes that form the record of acts” (1967, p. 396).

Like Margulis, contemplation of evolutionary processes led Langer to contemplations of the
Earth as a complex system. For Langer, the advancing course of life emerges from
the pressure of billions of impulses, ever pushing to actualization in every
single organism, entering or failing to enter the moving stream of acts that
constitutes the life of the agent, and beyond the agent, the stock, and
enfolding the stock, the whole teeming life process on earth (1967, p. 377).
At every level, a living system is seen as “a fabric of burgeoning acts, in
literally billions of pressive relations which automatically adjust the elements
of that incredibly complex dynamism to each other” (1967, p. 370 in
Dryden).

Here Langer is drawing on Whitehead’s depiction of becoming as impulse, there is…
“a rhythm to process whereby creation produces natural pulsation, each
pulsation forming a natural unit of historic fact. The data for any one
pulsation of actuality consist of the full content of the antecedent universe as
it exists in relevance to that pulsation (1938, p. 88-89). …The universe is
thus a creative advance into novelty” (1929 in 2010, section V, para. 349).
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In Whitehead’s becoming as impulse, creative and prehensive affinities with the quantum come
together in later applications of Whiteheadian thought to speculative models of reality, as seen
put forth by quantum physicists Tomonaga and Schwinger’s investigations of the observer and
the observed (Klose, 2008),10 which build on Von Neumann’s quantum demonstration showing
that an observed event in the external world is directly linked to the brain of the observer of that
event. In Whitehead’s philosophy,
the perceiving subject does not exist before the perceived events and is not
their contemporary. This would mean a new formulation of a concept of
substance, of a basis bearing the phenomena. Vice versa, the perceived
events are temporal before the objectifying actual entity. (Klose, 2008, p. 9)
In von Neumann’s model, the observer signified experience, while the observed was treated as a
quantum system. The event (in Whitehead’s sense of the term) of observation brought physical
aspects and consciousness together as two aspects of a rationally coherent, natural whole. The
Tomonaga-Schwinger-Surface made quantum adjustments to von Neumann’s principle to
accommodate, like Whiteheads’ becoming, a sequence of instantaneous “nows”. The observer
(consciousness) chose what question (or attention) to direct in the future to (quantum) nature,
which in turn influenced the brain in ways controlled in principle by quantum laws.
“This connection can be found via the quantum Zeno effect, which shows
how the choice and timing of questions can influence the course of events in
the probed system… Since the question to be posed is supposed to be an
experience [consciousness], it would appear that it really ought to be part of
the mental [immaterial], rather than physical [material], side of the mindbrain dynamics. Quantum theory has a lacuna that can very naturally be
filled in such a way as to allow our thoughts to exercise real, though not
absolute, control over the mechanical aspects of mind-brain dynamics.”
(Klose,2008, 14-15).

Joachim Klose argues multiple points of correlation to suggest a synchronicity between
process philosophy and what he calls ‘quantum ontology’ by which reality and matter are “mindlike”. Decades before the Tomonaga-Schwinger experiments, Whitehead’s model of reality stated
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“These elements of ‘freedom of choice’, on the part of the human participant and nature herself,
lead to a picture of reality that gradually unfolds in response to choices that are not necessarily
fixed by the prior physical part of reality alone.” Klose then asks, “Is it now justified to argue that
quantum events could be counted as sentient? This assertion would equip elementary quantum
events with a degree of creativity” (2008, p. 16-17). This is precisely the question that Stuart
Kauffman (2014, 2015) and Karen Barad (2007, 2013) speculatively pursue scientifically; Barad
describes the capacity of electrons to inscript, via quantum tunneling, a temporal future that is
antecedent to an objectifying actual entity. Lynn Margulis integrated Ian McHarg’s
thermodynamic theory of creativity (2006) into her foray into chimeras and consciousness as
sentience. Coming out of his work in neurobiology and Buddhism, Francisco Varela developed
an ethical philosophy of sentience. Some feminist new materialists pursue questions of sentience
by engaging ‘hard’ science in order to theorize embodied meanings and implications (Hird,
Haraway, Alaimo). Susanne Langer figures again as a prehension to this early twenty-first
century trend in feminist thinking. Writing in 1957 on embodiment and agency, she takes
seriously the materiality of process,
Embodied life is an intricately textured dynamic form, that is, a form whose
permanence is really a pattern of changes, [whose] elements are not
independent parts, but interrelated, interdependent centers of activity (1957,
p. 52) held together by multiply coordinated rhythmic interactions. An agent
is a product and producer of acts; a living being. (1971, p. 317)

Over time (such as it might be), concepts and ways of thinking, like proteins, fold
together, unfold and refold in Vichian ricorso. Becoming and the complex uncertainty of ‘acts’
and ‘events’ displaced deterministic and preformationist telos. Illustrative of Vichian Chaos, an
altogether different worldview started to take shape, greatly changed from, yet ironically
synchronous with, the mythic worldviews of antiquity, prior the advent of Platonism,
Aristotelianism and monotheism. Another of Vico’s beliefs emerged from Whitehead’s and
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Langer’s process philosophies of science, and from twentieth century advancements in scientific
concepts of reality and materiality, a rejection of anthropomorphism and human exceptionalism.
In a materiality of life that becomes, as a creative and emergent property of systemic processes of
complexity and Chaos, the uncertainty and dynamic conditions that contextualize and embed
emergence and evolutionary innovation have been shown to be responsive to sentient and
‘conscious’ quantum processes that exchange matter and energy. The explanation of how, to
repeat what Vico said, “whenever the time and fashion is thus and so, such and not otherwise are
the things that come into being” (Vico, XIV, para. 147, as cited in Bergin & Fisch, 1948) amounts
to a politics by which out of many possibilities, an actuality results. Inadvertently, twentieth
century science discovered materiality to be inherently politicized.

Ricorso: Scienza Nuova and Subjectivity
The event illuminates its own past,
but it can never be deduced from it.
11
(Hannah Arendt, 1953, p.323)

Former ontologies of life, materiality, nature, reason, and experience came up for grabs.
Conventional Western academic philosophy and science lost the charade of their former political
and social detachments, agnosticism, and authority over ‘normativity’, prompting new
theorizations of scientific knowledge, at least by those who acknowledged the revelations brought
to light by social and feminist science studies scholars.
Stating that “a theory of knowledge … does not require that we purify science of
references to mind …” (1969, p. 157), Polanyi understood scientific practice to be a craft, an art
that explored the unpredictable to establish collective meaning, as in art myth, and religion. For
Vico, the plural and changing ‘truths’ of mythic narratives, experience, and consciousness were
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‘more true’ and ‘more real’ than Euclidean certainties. Truths were that which is made, ‘verum
factum’. Vico saw the truths of consciousness, or uncertain choice, as different but equivalent to
the truths of science, each being created by humans through cultural concensus, according to the
communal processes that ultimately determine what ‘truth’ is. He believed that what motivated
people to “live in justice and to keep themselves in society” (Vico, para. 2, in Bergin & Fisch,
eds.,1948) was not rationalism and laws but “emotions, creative imagination, and mythic
traditions in which the people believe and live” (Vico, as cited in Mali, 2012, p. 44). The question
of social justice circled, through philosophies of the Other, back to the science of consciousness.
Hegel’s ethical sin, according to Emmanuel Levinas, was a failure of respect, by recognizing the
Other according to his own categories, he deprived the Other of their inescapable ‘irreducible
alterity’ or difference (Yar, Majid, 2002). Levinas asked, “What do I have to do with justice? A
question of consciousness” (1981, p. 157). Recognition of the Other in Levinas as an ethical
consciousness held affinities to Francisco Varela’s analysis of ‘ethical know-how’ based on the
bioneurological reflexivity of sentience and cognition, and to consciousness as an evolutionary
force as microbiologist Lynn Margulis had begun to advance prior to her death.
Not only did materialty itself turn out to embed the political, feminist science scholars, by
interrogating categories of oppression located in ‘scientific’ practices showed ways that the status
quo of the disciplinary practices structured power and inequality (e.g. [of many] Ruth Bleier,
Anne Fausto Sterling, Donna Haraway, Sandra Harding, Ruth Hubbard, Helen Longino, Londa
Schiebinger, Nancy Tuana). Sheila Jasanoff (2005), working in the politics of science, showed
science to be inadequate in providing objective authority. When summoned in service of national
policy debates, identical studies yielded multiple interpretations, depending on the various
political and cultural positions of that nation. Rather than providing objectivity, the ‘interactional
co-production’ of scientific knowledge served as an economic resource that shaped national
identity. Science became a form of politics, but ever since Galileo’s confinement, Fulton’s steam
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engine, the proliferation of engineering schools, and the splitting of the atom, that’s hardly news.
“The sciences are so intimately tied to political authority” (Lloyd, 1996, p. 224).
Polanyi recognized that these features present in a society “lead to further fragmentation
of initiatives and thus increase resistance to any deliberate total renewal of society” (1962, p.
71).12 This statement underscored Gramschi’s observation that hegemony depends upon consent,
and hegemonic discourses prop up status quos and certain powers. Perhaps this helps to explain
the apparently interminable Western discursive ping-pong match over materiality, between
whether opposites are in continual war, or compose a unity, or are different, equal descriptors of a
category (the road that goes up goes down). The match extends back to Heraclitus and before, to
the Milesian monists Anaximenes and Anaximander, and reaches forward, for example, to
Descartes, Hegel, Marx, Althusser, Žižek, Jane Bennett, and Elizabeth Grosz. Why do Western
philosophical and scientific conventions of intellectual analysis obsess over binaries, the dialectic,
singularity, and ontological unity? Despite the transformation of scientific conceptions of matter
being redefined in terms of forces, complexity, indeterminacy, emergence, and self-organization,
since the early 1970s the pursuit of the ‘standard model’ of matter is on-going. This unification
theory of matter states that four fundamental forces, the weak force, the strong force,
electromagnetic force, and gravity, interact in quarks and leptons to form the basic building
blocks of matter. This debate represents another manifestation of the contested political question
over subjectivity and objectivity in that way of knowing particular to meta-narratives of an
imaginary of science that instructs and restricts. Steven Goldman observed that this perennial
pursuit of unification, the compulsion to singularity that drove Einstein to fudge inaccurately his
initial formula for the general theory of relativity, is a holdover from monotheism and Greek
materialistic monism. (2008, p. 192). Patriarchy resists secularity and equality, forcefully.
Hilary Rose articulated the challenge, to create a “practice of feeling, thinking, and
writing that opposes the abstraction of male and bourgeois scientific thought” (1983, p. 87).
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Feminist inquiry turned to strategies of intervention on the ‘tyranny of ontology,’ to use Levinas’
(1989) and Lloyd’s (1995) verbiage. Haraway cautioned against the use of social constructivism
as a critical tool, because it may maintain rather than deconstruct science. Katherine Hayles reoriented scientific knowledge claims as True, Not-true, False, or Less-false (1993). Barad
promoted “onto-epistemology, the study of knowing in being” (2003, p. 829). Another tactic of
intervention has been through various approaches to embodiment, of knowers that embody their
social location (Harding 1997) and by the loosely assembled collective identified by the term new
materialism.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, philosopher of how we experience (phenomenology) wrote:
Insofar as, when I reflect on the essence of subjectivity, I find it bound up
with that of the body and that of the world, this is because my existence as
subjectivity [= consciousness] is merely one with my existence as a body and
with the existence of the world, and because the subject that I am, when
taken concretely, is inseparable from this body and this world (1962, p. 408).

In short, consciousness is embodied intra-actively with the world, and equally, embodiment is
infused with consciousness (in/with the world). Merleau-Ponty disagreed with Levinas’ depiction
of the Other as a separate alterity, stating instead that the subject spontaneously slips into the
Other, rather self and Other are bodily imbrications intertwined in world; self is also the potential
of the Other, and the Other’s potential; seeing someone necessarily involves possibility of being
seen. Perhaps, as quantum uncertainty and entanglement suggest, the response to this problem is
not an either/or but both/and/sometimes. Perhaps the wrong questions are being asked; perhaps
the whole frame has run its course and might better be retired to make space for other frames of
existential and phenomenal apprehension. Luce Irigaray (1993) critiqued both modes of thought,
because each engaged dualisms –either as total incorporation (Merleau-Ponty) or as reduction to
object (Levinas) – that implicate and produce male privilege. Where, she asks, is intersubjectivity
as a method of making sense? Irigaray asserted that Western treatment of women and nature
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foreclose the ethical, and that nothing short of transforming foundational views of subjectivity,
science and religion might alter the situation. This would demand new languages, ones that allow
release from the tyranny of Cartesian reason. Though its acolytes may recess kicking and
screaming, subjectivity is in motion again.

Figure 26. Obscured transitions. Grassland #027 (Underdown, 2005-9)

Lacunas, spatial and temporal, pockmark becoming terrains. Multiple paradigmatic
and fledgling orders overlap and bleed through to each other, edges blur. Lags between
scientific breakthroughs and socio-cultural responses open simultaneously across multiple
space-time frames. Temporalities and conditions are complex and dynamic, fast time
stretches out slowly. The timespan that serves as a backdrop to and frames human
observation may be mismatched to the rate of change, obscuring the transitions underway.
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Notes
1 a simplistic orientation: heat and cold are relative terms, rational and irrational unite.
2 Whitehead, in an admission of his own iconoclastic inclinations, credited his wife’s
thinking as fundamental to his own. Though Whitehead’s philosophy remained on the fringes of
mainstream philosophy of his day, it has recently directly influenced scholars Isabelle Stengers,
Bruno Latour, Niklas Luhmann, Lynn Margulis, and many more.
3 Amartya Sen writes on Michael Polanyi; Francisco Varela writes on Merleau-Ponty;
Lynn Margulis espouses Whitehead and Lamarck; Karen Barad writes on Levinas; Deleuze
writes on Bergson and Spinoza; Elisabeth Grosz writes on Bergson and Darwin (badly);
Kauffman writes on Heraclitus; Rosi Braidotti references Margulis, Varela, and Spinoza; Isabelle
Stengers references Vico, etc.
4 A partial listing of thinkers includes Heraclitus, Giordano Bruno, Giambattista Vico,
Henri Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead, Michael Polanyi, Thomas Kuhn, Gilles Deleuze, Bruno
Latour, Lyotard, Hans Jonas, Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, Gregory Bateson, Stuart
Kauffman, and a cadre of feminist science scholars, such as Elisabeth Lloyd, Sandra Harding,
Ruth Bleier, Helen Longino, Evelyn Fox Keller, Donna Haraway, Isabelle Stengers, Elisabeth
Grosz, Karen Barad, Elizabeth Wilson, Vicki Kirby, Myra Hird, Nancy Tuana, and more.
5 Societyhistoryscience my neologisn, because, for Vico, these were one discipline.
6 The theme of the embodied imaginary recurs in Kauffman’s ‘hard science’ of wonder
(2006) as well as in Isabelle Stengers’ cautionary note about eliminativism in science that
precludes wonder (2011).
7 Vico’s influence extends to the likes of Henri Bergson, Karl Marx, Samuel Beckett,
Alfred North Whitehead, C.S. Pierce, Edward Said, Richard Rorty, Marshall McLuhan, Julia
Kristeva, Derrida (difference within language), Gregory Bateson (difference as relationship).
Also interesting is that the term ‘quark’ in particle physics was taken from James Joyce’
Finnegan’s Wake, too, “Three quarks for Muster Mark.”
8 Langer is probably referring to Whitehead’s meaning of an ‘event’: the unit of reality,
or entity, that is a concrescence of all available information at the time, according to certain
principles, repeating and reinforcing certain patterns, and thereby creating new ones (Seibt,
2016).
9 ‘Ever not quite’ is a Whiteheadian motto, which he appropriated from William James,
to mean the property of becoming and characterized by possibility and novelty.
10 This is a theme central to Francisco Varela’s autopoeisis and cognition as well, that
rests on the ‘structural coupling’ of the entity and its context, and the aphorism that “anything
said is said by an observer” (Maturana & Varela, 1980).
11 Both Whitehead’s and Roy Bhaskar’s meaning of event inflect Arendt’s statement:
Whitehead’s ‘event’ is the unit of reality, or entity, that is a concrescence of all available
information at the time, according to certain principles, repeating and reinforcing certain patterns,
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and thereby creating new ones (Seibt, 2016). Roy Bhaskar’s ‘conjunctions of events’ is the ‘ways
of acting of things’ that does not ascribe necessary causality, teleology, or laws (1978).
12 Michael Polanyi’s brother is Karl Polanyi, author of the counter-capitalism socioeconomic tome, The Great Transformation.
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CHAPTER 5
QUEER CO-(M)MOTIONS OF SCIENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY

By historical method I mean every means of examination of conscience,
of meditation, of contemplation of vocal and mental speech and other
acts by which a person prepares and disposes the self to rid its coherence
and integrity of all inordinate attachments to empire, and after their removal,
by which he or she creates reciprocity and joins with others
in a society of equal historical selves (SOEHS).
During the narration of history of any kind, be sure to attend
to the sound of reproach in the voices of all the anonymous dead.
(Dimock, 2012, p. 29 and p. 85)

In the previous two chapters I pulled on two strands of memory, two different frames of
thinking, each permeated by very different theoretical orientations towards science and its
explanations, to very different effects on subjectivity and the social imaginary, productive of
different narrations of the world. Chapter 3, The Monster In Our Midst, recounted dominant
social imaginaries contextualized by a Cartesian/ Enlightenment noösphere that views the human
subject as a function of a natural and scientifically-knowable telos, a linear and deterministic
story told in a LaPlacean / Baconian / Newtonian mode of thinking. Chapter 4, Vico’s Chaos,
recounted a minoritarian social imaginary produced by a process-oriented noösphere that inverts
the former model, and premises scientific theory and practice as expressions by and expressive of
communities situated by and in their particular timeplace-thinking. Each of these ‘categories’ of
memory reverberate in current feminist theories of subjectivity; looking at these histories reveals
strategies, as Clare Hemmings notes, for a politics of the present. “If we can identify the
techniques through which dominant stories are secured, through which their status as ‘common
sense’ is reproduced, that political grammar may also offer a rigorous point of intervention”
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(2011, p. 20). In this chapter I move from memory, the topic of the last two chapters, to desire,
the impelling and organizing drive behind the politics of feminist new materialism.
I argue, through a focus on Rosi Braidotti’s theory of the zoe-nomad subject, that while
new materialism/posthumanisms extend the work of a long history of process-thinkers, vestigial
strains of the linear, deistic model still infiltrate the feminist project to its detriment. In response I
argue that Braidotti’s cultural critical theory of subjectivity needn’t draw on compromising
sources for its philosophical grounding, by which I identify Spinozist monism and her overidentification with Deleuze and Guattari. While feminist new materialisms embrace science
studies as well as literary and cultural theory, they tend to different tracks, and though these
tracks do acknowledge the others and share broad aims and orientations, the arguments take
significantly different approaches of reasoning. In Braidotti’s case, taking her work as
representative of the larger body of Continential-theory derived new materialist political desires, I
argue that her theory of the zoe-nomadic subject is better supported by the sciences of desire that
her theory, in fact, extends; as a strategy, this would offer the advantage of evading dismissal of
the whole project by the halls of conventional philosophical discourse (Rice University,
forthcoming) under charges of relativism, solipsism, failed logic, or utopianism) to connect a
philosophy of materiality to ‘leftist’ ethical subjectivity. An approach grounded in the ‘new’
science could establish this important feminist political project free of residual strains of
paradigmatic thinking that the politics of the project seeks to upend. In turn, Braidotti’s in-depth
considerations of the subject and processes of subjectivity as a micro-political intervention on the
processes of advanced techno-capitalism extend the work of, as examples, Varela and Barad in
important ways. Barad, Varela, and Braidotti, whom I treat as something of a triptych in this
chapter, orient their urgent calls for transformation of subjectivity to praxes of inter-/intrarelations, but leave off on what that might look like.1 While Braidotti’s aim for her theory of the
subject, “to become other than what we were defined and programmed to be”(2012, p. 341),
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inspires the reader with effective visions that reorient the imaginary, it fails to offer strategies or
tactics—what one of her influences, Isabelle Stengers, correctly identifies as the significance of
materialism, its relations with struggle against “those who believe and those who know” (2011, p.
369)—for reading and changing the power structures ‘we’ are up against.
In this chapter, drawing on late 20th century science and late 20th century feminist
posthuman and new materialist theory, I present my view of the structuring relations between
science and subjectivity, not as a narration by a narrator, but as co-(m)motions of innovation,
dynamic inter- and intra-motions by which each indivisibly ‘brings forth’ the other, the ‘two’
become indistinguishable. This approach enables me to explore the extent to which an affective
theorization of the ethical, becoming subject, such as Braidotti’s, when entangled to a differently
imagined science, provides a platform for the making of new and genuinely secular myths
““worthy of the complexity of our times” (2013, p. 186).
The stakes and goals are one and the same… new foundations of subject and social
imaginaries are necessary in order to build and enact political strategies that bring forth economic
transformation and the ecological restoration of our Holocene epoch planet.2 Rosi Braidotti and
other feminists3 modify Kant’s question to ask, what may we hope now? I extend the question
also to ask, what skills are needed in the becoming other than we have been? This chapter is
primarily about the “propelling force” of feminist desires, which are “a deep yearning for
transformation or a process of affirmation…the affectivity of the imagination is the motor for
these encounters and for the conceptual creativity they trigger” (2006, pp.169-170). By virtue of
their long outsider-status, as outside the margins of dominating frames of power, feminist
theorists (not necessarily female-gendered4) and non-Western thinkers and scientists,5 are wellpositioned to model processes of alternative, secular thinking and creating.6 Accordingly, the late
twentieth century feminist literature has brought to bear several challenges and interruptions to
western philosophic and scientific convention. Many of these extend process themes discussed in
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the previous chapter, with an additional critical element. Feminisms hold knowledge claims and
epistemologies accountable for their social, cultural, political, and economic effects; posthuman
and new materialist feminisms (I discuss these terms in more depth below) hold central critiques
of neoliberalism and its effects. Broadly speaking, these labels, posthumanism and new
materialism, loosely cluster the work of feminist thinkers7 who enact philosophical disruptions on
the dominating western dialectics and telos laid forth in Chapter 3. These disruptions may be
summarized as: 8
• a rejection of taxonomic thinking and of the dialectic imaginary,
• critiques of reductionism and deduction,
• an emphasis on affectivity that challenges the exclusively ‘rational’,
• rejection of human exceptionalism,
• rejection of universals and essentialisms,
• challenges to totalizing notions of a stable one-ness,
• exposure of androcentric biases and deterministic tactics of power
• exposure of false ‘ontologies’ as oppressions (for example race, sexuality, gender, class,
and nationality).
I bring to this group a discussion of scientists whose work supports in some way the aims of these
feminist theorists, Francisco Varela, Manuel DeLanda, Stuart Kauffman, Lynn Margulis, and
James Shapiro. The assemblage of these scientists may be simplistically explained by the
aggregate of what they offer as a group:
• a thinking-style built on process philosophies of becoming,
• reconceptions of matter, materiality, evolution, and genetics
• a re-integration of the body in matters of ‘mind’, and of the mind in matters of ‘body’
• an acknowledgment that embodiment and possibility are inherently linked to the ethical.
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• direct material relation between processes described through science and the social
imaginary,
• radical anti-individualist theorizations of the ‘self’ and the ethical subject.
In short, recent scientific insights represented in this group supports a feminist imaginary that
fosters possibility for what we, as subjects, may hope now.
A feminist imaginary allows a different knowing than that of rational critique. It is an
altogether different logic. The logic I present in this chapter as ‘desire’ bears the marks of the
logic presented in Chapter 3, Memory I, but does not, in its dynamics or mode of thinking, align
with those logics. The logics of this chapter, Desire, reconfigure those of Memory. These
reconfigured concepts come of asking different questions in a different time for different reasons;
that is, its fundamental difference can be largely explained by its accountability to a
fundamentally different situated-ness. Suspended in the gap space between memory and desire,
in-between these perforated and leaking boundaries, a feminist imaginary trolls genealogies and
temporalities and hopes and creative possibilities. While the human imagination can “run amok
with affectivity and dreams or fictions” (2006, p. 164), a feminist imaginary moves freely outside
of social normativity, its enactions subvert and complicate the reigning noösphere, such that we,
as human subjects, might become other than we have been.

Monster-ous Monstrosities
Proteus, of sea-green hue, traverses the mighty main in his car
drawn by fishes and a team of two-footed steeds.
Virgil, tr. Lewis, 1940 Georgics 4.388

And though she take a hundred lying forms,
let her not escape you,
but hold her close, whatever she may be,
until she take again the form she had at first.
-Proteus to Peleus, Ovid, Metamorphoses, 11.250
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Affectivity and embodiment precondition the posthuman, ethical project and, thus the
feminist imaginary, as I use it, embeds and is embedded in materiality, and therefore does not
relate to the ideological imaginaries of a Spinoza, Althusser, or Lacan. It does embrace Varela,
Barad, and Braidotti, whom I see as forming a particular triad that forms connections between
science (as enaction and innovation—materiality) and ethical subjectivity, in a way that supports
a politics of possibility, hope, and life. These “yearning[s] as a radical aspiration to freedom”
(Braidotti, 2013, p. vii) also only thinly veil a tone of urgency, an exasperation and almost
desperate pleading that simultaneously acknowledges and mourns inevitable, impending losses.
But Braidotti does not confront darkness with darkness. Her aim, at its core, is to cultivate
“affirmation and joy … in order to pull out of the end of millennium stagnation” (2002, p. 211).
She presents a nomadic theory of subjectivity that is an ethical, impassioned and compassionate
location of hope in the ‘here and now’ of possible futures, a hope so ardently placed beyond
(though not in contrast to) panic and mourning (affective politics, too, are complex and nomadic)
as to suggest a subtle underbelly of disquietude, one which, while understandable, goes
unacknowledged, save one admission to frustration. Nomadic subjectivity emphasizes the role of
“passions, empathy and desire as modes of relation” (2012, p. 266) that work against nihilism,
liberal individualism, and ‘delirious megalomania’. Desire, then, in Rosi’s theoretical frame,
reconfigures the subject, it is a ubiquitously dispersed9 praxis of political resistance embedded in
the human body, suitable to memory and to the “monstrous and grotesque imaginary we have
inherited from the nineteenth century” (2002, p. 267). The posthuman imaginary of feminist new
materialism takes on those monsters, and gets perceived by some as monstrous for its resistance
to humanism, and owns its own monsters; monstrosity is in the eye of the beholder.
Feminist biologist Donna Haraway’s monster is a schismed thing with a three-fingered
hand, its cut divides subject from object, and its hand unites the digits of science, economics, and
social control (1991, p. 8). Haraway laid scholarly foundations that explain how the cultural
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monstrosity of advanced techno-capitalism plays the God-trick on ‘nature’, invoking an altruistic
‘calling’ to command-and-control systems of profit, power, and war that exploit non-human
resources (1991). Age-old domination finds new expression in control hierarchies such as human
engineering, sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, corporate management, and labor practices.
Perversely, oligarchic malthusian gods (omg: affluent white Western men with too much power)
applied their disembodied, rationalist minds to mitigating the excesses of [neo-Darwinist]10
competition in their pursuit of a desired, yet out-of-nature, state of harmony. Social harmony, so
the story went, offered an improvement over God’s ‘natural laws’ left bare. Western colonial and
economic imperialisms of and since the twentieth century self-anointed such acts as acts of
altruism in domesticating the ‘wild’, i.e. Other humans, Other life, Other geographies. “The
search for the illusive subject paradoxically ends regularly in the discovery of the totalitarian
object—nature, the gene, the word” (1991, p. 78). As wielded by the OMG, scientific knowledge
operated as an armature of political and social control to wed unnatural, harmonious desires of the
mastering mind and the natural, material servile wild. 11
Rosi Braidotti identifies post-industrial techno-monstrosity in “consumerist liberal
individualism” that capitalizes on technologies of biopiracy afforded by information and
genocentric economies of hybridity, and which disintegrate distinctions between self and others
—the human/animal, life/not-life, the organic/inorganic/technological. She locates a “vampiric”
monster in an advanced capitalism that consumes the surplus vital matter of ‘others’,
it is head-less and centre-less, yet hegemonic, mobile and flexible, yet fixed
and very local; inherently violent and ruthless, thus prone to self-destruction;
as a system, it is illogical and without an endpoint, aiming only at selfperpetuation; … it is the great nomad par excellence (2012b, p. 17) that has
produced the homogenization of commodity culture in terms of consumerist
practices, coupled with huge disparities and structural inequalities” (2006, p.
31). “Advanced capitalism acts as the petri dish of a contemporary social
imaginary that “swings between euphoric techno-transcendentalism and
paranoid technophobia. (2012a, pp. 170-171).
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Braidotti locates the center of these scientific and political debates as the life-itself that festers
within the bellies of their material and embodied beasts.
Hybridity as monstrosity remains a source of terror and macabre attraction that
challenges humanism’s notions of the human and nature, and threatens anthropocentric
patriarchal autonomy.12 Haraway published her theory of the cyborg subject— part animal, part
human, part technology— at the height of the Cold War. Now, decades later, in times of “blissedout, techno-sublime euphoria” she has backed off from the misunderstood and misapplied,
transhuman interpretations of her earlier cyborg theory in favor of her theory of companion
species. Microbiologist and evolution scientist Lynn Margulis champions such hybridity that
expresses the symbiotic processes that characterize all living entities as chimeras; symbiogenesis
explains the evolutionary resource that has sustained all life, from bacteria to eukaryotic
organisms, for 3.5 billion years of evolution. Margulis’ lens that looks at ‘life-itself’ in the
context of geologic time observes that boundaries and membranes have always been dissolving,
transgressing, and transforming, the identity of an entity is inherently transient, provisional,
temporary, and in autopoietic process. Paradoxically, constantly renewing metabolic exchanges
with flows of matter and energy secure the continuity of form and function of an autopoietic
entity, whether cell or organism.13 Scientifically, the idea that an entity is constitutively
autonomous, whether living, inert, or conceptual, has always been a myth (i.e. false). The mark of
the definite article on conceptual objects (the human, the species, the ecosystem, the mind, the
body), according to Bruno Snell (see Chapter 4), reveals a fallacy of misplaced concreteness
(Whitehead, see Chapter 4). Static reifications and classifications, and autonomy as isolated
individuation are but misleading appearances that have no perch in life-itself. Monsters, if they be
hybrid and protean, are us, and that’s the good news, for it rearranges everything about the now of
Western culture and subjectivity. Real monsters, those that end life, may not be hybrids but be
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quiescent essences, singularity and certainty, hierarchical and centralized controls without
accountability to mess or complexity.
Braidotti locates another affirmative varietal of the monstrous (as in huge) in the “energy
of life” that does not respond to our names, but endures through differences and by differing
(2012a). This vision reflects a more recent iteration of the posthuman turn, which neither has one
voice or definition, but, may be described by its collective concensus that, in rejecting human
exceptionalism, sees the hybrid predicament of a world as salaciously and anxiously saturated by
technoscientific life as capital, to think it, posthuman scholars fumble for a critical and applicable
theory outside of humanism’s universalizing narratives that fix essences, and that acknowledges
the crucial play of nonhumans in all processes (e.g. information technologies, in vitro
fertilization, mammal and embryo cloning, transgenic manipulations, artisanal cheese-making).
But telling the human body being preyed upon by vampiric systems apart from the human body
of agential political and ethical transformation, both being modes of ‘becoming other’ flows, is
not, as Braidotti notes, readily transparent, and so it is the task of cultural and political theory and
practice to make the differentiations (2007, p. 67).
As a critical theorist, Rosi Braidotti sees her task as double-edged, at once to make sense
of our present and to dream aspirationally. “It is the dream of producing socially relevant
knowledge that is attuned to basic principles of social justice, the respect for human decency and
diversity, the rejection of false universalisms; the affirmation of the positivity of difference; the
principles of academic freedom, antiracism, openness to others and conviviality” (2013, p. xi).
This tone, deliberately engaged, marks a shift from her earlier work between 2002-2007 that
focused more on Agamben (2007a, reiterated in 2013 in The Posthuman), and on neo-liberal and
neo-Kantian thought, to which she countered with Deleuzian ‘becoming machine’ language
(2002, 2007b). It reveals an oppositional discomfort, a frustration and anxiety that gropes for a
way out. When her focus turns from human to posthuman discourse, which is when she integrates
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the inspiration of process-oriented sciences that describe life as a “relentlessly generative force”
(zoe)14 (2006, p. 37) in the midst of this age of “informatics of domination” (Haraway, 1991, p.
162), and when new materialist discourse returns the body of the post-anthropocene subject to
feminism —with sufficient weight to re-balance former marginalization of the ‘enfleshed’ body
by the discursive— the span of her new materialist/posthuman work comes into better focus. She
envisions new generations of ‘knowing subjects’ that “enact principles of community bonding
free from the provincialism of the mind, the sectarianism of ideologies, the dishonesty of
grandiose posturing and the grip of fear. … That means we need to learn to think differently
about ourselves” (2013, pp. 11-12).
In reframing a politics of the changing nonhuman/living world, the literature takes a
couple of paths. Barad makes an important distinction, “posthumanism” “marks a refusal to take
the distinction between “human” and “nonhuman” for granted, and to found analyses on this
presumably fixed and inherent set of categories” (2007, p. 32). The critical effect of such a refusal
is to disable dreams of the “human” and “nonhuman” as materially constituted differentially.
Barad’s ethico-scientific materiality of entities would be the ‘ism’ of the posthuman, while
Braidotti’s engagement of the ‘perverse’ and ‘paradoxical’ posthuman predicament is less about
Barad’s materiality and more about moving beyond European history (the ‘post’ of Humanism).
Braidotti’s aim is to use her brand of posthumanism as a navigational tool to explain the
‘profound’ transformations under way in our situated historical location (2013) and its affective
dimensions15 in order to “think critically and creatively about who and what we are actually in the
process of becoming” (p. 12). Haraway, noting that the imagined human of Humanism is known
to us only through non-innocent translations, perspicaciously asks, “how can humanity have a
figure outside the narratives of humanism; what language would such a figure speak” (2004, p.
49).
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New ways of thinking difference and subjectivity need new languages. To me, the term
‘posthuman’ suffers from its construction on ‘human’, thereby reinforcing the very thing it means
to decenter (here is one place that begs for a new word). I use the term posthuman simply to refer
temporally to the late twentieth and early twenty-first century made distinctive by the locking of
global advanced capitalism to advancing technolife, and also made distinctive by the biological
sciences that explain life’s becoming as a matter of complex flows, self-organizing relations, and
material assemblages of diverse organisms that give no privilege to, nor center on the human.16
Defined these various ways, the term posthuman figures frequently in the discursive language of
feminist new materialisms, the critical theory that, in response to what was left out by poststructural privileging of performative language and verbal text, feminist scholarship refocuses on
the body and materiality. Feminist science studies, having never abandoned the body, informs this
shift of focus in cultural theory and humanities scholarship, opening new avenues of
transdisciplinarity that integrate scientific and social considerations in new frameworks of
natureculture (Haraway), onto-epistemological (Barad), biocultural (Anne Fausto-Sterling)
analysis and reflection. Being based loosely on the premise that “cells and culture [and
environment (author’s insert)] construct each other” (2000, p. 242), neuroscientist Elizabeth
Wilson (2004) argues that ‘gut feminisms’ do the political work of difference that, without the
sciences, sociocultural constructions cannot accomplish. By reclaiming objects of knowledge that
have traditionally belonged to reductionist modes of explanation, new materialism provides for
new thinking around the sciences, nature, biology, the body, and materiality that extends the
dynamic process philosophies of becoming found in Bergson and Deleuze (each of whom were
inspired by Alfred North Whitehead) to arrive at a political and ethical commitment to life-itself
as well-being.
In general, new materialism concerns “an enlarged sense of inter-connection between self
and others, including the non-human or ‘earth’ others” (Braidotti, 2008, p. 34), and the barriers of
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negativity on the other. Rosi expands Deleuzian philosophy to construct her own vision for an
ethical politics of life and subjectivity “worthy of the complexity of our times” (2013, p. 186). I
assess Rosi’s vision in terms of what it offers productively to the overall project — the vision and
affect to become ourselves (collectively) as ourselves, who will have been fundamentally
different from the selves we are, from what the Western master-narratives tell us we are, and from
whom we thought we were supposed to have been — and to make note of what her vision lacks
and risks.

The Sciences of Desire

The Universe is not only queerer than we suppose,
it is queerer than we can suppose.
J. B. S. Haldane (1928, p. 286)

The critical theory of feminist new materialist and posthuman process-thinkers is
supported by twentieth century developments in science in the fields of physics, biology, and
evolution, which, as they seem to me to form an assemblage, I collectively refer to as the material
gap. This is the science that proceeds outside of organizing assumptions of cause and effect, of
telos, of reductionism, linearity, equilibrium, or certainty and universals. I explain here Stuart
Kauffman’s concepts of the ‘poised realm’ and, in biology, the ‘adjacent possible’ as cousin to
the physics concepts of ‘possibility space’ (aka ‘phase space’ or ‘state space’) as presented by
Manuel DeLanda. While Kauffman’s discursive style remains loyal to the linear conventions of
his training, put to use, ironically, to undermine those very foundations, DeLanda sees this
approach as problematic to changing our way of thinking about the world. He instead presents a
non-linear history that represents reality as “different ways in which single matter-energy
expresses itself,” (1997, p. 21). Since then, theories (more metaphors) have been put forth —that
matter-energy constitutes information, some astronomers analyzing the physics of black holes
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suggest that the universe is an information structure, and some astrophysicists suggest negative
mass may be possible under certain conditions to an observer (Grant, 2014). Scientific theories,
generally, are corrigible metaphors that reflect the participant-observer. Accordingly, I present the
ideas of an assemblage of late-twentieth century scientists, DeLanda, Kauffman, Margulis,
Varela, and Shapiro, not in order to critique, but to make the point that a different science, a
science of material possibility supports the desires expressed in the feminist critical theory of
political possibility that I also present in this chapter. I present this science as a way to model a
different thinking, to orient a different imaginary, to anchor a different subjectivity, to narrate a
transformation to modern Western myths that is underway. These scientists spatially locate a
creative dynamic in material gaps as characteristic to processes in both physics and biology, and
which make way for these scientists’ further musings on the materiality of life-itself. They share
in a rejection of the schizophrenic lineage of the Cartesian mind/body and the Hegelian dialectic
in formations of the subject. This group understands life to be self-organizing, creatively
expressed in flows of matter and energy that embed history and take unpredictable form in the
burgeoning of diverse entities. For most of this group, humans do not rate as exceptional. Such
scientific positioning lends support to conceptualizations of radical subjectivity that new
materialist feminist literature does well at extending and interrogating.
In the course of laying out their spatial configurations of possibility, both DeLanda and
Kauffman arrive at redefinitions of causality. DeLanda adopts a complex view by which “causal
interactions among component parts… exercise their capacities to affect and be affected,
constituting the mechanism of emergence behind the properties of the whole” (2011, p. 385), and
in his language can be heard echoes of Latour. Relations between interactive components and
between the object and the context in which it is embedded change, without the terms of the
object itself, changing. While DeLanda comes to this through his framings in physics, this is
nothing if not a topological restatement of autopoiesis. The properties that give rise to an object in
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its ‘wholeness’, composed by the functions and forces of its components, don’t matter to the
identification of an object as that object.17 His view of causality draws from a quantitative physics
that is without linearity, homogeneity, law, or teleology, but richly complex.
Possibility space, in DeLanda’s usage, is topological, meaning it is the space of all
solutions to predictive models of future states of a particular physical process. All tendencies and
outcomes in the possibility space are real; of these, as if acted upon by natural selection, only
some become actual. This distinction between the real and the actual that DeLanda emphasizes
describes two possible states materiality occupies. And like Darwin’s evolution of descent with
modification, “the current actual state cannot be deduced from the equation alone because it
depends on the historical path that the process followed” (2011, p. 389). Within possibility space,
capacities to affect and be affected are infinite, while tendencies to different types of stability
(steady, periodic, turbulent) in dynamic systems are limited. Capacities and tendencies are real
(‘virtual’ in the language of Deleuze, to whom DeLanda connects philosophically), even if not
actual; they precondition emergence while evading classical norms of mechanistic linearity18 and
ontological commitments to causal ‘law’. “The current actual state cannot be deduced from the
equation alone because it depends on the historical path that the process followed. … Thus, while
much of the work on causal mechanisms and mechanism-independent singularities is performed
by scientists and mathematicians, the elucidation of the modal status of capacities and tendencies
and the enforcement of immanence must be performed by philosophers (2011, p. 389).

Kauffman, however, attempts to do both, to provide through classical deductive,
linear, ‘lawed’ argument a speculative, scientific proof of ‘possibility space’, what he
analogously, but not identically, develops into his concept of the ‘poised realm’,19 which
in concert with quantum mind and the actual, recovers acausality, and with it an
embodied subjectivity that has been lost for 350 years of Newtonian Cartesianism, and
rescues a ‘responsible’20 free will and experience from determinist erasure. The triad of
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actuals, possibles, and mind, by which he also means consciousness and experience—
there is no discussion of the body in his 2014 paper (although writing in 2008 that,
“Embodied in us, human mind is a meaning and doing organic system” (p. 177)); body
and mind are adjacent and real, but still separate; stating that “immaterial mind has
consequences for matter,” Kauffman accepts the physicists’ language of immaterial to
mean “not objectively real,” a rock is objectively real (2008, 209); so, by implication,
Kauffman of 2008 understands matter classically, as that which has substance—jointly
function21 in a “co-creative becoming” of ‘reality’ (2014, p. 17) that is instantaneous22
and acausal. If Kauffman’s quantum ‘mind’ were to be understood generously along
feminist new materialist lines that undo binaries, as Kauffman wants to do, too, then
perhaps it would be reasonable (!) to conceive of his 2014 triad as inclusive of the body
as an affective and sentient transect (from the quantum level of the electron on up
through the subject’s conscious experience) that crosses through each component of his
triad; this is indeed the implication of his 2014 paper, that mind is not solely human; it
distributes across all of matter23 and that the poised realm system is both emergent and
material. Matter, and the body, in Kauffman lack clarity, but it seems his thinking may be
evolving.
Kauffman approaches this rescue mission of acausality and responsible free will with “hope
and skepticism,” (2014, p. 18); interestingly, the words imagine, experience, desire, metaphor,
and hope show up forty-nine times totally in his 2014 paper, so while Kauffman never surrenders
the split between ontology and experience, the objectivist inclinations of his thinking are being
radicalized by affect and by the quantum world and this brings him smack inside the interface of
science and subjectivity. Similar to Barad’s explorations of non-locality, measurement, and
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entanglement in quantum physics as grounding a new ethics, Kauffman, too, argues through
science for his desire for an evolving global ethics. If his argument is ‘true’ (his language is
formalist), then the classical world leaves a record, just as Barad states, “the past is never over
and done with” (2014), “we construct the world we think we live in (2014, p. 18). In the poised
realm, possibility affects the actual and mind, which in turn create and limit new possibles, and so
on as “we and nature jointly ‘create reality’ “ (2014, p. 17).
Kauffman’s renewed focus on quantum physics follows his prior work that focused on
questions of biology, in which he asserts that biology cannot be reduced to physics. Quantitative
biology cannot describe that always changing space of the ‘poised realm’ of biological emergence
of order at the edge of chaos. Like DeLanda’s ‘possibility space’, the poised realm does not
reduce to formal methods that ‘prestate’ possibilities, either of pre-adaptations, expressions of
pre-adaptation, or phylogenic trajectories. In the unpredictable poised realm of uncertainty, be it
of the biosphere, the cell, ecological community, or ecosystem, Stuart Kauffman locates
spontaneously ordering energies of ‘life-itself’ that emerge in a grand dance of “transform or die,
or both … each creature evolving as best it can, inevitably creates the conditions of its own
ultimate elimination…making way for new forms of life and ways to be” (1995, p.130 and p.
243). Examples of this spontaneous ordering, expressive of the emergence of ‘actual’ matter from
DeLanda’s ‘real’ matter of the poised realm, include a lipid’s formation of a bilipid membrane
vesicle, the Fibonaci series of a pinecone’s phyllotaxis, the origin of life as phase transitions
through collective autocatalytic processes of chemical reaction systems, patterns of ecosystem coevolutions, and the evolutionary repurposing of fins as wings and temperature-moderating
feathers for flight. “It is from these unlimited combinations that truly novel structures are
generated” (DeLanda 1997, p. 16). DeLanda references, amongst others, Kauffman (1990, pp.
428-429), who calls these the ‘adjacent possible’ of biological functionalities. I think of these
empty niches as the negative space of boundary conditions, a material gap where new relations
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between parts may be ‘at-the-ready’ should and when conditions change, as if warehousing an
indefinite array of creative, unpredictable-possibles of evolutionary and environmental processes
for a possible future of becoming actual (the lungs of the lung fish become the swim bladder that
yields neutral buoyancy in the water column for some fish, becomes the habitus of specialized
endosymbiotic bacteria (Kauffman, 2013, Heraclitus). Unknowable by reason but made sense of
by metaphor, the ‘emerging novel adjacent possible empty niches’, Kauffman suggests, follows a
‘quantum logic’ by which meanings cannot be ascribed to either true or false. The radical
intervention here is Kauffman’s concept of order as a creative, playful, stunningly beautiful, and
improvised24 property of complex networks. “We seem to have been profoundly wrong. Order,
vast and generative, arises naturally” (1995, p. 25).25
Evolution as a process of becoming over time ‘enables’ but does not cause. Like DeLanda,
Kauffman erases classical notions of causality, and instead engages his concept of ‘enablement’,
defined as making possible. Kauffman posits an explicit premise, that “no law entails the
evolution of the biosphere” (2012, p. 1380) and that “the very phase space of evolution changes
in unprestatable ways” (2012, p. 1386). In other words, nature is not an object obedient to
limiting laws of prediction; the poised realm, or possibility space, of life’s vast and generative
trajectory proceeds without limit or constraint, until subjected to the limiting effects of natural
selection on the becoming of actual and historical matter; there exists (I even claim, materially)
infinitely more possibilities and configurations than ever become actual. This ecological view of
‘enablement’ does not accommodate reductionism, instead, relationality in biotic and abiotic
niches “enable what evolves,” and we do not begin to understand this co-constitution.
The scientific investigation into the mysteries of this co-constitution have also been modeled
by Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela in their works on autopoiesis and
enactive cognition, and by Lynn Margulis’ work in symbiogenesis and endosymbiosis26, by
James Shapiro’s work in cellular genetics, and by Karen Barad’s work in entanglement and
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quantum field theory. An analogous equivalent to possibility space and the poised realm (which I
group under my umbrella term, the ‘gap’) appears as a component in all of their works, each
contribution shores up the work of the others. Intra- and interactions between organisms, between
cellular organelles and their information communication systems, biological niches, ecosystems,
and electron spins and charges are “ever changing, intrinsically indeterminate”; we cannot
anticipate the “niches” that constitute the boundary conditions and ecotones, we cannot anticipate
what will have emerged. “We can only inhabit a micro-identity when it is already present, and not
when it is in gestation” (1999, p. 52). For these scientists, despite their different disciplines and
the particularities of their vernaculars, life —living matter— evolves as a creative and ordering
emergence (or a bringing forth)27 through processes that are sentient, embedded, and consciously
‘communicative’ on the interior of their enveloping membranes and with epi-entity / epicomponent /epigenetic conditions. This position, despite the supporting advancements (using
reductionist methods) already accepted by the larger scientific community, remains marginal and
heretical to the culture of evolutionary biology, which relies on statistical formalisms to the
exclusion of observation and physiology. Such intransigence gives testamentary evidence to the
staying power of the neo-Darwinist genetic techno-imaginary of the selfish, capitalist
gene/subject as a machined blueprint. I remind my reader of the definition of life by biochemist
Craig Venter as “DNA software-driven machines” (as cited in Freeman, 2013). These precepts
hold not only circles of science and industry but also the collective popular Western imagination
in their narrative grasp of advanced capitalism; they model the content, practices, politics, and
worldview of what alternative understandings of life-itself and the subject are up against, and
thereby mark points for destabilizing interventions (Hemmings, 2011) in political strategies for
change.
Views of possibility as material to the ‘responsible’ co-becomings of the world, such as put
forth by DeLanda, Kauffman, Barad, Shapiro, and Varela, generate a different politics of life,
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“there is in these new theories a positive, even joyful conception of reality. And while these views
do indeed invoke the ‘death of man,’ it is only the death of the ‘man’ of the old ‘manifest
destinies’” (DeLanda, 1997, p. 274).
The view of the material world that emerges from these considerations is not
one of matter as inert…[nor] … an obedient matter that follows general laws.
It is rather an active matter endowed with its own tendencies and capacities,
engaged in its own divergent, open-ended evolution, animated from within
by immanent patterns of being and becoming. This other material world can
certainly inspire awe in us but does not demand from us to be accepted with
pious resignation. (DeLanda, p. 392).
Echoes of Deleuzian immanence and becoming figure prominently in DeLanda, and in Braidotti,
as will be shown; these tracings, shown in Chapter 4, hail Vico and company. In the long history
of inquiry into consciousness that extends far earlier than that of the Cartesian Enlightenment,
individuality was not attributed to active processes of materiality; this ‘tortured vein’ of thought
comes back to the surface in intersections of current science studies and philosophy, significantly
contextualized, again, by the current social and political conditions that inspire and situate the
inquiry.
Sounding like the radical and feminist philosophy that Kauffman is not schooled in, he states
“radical emergent becoming…creates its own future possibilities of becoming” (2012, p. 17).28
Without selection acting to do so, the biosphere is persistently creating its
own future possibilities! The biosphere, beyond selection, persistently
creates what it may become!…[R]eductionism fails for the evolution of life
and we are beyond Newton and Schrodinger. (2014, p. xiv)
Kauffman raises the same question that DeLanda raises in his statement that “no law entails the
evolution of the biosphere” (Longo, Montevil, & Kauffman, 2012, 1380). “The question then,” as
DeLanda puts forth, “is whether the very concept of ‘law’, a concept that, it may be argued,
constitutes a kind of theological fossil embedded in modern science, is adequate to think about
these immanent patterns” (2011, 386). Kauffman affirms that science can no longer be about
prediction, it is a search for explanations in a paradoxical world; accordingly, he investigates life
165

as systems evolving spontaneously in conditions of complexity, “No vital force or extra substance
is present in the emergent, self-reproducing whole” (1995, p. 24). In contrast to the Victorian
canon of natural history that connected the political mindset of empire and progress in England to
its legitimate powers to command and control nature, complexity evidences that “we do not know
what we are doing…having invented the categories, we carve the world into them and find
ourselves categorized as well …. global civilization would have to invent its own new sustaining
myths” (1995, pp. 300-303). Causality, then, as defined by Kauffman and his scientist co-authors,
is “difference that causes difference” (Longo et al., 2012, p. 1379) and is embedded in and
embeds the “indefinite, un-orderable” (p. 1389) poised realm, spoken like a true feminist
epistemologist. The material gap of intra-acting forces lies beyond mathematics and words, and
may be imagined only as that which exceeds the imaginary, and enables radical collective
emergence (the creative).
My discussion here on Kauffman and DeLanda focuses on a realm of meta-scientific inquiry
that reveals possibility space, the poised realm, and the adjacent possible as active lacunas, the
very materiality of which demands a transformation of scientific ideologies, if not of worldviews,
and which, for now, are conceptually populated by the creative co-becomings of subject and
world, both always-already in constant, dynamic motion, thus my phrase, the creative co(m)otions of science and subjectivity (pun intended, the dynamics are definitionally in motion,
appear chaotic, but in Vichian style, are simply complex). I now move to a parallel discussion of
embodied creative possibility space on the scientific micro-level, in Varela’s neurocognitive
sensorimotor patterns and in James Shapiro’s cellular genetics.
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Sentience
“If my internal awareness were glued
without gap to my fleeting experiences,
the passage of time would rip my ego to shreds.”
(Brough 1989, p. 288, as cited in Shear & Varela, 1999, p. 130).

Varela’s work, too, undoes dualist frameworks of inquiry by which “logical antinomies” only
lead to “conceptual knots,” indicative of wrongly posed questions that in neglecting first-person
praxes (“the experiential and social dimension in —even the most consecrated forms of natural
science —is often hidden, but never entirely absent” (Shear & Varela, 1999, 13)) neglect the
neurodynamics of experience, thereby silencing the empirical evidence of the ecological intraembeddedness of self, inter-subjectivities, and world. To study conscious experience29
scientifically, defined as the lived experience associated with cognitive and mental events in
which experience (and affect) are explicitly active components of consciousness (p. 1), Varela
advocates first-person methodologies, linked to third-person accounts. Subjectivity is central to a
science of the consciousness.
For Varela, “perception and action are embodied in self-organizing sensorimotor processes”
(1999, p. 15). Cognition consists of embodied action. Actions/behaviors of immediate coping–
‘know-how’– walking, reading aloud, dressing and undressing, eating, responding to the needs of
others—are expert skills unfettered by intention or the application of rules or analysis, having
taken the longest evolutionary time to develop; by training over time, these actions transformed
into embodied behavior. It is on this level of cognition-as-expertise that Varela constructs his
concept of ‘ethical know-how,’ one that can be learned through praxis. “The basic idea is that
embodied (sensorimotor) structures are the substance of experience, and that experiential
structures “motivate” conceptual understanding and rational thought” (p. 16), cognition brings
forth embodied subjectivity. Varela suggests that cognition, as understood scientifically, has
potential as a tool and practice for the development of the subject’s ethical engagement in the
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world.30
To explain cognition as distributed processes of emergence by which “signals move back and
forth, gradually becoming more coherent until a micro-world has been constituted” (1999, pp. 489), Varela cites Walter Freeman’s findings from a study of rabbits’ olfactory system, and I quote
here at length:
Emergent patterns of activity are created out of a background of incoherent
or chaotic activity by fast oscillations until the cortex settles into a global
electrical pattern, which lasts until the end of the sniffing behavior and then
dissolves back into the chaotic background. The oscillations then provide a
means of selectively binding a set of neurons in a transient aggregate that
constitutes the substrate for smell perception at that precise instant. Smell
appears in this light, not as some kind of mapping of external features, but as
a creative form of enacting significance on the basis of the animal’s
embodied history. What is most pertinent here is that this enaction happens
at the hinge between one behavioral moment and the next, via fast
oscillations between neuronal populations that can give rise to coherent
patterns. …
It seems that between breakdowns these oscillations are the symptoms
of very rapid reciprocal cooperation and competition between distinct agents
activated by the current situation, vying with each other for differing modes
of interpretation for a coherent cognitive framework and readiness- foraction. This dynamic engages all the sub-networks that give rise to the entire
readiness-for-action in the next moment. It involves not just the sensory
interpretation and motor action but the entire gamut of cognitive expectations
and emotional tonality central to the shaping of a micro-world. On the basis
of this dynamic one neuronal ensemble (one cognitive subnetwork) finally
prevails (i.e. a bifurcation in a chaotic dynamic) to become the behavioral
mode for the next cognitive moment, a microworld. … In the breakdown
before the next micro-world shows up, there are a myriad of possibilities
available until, out of the constraints of the situation and the recurrence of
history, a single one is selected. The fast dynamic is the neural correlate of
the autonomous constitution of a cognitive agent at a given present moment
of its life. … The cognitive self is its own implementation: its history and its
action are of one piece” (pp. 50-54, italics in original).
Systems of fast resonance to transiently bind neuronal ensembles pattern life-itself, being
located, for example, in the visual cortex of mammals, the avian brain, and the ganglia of an
invertebrate, Hermissenda. In objection to ‘causal modes of input-processing-output’ garnered
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from computationalism to model the workings of the brain as “simply incorrect,” Varela
describes the architecture of the brain as supporting the operation of signals to move “back and
forth,” not in a seamless flow from one state to another, but “in a punctuated succession of
behavioral patterns that arise and subside” in a “natural temporal parsing” (pp. 48-49). The
oscillations and breakdowns of neurocognitive processes in Varela bear striking resemblance to
Kauffman’s proposed “persistently poised quantum coherent-decoherent system”31 of
mind/consciousness, one difference being that Varela additionally explicitly addresses
intersections of embodiment and affect as constitutive of the ‘virtual self’ and “at the same time
contain[ing] a radical openness or unexpectedness with regards to its occurring” (Shear & Varela,
p. 132). He explores the linkages between affection and the constitution of time as directly
impacting what he calls ‘coping’, the readiness for action that marks an “expectation as to the
way the world will show up,” for example habitus and learning a skill. Affect, for Varela, is “a
dispositional trend proper to a coherent sequence of embodied actions.” Affection and learning
enact a world by coping in temporal flows that are deeply rooted biologically.
In sum, Varela presents a ‘hard-science’ of the role of affect and experience in preconscious neurological processes in a co-(m)motion of becoming self and world, mapped by the
co-(m)motions of science and subjectivity. He uses non-linear mathematics and dynamical
systems methods to perform temporal measurements (msecs) of neuronal sensori-motor enactions
that, in unceasing flow, configure items into ‘meaningful world’ (Shear & Varela, 1999, pp. 116125). Lending evidence to cognition as embodied and dynamic, measurements of each of cellular
rhythms, synaptic integration, central oscillations, memory, and excitability cycles show the
emergence of self-organizing patterns of “endogenous configurations of [reciprocal cell
assemblies] of neuronal activity” (p. 116). Taken together, these correspond as well to a view of
temporality as an embodied, neurocognitive process. ‘Nowness’, present-time consciousness,
emerges as a ‘pre-semantic descriptive-narrative assessment’ linked in humans to our linguistic
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capacities. The integration of moments of ‘nowness’ gives rise to broader temporalities of
memory and imagination (desire, anticipation) that constitute the flow of consciousness.
“Inseparable from our history as living beings and minute events in brain physiology, …
emotional tonality [‘an awareness that is constitutive of the living present’], is, by its very [preconscious] action, a major boundary and initial condition for neuro-dynamics” (p. 132-133).
The neurodynamics of time as a dynamical system are based on non-linear coupled
oscillators, for which the norms of perpetual self-propelled motion are instability and multistability. Accordingly, “any slight change in initial and boundary conditions makes the system
move to a nearby stable/unstable region” (Shear & Varela, 1999, p. 128), and we are reminded of
the butterfly effect.32 Here Varela engages complexity theory to discuss consciousness in terms of
fissures, breakdowns and loss in the fluidity of coping within the ‘phase space landscape and the
specific trajectories that move in it,’ which condition the embodied coupling of affective-tonality
and temporality. Varela acknowledges that this dynamic of breakdown and ‘re-membering
desire’33 is what Kauffman refers to as ‘operating at the edge of chaos’ and ‘self-organized
criticality’ (1993) in the space that hovers, or oscillates, between chaos and order. I point out to
my reader that this concept amounts to the quintessential scientific application of Vichian
dynamics (Chapter 4) to the constitution of material possibility. In making scientific statements
about ‘life’ as self-coordinating-systems, both Varela and Kauffman emphasize the creative
function of embodied mind/cognition. The “continual redefinition of what to do is … enormously
dependent on contingency and improvisation, and is more flexible than any plan can be…in terms
of the role such running redefinition plays in the coherence of the entire system” (Varela, 1999, p.
55). Varela’s uses ‘system’ in a specific sense that leads to another aspect of thinking that he
Kauffman share. The system in its entirety emerges out of the local chaos of interactions, there is
no one central representation or command system, it is only the observer who imputes central
control. “The creature itself has none” (p. 59).
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Maturana’s and Varela’s system of autopoiesis, in setting out to define the
phenomenology of biology, arrives at an epistemological stance by which living systems are
describable only from the remove of an observer and, for social groups, only in a linguistic
(social) domain, which for humans is language. I presume that in making this observation,
Maturana and Varela are also commenting on scientific claims to objective truth of its
knowledge. “No description of an absolute reality is possible” (1980, p. 121). Though we are
embedded in it, ‘nature’ lies at a distance to our intelligibility of it, at best we might indirectly
infer and debate its nature, which cannot be proven. The particular properties of an entity-in-itself
cannot be directly apperceived, but autopoiesis generates observers, thus relations between
entities can be described; hence, cognitive reality is unavoidably relative to the knower’s
interpretation, mediated by the behavior34 of description. Humans, as autopoietic systems, interact
with this world through their descriptions … “this demands an entirely new cognitive outlook …
autopoiesis generates a phenomenological domain, this is cognition” (pp. 122-123), and it is
cognition that generates time as a dimension of the descriptive domain, it is not a feature of the
‘ambience’” (p. 133). Language, then, appears in the evolution if hominids as a biological
phenomena of social groups dependent on communicative interactions for their survival,
dependent on the biological-cognitive dynamic of love and acceptance of others. Emotions, (fear,
anger, sadness, etc.) are part of the dynamic that defines an organism’s structural pattern (TofK
247).
Language was never intended by anyone only to take in an outside world.
Therefore, it cannot be used as a tool to reveal the world. Rather, it is by
languaging that the act of knowing, in the behavioral coordination which is
language, brings forth a world. We work out our lives in a mutual linguistic
coupling, not because language permits us to reveal ourselves but because
we are constituted in language in a continuous becoming that we bring forth
with others. We find ourselves …not as a pre-existing reference nor in
reference to an origin, but as an ongoing transformation in the becoming of
the linguistic world that we build with other human beings (1987, pp. 234-5).
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In this way language directly links biology to social and cultural practices, Varela
contextualizes the scientific phenomena of enactive cognition, not as concerned with objects but
as self-reflexive ricorsos, by which, like a Klein bottle that has no inside or outside, no start and
no finish, we bring forth ourselves. This knowledge, states Maturana and Varela,
“compels us to adopt an attitude of permanent vigilance against the
temptation of certainty. It compels us to recognize that certainty is not a
proof of truth. … This is why we cannot evade …an ethics that has its
reference point in the awareness of the biological and social structure of
human beings, an ethics that springs from human reflection and puts human
reflection right at the core as a constitutive social phenomenon” (TofK 245).
… Every human act has an ethical meaning because it is an act of
constitution of the human world. This linkage of human to human is, in the
final analysis, the groundwork of all ethics as a reflection on the legitimacy
of the presence of others” (1987, p. 247).
In a series of lectures printed in a volume Ethical Know How (1996), Varela presents the
theoretical science of cognition and consciousness that drives his desires for a compassionate
ethics and “the re-enchantment of wisdom, understood as non-intentional action” (p. 75).35 He
describes dense, chaotic, concurrent co-ordinations of multiple interacting cognitive sub-networks
of the brain, which “ensure that every active neuron will operate as part of a large and distributed
ensemble,” (p. 48) ultimately producing for the outside observer the illusion of a coherent pattern
of behavior and representations as aspects of the world. Color, for example, emerges from the
‘dialogue’ between an organism’s active history and an environment by which a perturbation
triggers “neural networks to constitute sensorimotor correlations and hence put into action their
capacity for imagining and presenting” (p. 57), i.e. “we bring forth new worlds” (Barad, 2007, p.
170), “we construct the world we think we live in” (Kauffman, 2014, p. 18), “we have only the
world that we bring forth with others” (Maturana & Varela, 1987, p. 248).
Varela brings the body back to a post-Cartesian science of mind driven by complexity, not
dissimilarly from Kauffman’s science of mind, but with the significant distinction of his focus on
the enactive body, which opens readily to feminist new materialisms. Varela’s enactive approach
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is a neuroscience of embodied activity rather than a neuroscience of brain activity (Noë, 2004);
the way neural activity is embedded, not in the brain but in sensorimotor patterns and structures
of skillful activity (which I point out is a function of motion, or movement and of contingency)
determines phenomenon. Experience is the enactive neuroscience of embodied activity, “realized
in the active life of the skillful animal. … Brain, body, and world work together to make
consciousness happen” (Thompson & Varela, 2001, as cited in Noë, 2004, p. 227). Varela favors
an ethical philosophy of the subject informed by phenomenology36 and by wisdom traditions of
the East, especially Buddhist mind-trainings, and he leaves behind rival Kantian and Hegelian
moral philosophies of the West.
The effects of this move—used by Varela to connect empirical neurodynamics of temporal
flow to self-motion (immanence), self, and affect— allow me to use Varela’s enactive cognition
as a bridge from quantum complexity and neuroscience to feminist new materialist theories of
ethical subjectivity. The dynamic functions of Varela’s enactive cognition serve to re-interpret
borders, temporalities, and relationality outside of Western framings, and, instead, understand
them as ensembles that operate without hierarchy, central control, or telos. By means of his
autopoietic definition of life as closed operationally, yet systemically open to fluxes of matter and
energy, Varela injects a conception of life-itself with fundamental paradox, a topological relation
that also much enamors Braidotti, but before I delve into that realm, there are two more scientific
threads to follow. One connects Varelan theory to Lynn Margulis’ theories of evolution grounded
by her work, ecological in approach, in microbiology on symbiogenesis,37 and the other, through
Margulis, to James Shapiro’s presentation of cellular genetics, which absolutely undoes the
Franklin / Dawkins ‘genetic imaginary’ presented in Chapter 3 and replaces it with a whole new
narrative that prompts an altogether different ‘genetic imaginary’, one that is an autopoietic
imaginary of the ‘responsible’ possible.
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Consciousness, in the embodied enactive sense that Varela explores it, concurs with
Margulis’ interest in consciousness as the sentient, motile capacity of living entities to learn and
evolve, the embodiment of all living entities being chimeras. (Omitted: explanation of SET of the
eukaryotic cell.) The autopoietic characterization of ‘life’ frames Margulis’ empirical work from
microbiology to Gaia and, though she edited a volume on Chimeras and Consciousness, she was
less familiar with Varela’s neurological explorations of enactive cognition. Nonetheless, she
holds to the same basic standard of consciousness as sentience that premises Varela’s (and Alva
Noë’s) explorations of phenomenal consciousness; what Varela refers to as ‘embodied
sensorimotor systems’ Margulis refers to as ‘cellular motilities’, each phrase necessarily
describing phenomena immediate to triggered motion and movement. Margulis and Noë review
these aspects of the development of life against an evolutionary setting that takes seriously
sensorimotor skills as constitutive of a kind of knowledge, which extends from the simplest of
bacterium to complex organisms with “greater degrees of freedom of movement, and so greater
possible patterns of sensorimotor interaction” (ibid.). Phototactic (light), magnetotactic
(electromagnetism), aerotactic (oxygen), thermotactic (temperature), gravitactic (gravity),
phonotactic (sound), rheotactic (fluid), and chemotactic bacteria each embody particular
evolutionary paths of environmental sentience and sensorimotor knowledge that stimulates their
motor responses.
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Figure 27. Magnetotactic bacterium. Image shows visible internal magnetite.

Figure 28. Magnetic polarity in bacterial motility.
Double click on image to play video of Magnetotactic bacteria
moving directionally in response to magnetic polarity.
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These forms of sentience, the awareness of light, or magnetic polarization, or chemical conditions
of the immediate environment amount to a form of consciousness in that the ‘knowledge’
provokes the action of their particular prokaryotic motility mechanisms.
Communication among millions of life forms (strains, varieties, and species)
has been rampant nearly since the origins of life itself. Bacteria detect
Earth’s magnetic field and gravity. Protocticst bodies evolved eyes, tentacles,
and fishing rods to help catch prey. The biosphere is abuzz with more-thanhuman sensation and information flow. Chemical communication among
tress, whale sonar systems, and, more recently, people who talk, read, and
write electronically have augmented the nonstop tendency of this life to
reach out to other life. Communication modes that began in crowded
bacterial mats and scum have been in place, grown, declined, and changed
for at least 3,000 million years. (Margulis 2011, p. 9)
Prokaryotic and eukaryotic cellular motilities differ by type, and within each category are
scads of (co)-evolutionary innovations, convergences, and variations. The living entity not only
“moves” in response to its environment, it is “moved” by its environment; in complex forms,
entities embody a sensitivity to the way its own movements change the way the environment
stimulates it (Noë, 2004), and has the capacity to change its environment (Margulis everywhere),
as well. Speculatively, then, ‘life’ and ‘perceptual consciousness’ are integral to each other and to
the environment and to (oft-neglected) motion/movement; operating in concert, these becoming
cognitive skills, bring forth a ricorso (Chapter 4) becoming of self, other, and world.
In another micro-instance of ‘gap’ dynamics that model the bringing forth of life and
world largely resonant with Varela’s and Margulis’ work, James Shapiro advances a science of
sentient cellular genetic processes, the cell being the minimal autopoietic unit, that puts to final
rest the neo-Darwinist-Dawkins concept of the selfish, autonomous, and immortal DNA-focused
gene and its concomitant blinkered causal determinisms that devastate life and Earth. Shapiro’s
evolution for the 21st century opens up, instead, to self-organizing genomic systems that leverage
multiple paths of change to rewrite the non-species self (2011).
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Accepting that these speculative sciences are adequately accurate (enactive cognition, the
poised realm, the adjacent possible, and possibility space), and given the leaky processes of
symbiosis, symbiogenesis, of coherence-decoherence in the quantum field, and of the genetic
biology of the cell, then the physics and biology of uncertain, nonlinear processes of becoming
are necessarily contingent, to some degree, on the social, ethical, and affective conditions that
play an important role in the material constitution of possible realities and actuality. Explorations
of consciousness and experience as natural phenomena belong not only to philosophy but
appropriately also belong to problems in biology about the nature and origins of life (Noë, 2004),
and perhaps, by extension to physics, as well; in both cases they belong as a matter not of the
brain but of the active becoming of lives in motion. “Experience is what makes possible and
constrains conceptual understandings” (Varela, 1999, p. 16), and is thus also integral to how
subject and collective imaginaries function in the becoming of the world.
The multiple sciences of becoming inform of a sea-change underway in the sciences that
speaks to a fundamental shift in their framing imaginaries, and that correlate to utterly different
modes of thinking that have been subjugated and marginalized for centuries (Chapter 4). The
qualitative character of the conditions that contextualize a subject’s and group’s experience and
imaginary, and vice versa, are directly integral to what had traditionally been considered the
exclusive domains of quantitative empirical research. Subjectivity, it has become evident, is in
active co-(m)motion with the dynamic processes that are matters of science, they dance together
inextricably in a structured and structuring improvisation. Perhaps now, as connected to the
insights marked by these interventions in science, and in acknowledgment of current dire
planetary conditions, new subjectivities might be hovering in a poised realm, oscillating between
the possible and the actual, becoming skilled in ways that might enact a hopeful present. As
Varela states, we are compelled to see that “the world will be different only if we live differently”
(Maturana & Varela, 1987, p. 247). Subjectivity is in motion again.
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Co-(m)motions: From Memory to Desire

The sciences of becoming— quantum and complex, evolving and symbiogenic, hybrid
and cognitive— teach that there is nothing fixed or static about nature or life, evolutionary
processes open to limitless stories of what might be and what could be; should sundry conditions
be favorable opens to understandings of life as flows of becoming alterities of matter-energy
without limit, these constitute the conditions of proliferation on which natural selection acts. To
clarify, natural selection is not creative, it edits, it cuts and limits. “Life is not what we thought
and living it is beyond the ken of reason alone, for we cannot reason about that which we cannot
know”(2012, p. 1)38 nor can we reason about the body in pain, the sight of a loved child, the
affection of music, or sun-setting light on white cows grazing in a golden field.
The sciences of desire move away from normative conventions of disciplinary science,
and in so doing move subjectivity out of determinist contexts into new frames of thinking, new
imaginaries, and new possibilities. The re-definition of boundary conditions as porous, sentient,
and paradoxical, and finding creativity poised in gaps of possibility drive new attention to
concepts of matter and materiality. Messy and emergent life as an object of scientific study
cannot at once be both alive and dissected, the conduct of natural science by taxidermy and
luxuriously framed dioramas of pinned specimens belongs to memories of imperial conquest and
hyper-individuality, worlds of telos-structured entitlements. “What needs to be broken is the
phantasy of unity, totality, and oneness [what I have called in this project the ‘irresistible
charisma of monotheistic thinking’]. What gets pulled out from under the subject’s psychic
landscape is the delusion of stability, the phantasy of omnipotence. To recognize this basic ego
deflating principle is ground zero of subject formation” (Braidotti, 2012a, p. 174). Karen Barad,
through her feminist work that applies the effects of developments in quantum physics,
particularly entanglement and quantum field theory, to conceptualizations of matter, provides
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Rosi’s radical collapse of the delusion of classical certainty with quantum substance that shields
Rosi’s theory from charges of epistemological relativism. Barad provides the scholarship for
moving from memory to desire, she engages her expertise in matter to interrogate cultural notions
(whether in the social or science domain) of identity, agency, causality, and peculiar motions of
temporality. Because I see Rosi Braidotti’s work as building on and extending the sciences of
desire (in which principles of becoming — of moving from possibility to actuality —entangle
ethics) to a feminist critical theory of subjectivity, I use her work to observe how the new
materialism project shifts feminist discourse from its focus on systems of power to discussions of
matter, ethics, affect, and life. Through Rosi’s work I am able to evaluate desire as a
transformative strategy in a posthuman / threatened / techno-capitalist world, and as a feminist
response to her question, what may we hope now?. In observing Rosi’s vision, I also make note
that she does not offer ideas as to praxes that might enact her vision of an ethical becoming of
Earth and life. Memory, as narrated through the topics of Chapters 3 and 4, gets writ large on
present bodies and becomes desires. In becoming-desires, how do hopes for ethical desire get
enacted now?
The feminist voices of new materialism on matter are not univocal, but they share the
same foundational desires for social transformation that find political and ethical function in
“materiality” when dissolved of former and falsely imposed dichotomous contexts
(material/discursive, nature/culture, matter/mind, human/nonhuman). Feminist new materialisms
hold themselves and others to rigorous standards of scholarship that keep pealing back the layers
to root out the instigating ways and means of oppression in order to resist them and foster change,
even as planetary conditions rapidly change. The new materialist approaches claim to build on
former feminisms, and in bringing the body back to feminism, bring back actionable ethical
positions that evade former charges of cultural relativism.39 All is aleatory and in motion, but not
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detached from ‘substance’ or world or conditions for thriving. The aim on the grand scale, is a
new paradigm of thinking.
My question, in light of my organizing exploration of new materialism’s effectiveness in
advancing transformative feminist theories of ethical subjectivity for twenty-first century
conditions, becomes: given their shared and divergent points of view within radical theoretical
discourse, what patterns (technê) inform (en)activist strategies and practices to change paradigms
of thinking? This political interest trumps the enticement to delve into an in-depth academic
analysis and critique of their positions, which would be warranted, but for present purposes I
restrain myself to doing so only to the extent that is useful to this larger question. This disclaimer
now in place, I return to the matter of matter.

Rethinking Matter
“If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life,
it would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel’s heart beat,
and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence.
As it is, the quickest of us walk about well wadded with stupidity.”
George Eliot, Middlemarch

In opposition to a long dominant notion of matter as inert and passive, and all that that
genealogy confers and its practices configure, feminisms turn to a notion of matter as active, but
there are different approaches taken, broadly speaking one largely associates a philosophical
retrieval of ‘vitalism’ and ‘monism’ (e.g. Braidotti, Bennett, Connolly (?)), another complicates
that (e.g. Claire Colebrook, Grosz), and another resists cultural, discursive modes by favoring
feminist science studies of the agential material ‘non-human’ (e.g. Haraway, Barad, Alaimo,
Wilson, Hird).40 Jane Bennett’s descriptive term for matter is ‘vibrant’, and her (neo)vitalist
notion finds support in many, mostly cultural and critical, theorists (Braidotti, Deleuze &
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Guattari, Elisabeth Lloyd, Moira Gatens, John Protevi, Patricia Clough, Elizabeth Grosz, and
Brian Massumi. These scholars back up their positions with a Spinozist monism, resurrected from
17th and 18th century philosophy for its rejection of mind/body dualism and for its ideas of
interconnection and affectivity as defining features of the subject (Braidotti, 2006, p. 162), and
for its concept of matter as one substance. A Spinozist vibrant matter, according to Bennett,
locates potent ‘aliveness’ shared by all matter, living and otherwise, whether “edibles,
commodities, storms, [or] metals” (2009, p. viii) by virtue of the agency of things with “nonpersonal, ahuman forces, flows, tendencies, and trajectories” (p. 61). All matter is intelligent, selforganizing, and densely interconnected through networks of relations. Bennett being a political
theorist, I make sense of her, to me, obtuse concept of ‘vibrant matter’ as little more than a
treatise on Brownian motion, engaged as a political methodology to redefine the relationship
between humans and things (she calls her project a ‘political ecology of things’ with ‘thingpower’), in order to unseat the anthropocentricity of the subject-object binary and capitalist
commodification. Whether successful or not, her ultimate aim is to enliven social justice; Bennett
asks, What difference would it make? (p. viii), should all things be seen as interacting actants.
Vibrant, monist matter is the core concept to Bennett’s ontology of ‘vital materialism’ that
Spinozist-thinking descendants of Deleuze engage, and Rosi, echoing Deleuze, correlates to a
political ontology of ‘radical immanence’ (2013, p. 115). This return41 to ‘neovitalism’ (Rosi thus
distinguishes it from classical vitalism to distance it from the tangential association to fascism and
to incorporate a philosophy of flows and flux, which “benefits from the philosophical monism
that is central to a materialist and nonunitary vision of subjectivity” (2011, p. 199). Monism is
seen as the unity of matter from which self-organizing processes of difference, framed by internal
and external forces (as opposed to a dialectic scheme), proliferates. Difference, then,
paradoxically in Rosi’s description, is the effect of monism’s vitalist, non-essentialist principle of
‘not-One’42 in a vital web of complex interrelations” (2013, p. 100). Politically it stands against
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the necrophilia of an authoritarian dichotomous secular theology (“friend or enemy” / “with us or
against us’) that structures modernity as necessarily violent, and, instead pursues a political
reasoning with “the ability to account for the fluid workings of power in advanced capitalism by
grounding them in immanent relations and hence resist them by the same means” (2011, p. 200).
This brief synopsis of vitalism demonstrates that to theorize matter as inter- and intra-active
necessarily bleeds into theorizations of subjectivity.
This holds true for each of my forthcoming foci in the triptych of Varela, Barad, and
Braidotti. Rosi acknowledges an expressed element of “residual [nontheistic] spiritual values” in
a neovitalist notion of immanence (2011, p. 200) that she defends against Žižek’s charges of
neomysticism as a generative theory of desires (2011).43 The point of critical theory for Braidotti
is to “upset common opinion (doxa), not to confirm it” (2013, p. 87), and to pursue and create
new ways of thinking and new frameworks “that help us think about change, transformation, and
living transitions” (2011, p. 64).44 Distinctively, Barad cannot be seen as subscribing to ‘vital
materialism’, and though she, too, sees matter not as fixed substance but as active across organicinert ‘boundaries’, she makes no claim to some mysterious vital ‘force’ (2007, p. 151). In terms
of theoretical function, though, a similar relationship exists between Bennett’s vibrant matter and
vital materialism as between Barad’s intra-action and agential realism, and to similar effect. The
core concept (vibrant matter / intra-action) constitutes and enables the enactions of its larger
theory (vital materialism / agential realism)— each being frames of thinking based on concepts of
dynamically becoming matter that open to ethical accountabilities that the former construct of
thinking, which characterizes Newtonian-Cartesian-Enlightenment attachments, silences.
matter is substance in its intra-active becoming—not a thing but a doing, a
congealing of agency. … ‘[M]atter’ refers to phenomena in their ongoing
materialization (p. 151, ital. in original). Matter is a dynamic
expression/articulation of the world in its intra-active becoming. … The very
nature of materiality is an entanglement. Matter itself is always already open
to, or rather entangled with, the “Other”. The intra-actively emergent “parts”
of phenomena are co-constituted. Not only subjects but also objects are
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permeated through and through with their entangled kin; the other is not just
in one’s skin, but in one’s bones, in one’s belly, in one’s heart, in one’s
nucleus, in one’s past and future. This is true for electrons, as it is for
brittlestars as it is for the differentially constituted human. (2007, pp. 392-3).
Intra-active matter forms the bedrock of Barad’s “posthumanist performative theory of the nature
of matter and discursive practices [which] provides a means for taking account of the productive
nature of natural as well as cultural forces in the differential materialization of nonhuman as well
as human bodies,” (2007, p. 34) which she names ‘agential realism’, drawing on her particular
meanings of both agency and realism.
Crucially, agency is a matter of intra-acting; it is an enactment, not
something that someone or something has…It is the enactment of iterative
changes to particular practices—iterative reconfigurings of topological
manifolds of spacetime-matter relations—through the dynamics of intraactivity. Agency is about changing possibilities of change entailed in
reconfiguring material-discursive apparatuses of bodily production,
including the boundary articulations and exclusions that are marked by those
practices in the enactment of a causal structure” (2007, p. 178, ital. in
original).

Former modes of Newtonian determinist reasoning make no sense in this world that
Barad builds. Her language is full of circular neologisms required to present new ideas based on
new science using the preceding status quo of values-freighted lexicon. ‘Realism’ refers to a nonrepresentationalist notion of “experimenting and theorizing dynamic practices that play a
constitutive role in the production of objects and subjects and matter and meaning” (p. 56).
Realism rejects the extreme oppositions between objectivism and relativism, each which deny the
embodiment of knowledge claims.45 Agential realism, then, is intra-active becoming of matter,
movements and co-(m)motions in processes that navigate and negotiate possibilities within
conditions for which dichotomous reasoning and binary divisions bear no relevance, even
existence, beyond nonsense or syntactical convenience. The phenomena of agential realism, then,
are entangled material agencies’, ‘intra-active’ at their core. Again, terms need to be clarified.
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Barad makes explicit that her use of the term ‘phenomena’ has nothing to do with philosophical
associations either to phenomenology, the way things-in-themselves appear, or to Kant’s notion.
Rather she bases her use on Bohr’s notion to refer to “that which is observed, what we take to be
real” (2007, n.30, p. 412), and, as interpreted within the intra-actions of ‘agential realism’,
phenomena are richly complex, and materially enactive. Agential realism understands “matter as
a dynamic and shifting entanglement of relations, rather than a property of things” (p. 35).46
Matter, Barad notes, is not classical, “it does not reside in space and move through time. Space
and time are phenomenal, they do not exist outside of matter, rather they are matter’s agential
performances” (2014). While I find her use of the term ‘performance’ misleading, by either
conventional or post-structural terms, what begins to accrete, as Barad sees and shares it, is a
multi-constituting world of dynamic relations and complex improvisations and becoming
enactments that bear no resemblance to the world we thought we knew, but in fact had only
wrongly imagined, this planet inhabited, perhaps infested, by neoliberalism.
Though Barad’s theory of intra-active matter derives from her familiarity with quantum
physics, her concept of matter conforms, as well, to James Shapiro’s presentation of the many
mechanisms active in cellular biology that process genetic information in response to both
‘internal’ and environmental and cultural factors, as well as to what Varela and Margulis refer to
as the autopoietic functions of the cell that respond, signal, and inform how cells and matter
‘learn’.
Agential realism reflects Barad’s interest in scientific practices as “entangled material
practices of knowing and becoming” (2007, p. 56), laying the foundation for her move from
scientifically-framed discourse to matters of power, ethics, and subjectivity (“entanglements are
relations of responsibility…not through the realization of some existing possibility, but through
the iterative reworking of impossibility, an ongoing rupture, a cross-cutting of topological
reconfiguring” (2014). While whether Barad succeeds at this transversal from the science to

184

ethics gets debated, and I return to this question later, but what is opened here is the direct
relevance of discussions of the nature of matter and life to the feminist politics of new
materialism and ethical subjectivity. Once the categories of exclusion have been dissolved by the
science itself, the materiality of political and ethical respons-abilities removes all innocence from
systems that think and do in the purported purity of isolation.
Intra-action, spacetimematter, and agential realism are terms Barad introduced that have
become integral to feminist new materialist literature, and which signify the inevitable awkward
semantic wrangling that comes of thinking and communicating natural and social worlds together
using the limiting lexicon of the status quo. Such neologisms continue the ‘tradition’ in science
studies literature of ‘chimerical word forms’, Haraway’s ‘natureculture’ and ‘technoscience’,
condensed without hyphen in a ‘kind of visual onomatopoeia’, exceed their composite
distinctions (Haraway 1997, pp. 3-4, n. 21, as cited in Barad, 2007, p. 407) and “avoid cementing
the nature-culture dichotomy into its foundations” (Barad, 2007, p. 32). Barad calls her
framework an ‘ethico-ontoepistemology’ “to mark the inseparability of ontology, epistemology,
and ethics” (p. 409, n.10). Such fusions evidence a thinking that utterly departs from the
genealogical histories of Western philosophy that root the component parts of these neologisms in
entirely separate disciplinary fields.
Barad shares this challenge of languaging a new framework of thinking with Francisco
Varela. Interestingly, both concur, generally, that, using Barad’s words, “the world is intraactivity in its differential mattering…the universe is agential intra-activity in its becoming” (p.
141), though Varela (Margulis would concur, as well) references biology and calls the related
explanation, autopoiesis (Kauffman, too, refers to a related ‘phenomenon’ as auto-catalytic
processes). Where Varela explicitly tracks his empirical studies of cognition and theoretical
explorations of consciousness and experience to Eastern meditative practices and to philosophical
phenomenology through Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, Barad explicitly rejects any concept that our
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“access to the world is mediated, whether by consciousness, experience, language, or any other
alleged medium” (2007, p. 409, n.9). Most interesting, though, is that both Barad and Varela
arrive at a core notion of enaction as the motile, dynamic (autopoietic / intra-active / Gaian) mode
that is the paradoxical co-becoming of the world, and I would argue that Barad and Varela’s
notions of enaction are synonymous, indicated as well by the fact that both theorists spill into
considerations of ethics and subjectivity as an attention that, given their science, cannot be
ignored. Their thought is not so very far apart. Varela’s notion of ‘consciousness’ and cognition is
not what Barad gestures at in her rejection of a mediated access to the world. In contrast to
Barad’s position that language functions as a ‘medium’, Varela considers language to be a
material expression of autopoiesis, akin to what Barad encompasses within intra-active agential
realism. This comparison and contrast could become a much more complex and nuanced study,
but my interest and point here is that the gist of their thinking styles signals their shared
subjectivity in terms of what belongs within science and how, as a practice, science and meaningmaking relate. Perhaps another point of agreement gives evidence to this, that each warn against
the export of their scientific theorizations to analogical models of politics or psychology in the
macro-world. Ultimately, Barad and Varela are more concerned with the ethical and
philosophical implications of their scientific explorations for natureculturesciencesociety (to
extend the chimeric onomatapoiea) and notions of ethical subjectivity.
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Matter, Life, and Subjectivity
“We are all linked by a fabric of unseen connections.
The fabric is constantly changing and evolving.
This field is directly structured and influenced
by our behavior and by our understanding.”
-David Bohm

Barad’s erasure of delineation between subjects and objects is consistent with Margulis’
rejection of the notion of biological individuality. Where Barad’s work (2007) organizes around
theories of matter, Margulis’ work (1995) focuses on characterizing life in terms of matter. “Life
is matter gone wild… life is moving, thinking matter…it is awareness and responsiveness; it is
consciousness and even self-consciousness … life is the transmigrator of matter… life is a
network of cross-kingdom alliances…life is the transmutation of energy and matter… life is
memory—memory in action ... we carry our past with us … life is not vitalistic” (Margulis, 1995,
pp. 214-217). Margulis and Sagan agree with Samuel Butler that “life is matter that
chooses…living matter can ‘memorize’, in support of which she, like Barad, references Niels
Bohr. “Life, sensitive from the onset, is capable of thinking…thought, like life, is matter and
energy in flux; the body is its ‘other side,’” (pp. 226-233), “Life is existence’s celebration.”
Millions of years of endosymbiotic47 intra-actions of living entities and cosmic elements have
produced communities that co-enact— at every scale of systems, from cellular to Gaia,
boundaries impute no isolation. Microbial symbionts, for example, are pervasive and essential
contributors to animal metabolism, genetic variation, and the immune system. Epigenetics,
noncoding RNA, and a myriad of complex functions within genomic processes evidence that
autopoietic enactive cognition indeed becomes encoded in DNA (Shapiro, Evelyn Fox Keller).
Biochemist, cell biologist and philosopher Alfred Tauber states, “Such an ecological
understanding of organismal identity contextualizes the subject within a larger frame of reference
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and thus breaks the self/non-self, subject-object dichotomy of Western language and thought”
(Gilbert, Sapp, and Tauber, 2012, p. 326). Once deconstructed scientifically, the ‘individual’ of
Margulis’ biological ‘subject’ is neither unitary nor autonomous. Functionally, and even
anatomically, there is simply no such living thing as ‘self’ or individual. Informed by Varela’s
autopoietic neurocognition, ‘a’ Margulisian subject is in fact a self-organizing, self-maintaining
assemblage of conscious communities with permeable, shifting, and transitory membranes and
borders.
It helps to hold Margulis’ argument against notions of individuated selves (which draws
on Varela) in mind along the way to understanding Varela’s notion of the virtual ‘self’, but to get
there first requires another explanatory tangent. Varela’s work precedes recent feminist debates
on the ‘nature’ of ‘matter’, but, perhaps, because he and Barad explore questions of the becoming
of the world from a shared positionality towards science and ethics (or is it just uncanny?),
Varela’s autopoietic enactive cognition bears much resemblance to Barad’s intra-action. While
Varela restricts his work to the study of living entities, Barad, acknowledges a “vitality to the
liveliness of intra-activity” which she clarifies as unrelated to ‘vitalism’, but is meant in terms of
the aliveness that makes possible the distinction between the animate from the inanimate (2007,
p. 17 and p. 437, n. 81); this is the structuring principal behind autopoiesis. The two theorists put
forth their respective concepts, enactive cognition and intra-action, as re-workings of the
traditional notion of causality “in an ongoing reconfiguring of the real and the possible” (p. 177).
We are back to ‘possibility space’, the ‘poised realm’ and the chaotic oscillations of Varela’s
sniffing rabbit that, in context of a given environment, gives rise to coherent patterns of behavior
based on the animal’s embodied history.
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Figure 29. Peter Rabbit. (Beatrix Potter)

In another example of their convergences, the bioneurologist and physicist situate
language (different discursive practices) as part and parcel to the dynamics of materiality that
configure the world. Neither supports the idea that language serves a mediating function between
dichotomous inner and outer realities so as to ascertain correspondence, which then constitutes
‘knowledge’. Rather, communication is an autopoietic function, materially immediate to the cobecomings of an indeterminate ‘self’ and world. “Matter is always already material-discursive,
and discursivity is not to be understood as a human-based practice” (Barad, 1997, p. 445, n. 43).
Thus, for both Barad and Varela, what matters, and what doesn’t, is directly bound up with issues
of accountability and responsibility. Barad could be speaking for both of them when she writes,
“matter emerges out of, and includes as part of its being, the ongoing reconfiguring of boundaries,
just as discursive practices are always already material (i.e. they are ongoing material
[re]configurings of the world). … the material and the discursive are mutually implicated in the
dynamics of intra-activity; … matter and meaning are mutually articulated” (p. 152, italics in
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original). With this context in place, it becomes possible to follow with explanations of Varela’s
notion of the ‘virtual (selfless) self’ and Barad’s notion of the subject.
While they use very different styles of language and syntax, and reference very different
domains, I suggest they share a similar conception of the subject without localized center; the
apparent whole of complex, inter (intra-)acting functioning behaves in patterns as though
coordinated. With no ‘agential’ center or ‘self’ to be found, Varela calls this the selfless (virtual)
self. The reader is reminded that from the point of view of the Margulisian ‘self’ as a dynamic
community of autopoietic communities, it could hardly be otherwise. But what Varela introduces
here is the connection of the so-called-self to complexity, by which distributed network systems
exhibit emergent, and in this case of living entities, cognitive properties. The selfless self,
metaphorically, is emptiness,48 a gap space that enables relationality with the environment, a gap
that bridges the corporeal, neural body and emergent social properties.
Having referred to a ‘gap space’ throughout this chapter, I have now presented enough layers
of meaning to clarify my concept, propped up by Barad’s discussion of space in cultural
geography (2007, pp. 223-4 and pp. 447-8, n. 2). Gap space in no way models a literal or static
‘container’ or ‘locality’ for intra-active, autopoietic dynamics of matter and energy in motion.
Conceptually, then, gap space is what it exactly isn’t, or isn’t what it exactly is. It bears no
relation to a ‘Euclidean geometric imaginary’ to use Barad’s term. This would be impossible in
the way that I apply it to Varela’s absence of center, to the a priori that isn’t of the non-locality of
the subject. This conceptualization is non-Western to its core, gap space is the very inverse of a
Western physical view of mappable space that sets the standard for so much of its noösphere of
“objectivity, inevitability, and reification” (Soja, 1989, p. 79 as cited in Barad, 2007, p. 224), and
that Haraway points out contributes to the fetishization of the neo-Darwinain gene (1997). Nor is
the gap space, as I mean it, an “agent of change” as described by Henri Lefebvre and David
Harvey. I do not mean to suggest in any way a notion of the gap space as absolute, such a view as
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argued by Neil Smith and Cyndi Katz would position the gap space within capitalist patriarchy
and racist imperialism (1993). My notion of the gap space can only be understood within a
Baradian frame of spacetimemattering, within Varela’s autopoietic enactive cognition of the
virtual ‘self’, within the contingencies and motile improvisations of how and what complexity
brings forth. The gap space conforms to but is a more narrow focus of DeLanda’s ‘possibility
space’, and of Kauffman’s ‘poised realm’. Narrowing to this focus makes the concept useful for
describing and applying what Varela does in tying the science to the subject, which in its sweep
gathers in the ethical, and to what Barad does and the feminist new materialist project aims to do,
namely also to gather within that sweep the political and issues of power, thereby affording new
analytical approaches and enactive, embodied praxes of feminist intervention and transformation.
These frames make sense of the direct connections between scientific materiality and the effects
of power on the production of bodies and subjectivities. The gap space may be thought of as “the
pause that precedes each breath before a moment comes into being and the world is remade again,
because the becoming of the world is a deeply ethical matter” (Barad, 2007, p. 185). Like the
quantum that exists neither in space nor time, which oscillates between continuity and
discontinuity, and as the epitome of leaky spacetimemattering, gap space torks and changes
change. What the gap space makes clear that much of the posthuman and new materialist
literature does not, is that the transformation envisioned requires training and praxis; the politics
of the gap space requires embodied, strategic approaches that address imaginaries, understood as
a constitutive, doing dynamic of spacetimemattering, of enactive cognition and ethical knowhow, all of which bring forth a Gaian, autopoietic world.
Varela’s selfless, as-if-self (or virtual self, like a virtual interface) relates to the environment
“in relation to the perspective established by the constantly emerging properties of the [system’s
continually contingent and improvisational redefinition of what to do] and in terms of the role
such running redefinition plays in the coherence of the whole system” (1992, p. 55). This, for
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Varela, is how ‘coupling events’ give rise to [embodied] intentions (desires) unique to living
cognition; neural networks “put into action their capacity for imagining and presenting” (p. 57),
and this precedes the bringing forth, or the enactment, of a compelling world.
Segueing from Varela’s ‘coupling events’ to Barad’s description of what intra-action
iteratively performs, that these two concepts are analogous becomes apparent in terms of both
enaction and their difference-configuring effects on boundaries, properties, bodies, and meanings.
Barad notes,
Intra-actions reconfigure the possibilities for change. In fact, intra-actions
not only reconfigure spacetimematter but reconfigure what is possible.
Ethicality is part of the fabric of the world; the call to response and be
responsible is part of what is. There is no spatial-temporal domain that is
excluded from the ethicality of what matters. Questions of responsibility and
accountability present themselves with every possibility; each moment is
alive with different possibilities for the world’s becoming and different
reconfigurings of what may yet be possible. (2007, p. 182).
Through Vicki Kirby, Barad, too, uses the language of non-locality to explicate the
posthuman condition, to dispel Nature and human identity as containers or causal forces,
and to dispel any whiffs of essentialism (184). As posthuman subjects, we are part of the
world in its ongoing intra-active becoming, in which (sounding like Lyn Margulis and
Varela) practices of knowing and learning afford humans no privilege. The subject in
Barad’s thinking, by virtue of its entanglement with “Others” (living and not), is an
embodiment that always already entails “an exposure to the Other; memory and remember-ing are not mind-based capacities but marked historialities ingrained in the
body’s becoming” (p. 393). Subjects (by now it should be clear that subjects are not only
humans) are responsible to others through the entanglement that materiality entails, there
is no such thing as individuation. “Ethics is therefore not about right response to a
radically exterior/ized other, but about responsibility and accountability [to our part of the
entangled webs we weave (p. 384)], for the lively relationalities of becoming of which we

192

are a part” (p. 393). Spacetimemattering entangles questions of justice (p. 236).
In summary, for Margulis, Varela, and Barad, the personal, self-constituted “I” is illusory,
construed by virtue of ongoing, fragile micro-narratives. Exploration of the selfless self, the nondual manifestation of subject and object, then, is “a matter of learning and sustained
transformation (a praxis of “ethical know-how’) that resists deeply entrenched drives for identity
construction (Varela,1999, p. 63), instead to experience the groundlessness of becoming.
Groundlessness, in this sense, is not a negative, but affectively positive. As emptiness and
uncertainty, groundlessness paradoxically embodies the creative potentialities of the gap space.
Groundless becoming is a mode of an embodiment of emptiness within the lived world (Varela,
Rosch, & Thompson, 1992, p. 234). It is a stance of un-knowing, of possibility, of a becoming-incommunity without category. It rests on a perspective on the evolution of Life and Earth as
emergent, non-teleological, mutable, communal, and unpredictable. Groundlessness, the illusory
selfless, virtual, intra-active “I”, is the space of the enactive imaginary, the transformation of
which demands embodied training and praxis. In the Eastern wisdom traditions that Varela
espouses, experience and praxis of groundless subjectivity cultivate ever-growing openness,
compassion, and lack of fixation. Varela’s radical view merges metaphor, philosophy, and
neurobiology in a counter-narrative of the ethical subject “for the troubled times we have at hand,
and the even more troubled ones we are likely to have” (1999, p. 75).
This sentiment, too, frames Rosi’s motivation, “these are strange times and strange things
are happening” (2012b, p. 22). Ultimately, Rosi’s self (and I will explain more below), like
Varela’s, is virtual, “this self is in fact a movable assemblage within a common life space that the
subject never masters or possesses” (p. 331), linked to temporalities that unfold virtually. She,
like Varela, likens the ‘empty’ self to the heightened awareness of a meditative state. The hopes
of her nomadic theory postulate the “materialist dissolution of the self, … the “I” just inhabits
[life] on a time-share basis” (p. 365).
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Like Barad’s, Rosi’s is a material theory of desires for affirmative, in-depth change, shot
through with memory and imagination. “Between the no longer and the not yet, desire traces the
possible patterns of becoming” (2006, p. 197). Braidotti identifies her notion of desire as drawn
from Spinozist passion and Deleuzian affirmative thought in service of the ‘enfleshed’ creative
immanence that undoes the ‘Hegelian trap’ that associates desire with lack and negativity.
Memory in this, her inherited frame, plays a crucial role in the formation of the politically active
and ethically conscious subject; memory’s nonlinear temporality is an always already of motion
that connects to the subject’s affective dimension to sustain, reworked by the imagination, the
process of change and transformation. Affect, memory, and desire, then, are political tools of
subjectivity, to be engaged with specific deliberation. Desire for Rosi belongs within a
nonessentialist ‘vitalistic pragmatism’ that constitutes the nonunitary ‘self’ of complex political
agency; for her, the subject is “an empirical transcendental site of becoming” (2012b, p. 284). In
this last aspect, her attachment—to me unfortunate and unproductive—to the transcendental
reflects a departure from Varela’s and Barad’s theory of the subject. However, Braidotti’s
following remark takes on new layers of meaning if read through the physics lenses of Kauffman
and DeLanda’s ‘possibilities and actuals’, through Varela’s autopoietic neurobiology of the
virtual, and through Barad’s theory of ‘memory’ as an active spacetimemattering of the
becoming-present. “Memories need the imagination to empower the actualization of virtual
possibilities in the subject” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 236). For Rosi, the imagination triggers the
conceptual creativity that ‘propels’ the ‘becomings’ of the subject (p. 155), contextualized by the
scientific sense of the virtual, the possible, and the actual; the imaginary belongs within that same
conceptual frame, participating in the dynamic processes of sentience, gap space, the poised
realm, and entanglement. While these are mysterious, they need not be therefore attributed
transcendental qualities. Though Braidotti arrives at her remark through her philosophical
gestations of “duration” from Bergson and Deleuze, and while I don’t mean to discount that path,
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her remark carries specific, meaningful, and material weight in terms of these scientific
referential frames. Rosi’s conception of the imagination, as the trigger of hopes rooted in
ordinary, accountable micro-practices of everyday life, and critical to the project of developing
new social imaginaries, supports this interpretation.
Varela, Barad, and Braidotti come together over the centrality of praxis in the becoming
of matter and meaning, and to the enacting of ethical worlds.49 Varela and Barad specifically
emphasize training and skills as critical to the ‘know-how’ of praxis, and are conspicuously left
out in Braidotti; but I would argue that visions and even a ‘pragmatic vitalist’ theory are
insufficient to accomplish politically transformative goals in cultivating subjectivities. Through
separate avenues of neurobiology and physics respectively, Varela and Barad arrive at the same
accounting for the respons-(i)abilities of an ethical human ‘knower’, and at the same
acknowledgment of ethics and science as inseparable, scientifically. For Barad, the ‘knowing’
subject has nothing to do with traditional philosophical models of the “self-contained rational
human subject that stands outside the physical world the subject seeks to know” (2007, p. 342).
Knowing is a physical, material (not ideational), ethical practice of differentially constituted
subjects distributed across ‘boundaries’ through intra-actions. Knowing reflects the
embeddedness of the subject in larger material configurations of the world and vice-versa. A
knower embodies ethical enaction, regardless of any particular judgments as to what is and what
is not ‘ethical’. Ethicality is part of the fabric of subjectivity and of the world, subjectivity is part
of the fabric of the world and ethicality, and the world is part of the fabric of the subject and
ethicality. They co-matter in possibility and actuality. The politics of posthuman feminist new
materialisms center on processes of collective well-being, which stands out in stark contrast to
politics of capitalist growth and progress. “Each moment is alive with different possibilities for
the world’s becoming and different reconfigurings of what may yet be possible” (2007, p. 182).
An ethical (or not) ‘know-how’ of intra-active worlding50 hangs in the balance of praxes, training
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and skills-acquisition. Thus, ‘knowing’, inclusive of its intra-active, enactive ethical dimension, is
a proper object of scientific study.

Rosi
If you want to change yourself, change your environment,
if you want to change the world, change yourself.
Francisco Varela (1992)

Concurrent to feminism’s reassertion of the centrality of embodiment to subjectivity, a
resurgence of physiology in genetics and evolution marked a return to the body as a complex
community of sentient intra-acting communities, (Denis Noble 2008; Gilbert, Sapp, & Tauber
2012; Margulis and Sagan, 1995; Shapiro, 2011), as opposed to the former model of the body as a
passive expression and carrier of deterministic DNA mechanics. Underscoring this synchronicity
are shared understandings across these disciplines of matter as intra-active, that no creature is
separable from the environment, that qualitative, affective and ethical topologies are part of the
fabric of materiality, and that the preservation of academic apartheid prevents making sense of
the complexities of our age. Rosi’s pursuit of an ethical re-grounding of hybrid social
participations leads, she claims, to the formation of new social and political theory “worthy of the
third millennium” (2012b, p. 20). I revisit the work of Rosi Braidotti in the remainder of this
chapter, in light of the science of desire, to assess whether she lives up to these claims, and what
this represents for the larger feminist new materialist project.
To link philosophy to the creation of new forms of subjectivity, Braidotti’s nomadic
project functions on two intended planes, one inspirational and the other conceptual, in order to
accomplish two aims, one that is cartographic in sourcing European critical theory (her primary
inspirations are Spinozist monism and Deleuzian forces) and the other that is conceptual, to link
“the act of thinking to the creation of new concepts and critique to creation” (2012b, p. 8). She
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claims that her “reinstate[ment of] movement at the heart of thought” actualizes new, non-unitary
visions of the subjectivity, and “collective experiments” with ways to actualize them (pp. 6-8).
Her stance is that a subjectivity constituted in an eco-philosophy of becoming will have
produced51 pragmatic analytical tools for dealing with our times ‘productively’ (p. 341), a
nonunitary, complex politics will have disengaged from dialectical schemes of opposition and
recognition, this politics will not have negated but, rather, resisted the present (and strains of
memory) in constructing alternatives, echoes of Varela and Barad are heard. Braidotti calls for a
social theory that integrates science, technological complexity, and its implications for political
subjectivity, echoes of Varela are heard. Nomadic theory generates question of ethical values that
reflect complex temporalities (this is also a Baradian theme); it makes space for conceptual
creativity in confronting the dissolution of liberal individualism and moral universalism by the
current historical condition. Nomadic theory desires disruption of the hegemonic subject.
I proffer that Rosi’s key theory of nomadic subjectivity is supported by the sciences of
desire, and in this way she may be read as extending the transformations in scientific thinking
about matter and materiality to a transformed feminist theory of the subject that produces a
different politics.
The nomadic subject is ecologically bound, marked and mediated by its environmental
(inclusive of technological) interdependencies. Reminiscent of the language of the subject used
by Margulis and Varela, the nomadic subject is a non-unitary collective, and, in language
reminiscent of the Baradian subject, the nomadic subject is an in-between entity immersed in and
composed of multiple dynamic systems. Such synthetic analysis breaks down anthropocentrisms
and foregrounds the predicaments posed when multiple scales of systems —such as
technological, ecological, transnational, organismic, scientific and militaristic—inter- and transect. Braidotti describes what I call the Scylla and Charybdis that the nomadic subject of her
project must navigate between:
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• “humanistic expectations of decency and dignity” on one side of the channel, and “the
growing evidence of a posthuman universe of ruthless power relations mediated by technology”
(2006, p. 4) on the other;
• between reductionist science and capitalocentric subjectivity;
• between metaphysical naturalism that literally maps cultural, social, and political theory
according to science principles, and on the other side a naturalized techno-exceptionality (e.g. the
technological rescue from the dire effects of climate change);
• between post-structuralism and transhumanism;
• between biogenetic capitalism and climate change;
• between domination and exclusion;
• between necropolitical ideologies of the state and bare survival (2006);
• between humanistic nostalgia and neo-liberal euphoria about bio-capitalism (2007).
The ethical posthuman subject is nomadic amongst multiple narratives, adumbrated by both
restrictive and productive forces of power (material, cultural, political, technoscientific, discursive,
affective, empathic). Consciousness synchronizes these multiple differences. Unlike consciousness
in the humanistic subject, as conceptualized by Braidotti in a way that echoes Varela, Margulis, and
Barad, consciousness is the sentient, embodied, autopoietic becoming process that constitutes the
ethical core of nomadic subjectivity. Applied to a politics of the third millennium, ethical nomadic
subjectivity is ultimately about living and leaving this Earth together gracefully (Jensen, 2015,
quoting Jim Koplin).
At this early stage of its development, posthuman theory gropes toward protean
unknowns, hoping to survive predatory monstrosities in getting to an ‘Other’ side that ‘thinks
differently about ourselves’, that transposes the subject into a non-unitary, nomadic vision of
collective community selves. Even Odysseus needed supernatural assistance to survive with only
a few of his crew the dangers and inevitable shipwreck in crossing the Strait of Messina between
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Scylla and Charybdis. Like that crossing, nomadic theory is a rescue mission, there is great
anxiety, fear, and the stakes are high. Survival starts as a function of the imaginary, how which
narratives transpose memory and danger, how to enact empathically. Embodied, embedded, and
motile, the imaginary precedes, creates, infuses, and follows what will have been.

For the hell of it
What counts is what we are, and the way we deepen
our relationship with the world and with others,
a relationship that can be one both of love for all
that exists and of desire for its transformation.
Italo Calvino in interview,
as cited in MacFarlane, 2013, p. 102

The entry point of Braidotti’s critical theoretical project begins with a feminist politics
that advocates ethical change. From there her theory takes shape through her citations of
European philosophers and feminist scholars who help drive forward a ‘joyful’ accountability to a
future for which we now hope. Her project is politically pragmatic and theoretically visionary
from the outset; she vests her hopes in a “non-rapacious ethics of sustainable becomings: for the
hell of it and for love of the world” (2006, p. 278). This elucidation of her affective inspirations
reflect a kind of outright abandon of determination that emerges from long mourning and which
celebrates the challenges of fostering ethical subjectivities and political change in an era of global
advanced technocapitalism.
Braidotti establishes nomadism as a thought-style built on former ontologies, and while
she points out that the necropolitical machine (such as that produces drone warfare) demonstrates
the potential of nomadic thinking for-profit, her work does not grapple with material praxes for a
new posthuman sociality of her generative vitalist vision. . She identifies nomadic theory as
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deeply materialist by virtue of its “neo-vitalist immanence of life” (2012b, p. 85) in dimensional,
situated bodies. She argues for a transversal vision of subjectivity suited to biogenetic life’s
hybridity of vitalism and machinism.
This is how I understand vitalism in the context of biogenetic sciences: the
potency of multiple, self-organizing organisms, most of which are
technologically mediated, from Dolly the sheep to multiple digital avatars,
without forgetting genetically modified food, test tube babies and complex
information and communication technology networks. Central to the
posthuman turn as I see it is the impact of material vitalism, or vitalist newmaterialism: zoe-driven practices of non-human life forms” (2013, p. 77).
Vital materialism is a transcendentalist accretion that merges 20th century desire with 17th century
idealisms in reaction against Cartesian mechanistic viewpoints. Bergson in 1888 explains vitalism
as an understanding of two distinct spiritual principles, the first dictates the organization of matter
in cells, tissues, organs, and the “marvelous harmony among organs…which resists the forces of
inorganic nature,” and the second is the domain of “thought, perception, decision-making,
will…This would be the soul, properly speaking.” The distinction Bergson makes between these
two principles identifies the former as acting without consciousness of itself and “blindly
pursu[ing] an aim that the Creator has set” (2002, p. 31-32), while the latter principle is fully
conscious of what it is doing. Generally, vitalism, as engaged by its many thinkers, “supports the
notion that something exists in the living creature which cannot be understood by means of
phyisicochemical analysis” (Kanamori, 2005, p. 13). Historically, vitalism has been largely
dismissed by biological and medical science research that do not investigate philosophical
conundrums of “wonder” and “conditions of possibility” that explain that something ‘life’ force
of organismic development beyond genetic orders and gene expression that (Kanamoori, 2005, p.
22). The path of vitalism absorbs along its way from Bergson’s élan vital52 to new materialism
shades of Whiteheadian process and Deleuzian immanence, before arriving in Bennett’s vibrant
matter and Braidotti’s posthuman materiality. Throughout this journey, vitalism retains
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resonances of its dichotomous, transcendant roots of anthropocentric spirituality, posing problems
for Braidotti’s theoretical reasoning largely due to her uncritical over-reliance on Deleuzian
metaphysics that recycle and resignify historical concepts. Braidotti’s contribution to Deleuzian
thought is to extend his brand of vitalism and monism to the body. Prior to Deleuze’s mediations,
Spinozist monism was situated by Europe of the 17th century and vitalism belonged with
Bergson’s France of the late 19th-early 20th century, each characterized by traits now viewed
negatively by new materialist theory, e.g. theistic, universalizing, essentialist, and hierarchical.
To be sure, there are aspects of Spinozist thought that explain the perception of his
relevance to new materialist thought, but the overwhelming problems show this engagement to be
a marriage of convenience. For Spinoza, substance is not individualized, the individual is a mode
of wholeness rather than an interplay of parts. Substance refers to the pervading trait of all
existence, while not obliterating distinctions between the ‘animate’ sentient organism
(unreasoning animals, exclusive of conscious and reasoning man) and the ‘vegetative inanimate’
(Hans Jonas, 51). Spinoza conceives of mind and matter (idealism and materialism) as belonging
together and interrelated— and here’s the catch overlooked by post-modernists— in ‘finite brute
animals’, while the infinite of reason and intellect define the substance of man. Following are
notes on Spinoza’s philosophy that reveal too many points of conflict between his thought and
founding views of feminist new materialisms to warrant his recent enamored status.
Spinoza’s project was about knowing God as an indivisible totality, the infinite necessary
existence of absolute being by which all things as they are, are necessary. “Spinoza’s purpose is
to get us to abandon the imagination. … The Letter on the Infinite has the same pedagogical
purpose as the Ethics: to teach us to think with the understanding alone, without help from the
imagination” (Garvey, 2015). Spinoza defined his God as “an absolutely infinite being, that is,
substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal being and infinite
substance” (Spinoza Ethics as cited by Garvey, 2015). Though Spinoza’ s God was not the
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Abrahamic, his was a monist, i.e. monotheistic, God. The essence of monotheism in Spinoza’s
time was the rejection of idolatrous religions. Monism (and its associated quality, reason) was the
binary opposite of imagination, or abstraction, which constituted the finite. To know Spinoza’s
God demanded non-representational understandings, and required men to abandon the
imagination and imagery, for God could only be understood through reason. “The imagination is
necessary for living and so all of us have good reason to resist its purging, as necessary as that
might be for understanding God” (Garvey, 2015). Philosophers use only reason, for the
imagination interfered with knowing God, or divine infinity, which could be known only through
reason.53 Everything that is real is necessary, there or no potentialities or possibilities,
indeterminism does not exist. God determines absolutely, all substance is a mode of the monist
God substance, which defines reason within the infinite and eternal of God, and from which all
other substances are mere finite modes of that infinite substance. Only understanding, being of
God, could conceive universality. Thus, in Spinoza, monotheism and knowledge of the infinite
reject the imagination.
Spinoza reasons dichotomously, between substance and mind, between hierarchical
dialectics of ‘active’ and ‘passive’ power that mark the fitness of an organism. The dialectic of
individual life hinges on the ratio between the isolated autonomy of individuality “focused in a
self, [and] the wider [...] periphery of communication with other things; the more isolated, the
more related it is” (Jonas, 1965, p. 57). Even Bergson lectures on Spinoza as a Cartesianist and
idealist who relegates the “phenomena of life to the ranks of purely physical phenomena, in order
to establish a place apart for thought, the only spiritual being, the only free power” (Bergson
1887-1888, in Bergson and Vaughan, 2007, p. 27). This testament alone of Bergson’s evidences
the incompatibility of vitalism and monism that contemporary feminisms espousing vital
materialism herald.
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This is, of course, a coarse and simplistic summary of Spinoza’s triangulation of monist
substance, imagination, and reason that segregate the finite from the infinite. Garvey presents a
nuanced questioning of Spinozist paradoxes in an attempt glean his position on the relation of the
intellect to imagination, but for my purposes here, by presenting Spinozist monism in context
exposes the concept as unsuited to feminist new materialisms.
As support of her political ecology of things, Bennett traces the absence of telos in
Deleuze and Guittari’s abstract machine54 back to Spinoza, quoting, “There is no need to spend
time in going on to show that Nature has no fixed goal and that all final causes are but figments of
the human imagination” (Ethics, as cited in Bennett, 2009, p. 154, n.25). Bennett (and Deleuze
and Guattari) take Spinoza romantically out of context, but if interpreted within the context of his
denigration and rejection of imagination, Spinoza’s remark is, in fact, an explicit rejection of the
non-teleologies Bennett’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphysics promote. The Spinozist move
inadvertently actually draws a connecting line from Descartes through Spinoza to Kant and
Bennett, the latter who explicitly supports the teleology of Kantian Bildungstreib,55 causing
Braidotti’s alignment with Bennett’s vital materialism to be a problematic one. Compare the
above background with Braidotti’s adoption of ‘Spinozist monism’:
The conceptual frame of reference I have adopted for the method of defamiliarization56 is monism, It implies the open-ended, inter-relational, multisexed and trans-species flows of becoming through interaction with multiple
flows. A posthuman subject thus constituted exceeds the boundaries of both
anthropocentrism and of compensatory humanism, to acquire planetary
dimension (2013, p. 89).

Indeed, Timothy Brennan calls the “resurrection” of Spinoza in cultural and literary theory, and in
post colonialism a fad, and he critiques the invented use of Spinoza.
The very thinker who stood for an airtight and enclosed system
of inflexible laws is invoked by the best philosophers as the champion
of the open-ended productive force and positive potential of the
human to develop outside of any social force (2010).
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While that description does not perfectly match how vitalist new materialisms engage Spinoza,
clearly, monism is hardly the path to de-familiarization. I concur with the Brennan’s sentiment
that finds radical philosophy’s readings of Spinoza to be revisionist. Brennan, too, locates
Spinoza within a Cartesianist genealogy, and offers, as I have in Chapter 4, Vico, Spinoza’s
contemporary, as an appropriate counter to the romance with Spinoza. Similar translation
problems come up in Braidotti’s adoption of autopoiesis as transfigured by Guattari.
While Maturana and Varela made a distinction between autopioetic and allopietic
systems, autopoietic being the biological domain self-organizing living entities, and
allopoietic the domain of “machines that have as product of their functioning something
different from themselves, as in a car” (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 135), Guattari
extends the principle of autopoiesis to machines or technological others. Braidotti adopts
Guattari’s notion presumably because it supports the complexity of the posthuman
subject and her monist conception of matter. It recognizes that the technological, as an
attribute of Guattari’s “transversalist conception of subjectivity” (2012b, p. 116),
constitutes a site of post-anthropocentric becoming “which values non-human or apersonal Life” (2013, pp. 94-5). To think matter in terms of Guattari’s autopoiesis,
Braidotti somewhat fantastically claims, is an ethical intervention that frees matter from
the commodifying imperative of advanced capitalism, demonstrating the effectiveness
of the pragmatic and immanent aspects of nomadic vitalism (2013).
This corruption is no longer autopoiesis, it is poetic license taken to such an
extreme that its inspiring concept (autopoiesis) loses its capacity to generate meaning,
and thus, its metaphorical power for a new materialist philosophy. To extend autopoiesis
to the machinic in order to recover the “‘life’ force of inorganic matter” (2006, p. 126)
subverts Maturana’s and Varela’s initiating deliberate purpose in developing the theory,
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which was to counter computational models in biology. Guattari’s autopoiesis “takes the
life out of biology” (Margulis, 1997) in the same way that neo-Darwinian formalistic
evolutionary biology does. Braidotti and Guattari make the mistake of relying on a
superficial understanding of autopoiesis. They are wrong in reading autopoiesis as “a
dualistic scheme [that] opposes the inert to the living and is thus more oppositional than
nomadic” (Braidotti, 2006, p. 125). Were Braidotti to have a deeper understanding of
autopoiesis and enactive cognition, she would recognize these as, indeed, nomadic in
every way she would wish– free of a re-naturalized evolution led by a deterministic
master narrative of neo-liberalism, free of a paranoid techno-future that pitches Life and
nature against the human. Autopoiesis is a systems-thinking that, paradoxically by
definition, is not systematized, and it materially spatializes sentience, recognition,
choice, and intra-action. Life hardly needs help from a machinic vitalism to achieve
diversity and heterogeneity, and nomadism does not benefit from this artificial support.
Machinic autopoiesis is an expensive tactic in a strategy to give primacy to “transversal
connections among material and symbolic, concrete and discursive lines or forces…in
the age of bios/zoe- power” (2006, p. 129, italics in original).
This problem casts attention on a slippage in new materialist thought between
monist matter and making distinctions between living and inert entities. Barad is unclear
as to how she resolves her concept of matter as entangled with her Levinas-grounded
ethics. Vital materialists who refuse the distinction in order to be faithful to their dogma
of monist matter (e.g. Bennett) find themselves awkwardly also trying to argue for a
politics of life-itself. By grounding her theory in monism and vital materialism, Braidotti
attaches her thinking to the essentialist, theistic philosophy of Spinoza and, through
Deleuze and Bennett, to Bergson’s transcendentalisms. Vitalism, reconfigured as a
monist trait characteristic to all living and inert matter, competes against a zoe-politics
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of life in an era of advanced techno-capitalism. It is not a ‘legible’ political strategy to
embrace both monism and vitalism. Matter may be active and entangled, but monism
fails to shield philosophical and political thought from the effects of binary attachments
that extend androcentric lineages, even as the politics claim to reject individualistic and
humanistic controls.
Despite her ‘cartographic’ method intended to subvert habits of linear thinking, Braidotti
structures her argument as an a posteriori logic common in rationalist argumentation (e.g. Žižek).
Biases drive the argument, which inevitably arrives at its pre-determined conclusion, and
Braidotti’s ideology contorts and drives methods. For example, autopoiesis does not support vital
materialism. Though she declares a desire to break with divinely ordained telos, such as that of

Figure 30. The Still Point. (Betti Franceschi)

Teilhard de Chardin, her embrace of Spinoza and Bennett, ironically, also gathers in the divine
and deterministic (2013). Consequently, zoe-nomadism wavers towards and away from whiffs of
essentialism and transcendental empiricism, which Braidotti both hails, in her concepts of zoe and
vitalism, and rejects, in her concept of nomadism. By skirting the edges of transcendental
empiricism (Deleuze and Guattari) and Bergsonian/Spinozist theistic mysticisms, Braidotti’s
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claims to materiality are somewhat aspirational, and belie attachments that, in terms of struggles
with her own subjectivity, suggest she has not broken free. “The process-oriented vision of the
subject is capable of a universalistic reach, though it rejects moral and cognitive universalism”
(2013, pp. 190-191). Her wrong reading of autopoiesis and Spinoza reveals the entrenchments in
her own thinking habits. She acknowledges the privilege of nomadic theory in her case, made
possible by the support of a steady job and partner. Nomadism requires a still point.
That said, the subject imaginary of the nomadic subject rejects classical ethics tied to
Kantian moralistic normativity. For Braidotti, a ‘non-unitary’ and ‘non-essentialist’ zoe ethics is
what emerges from the collision of bios and zoe in the contested and political space marked by
the body. Nomadism requires agility and precision in its navigations. Given that the subject
imaginary critically connects how global economic and planetary environmental challenges get
addressed, becoming-nomad requires a praxis of the imaginary by the ethical subject. The
imaginary of Rosi’s theorization gets set in motion by nomadic motilities premised on the
dispersed ubiquity of ‘life-itself’57 across shared spaces of ‘nonprofit micro-political practices.58
The imaginary Rosi describes reconnects to the past in a Hemmings return narrative that ‘knows
better and can now move on’ from theoretical and political impasses (Hemmings, 2011, p. 5).
But Rosi stops short of recognizing the imaginary as a political site of struggle, she misses the
opportunity to repurpose cyclical time and memory as the imaginary’s capacity to disconnect
from past undesired topologies in order to reinvent a present becoming-future. This is Rosi’s limit
that I wish to extend, to mark a gap space for the subject imaginary as both embodied and
transgressive of its boundaries, which, conversely, are also transgressed. Boundaries, like the
bodies they entail, and embodiment are made paradoxical by the imaginary, revealing the subject
imaginary as a nexus of enactions… a site, and even a target, of political contestation. Feminists
must acknowledge the struggle over the subject imaginary as an out-and-out political conflict. For
this battle, revised and new narratives, new myths, are needed; science, significantly, provides
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one possible source of new texts for the nomadic subject’s imaginary. New materialisms have
been critiqued for claiming but not succeeding at connecting their ontological reorientations to an
ethical vision (Materialism and New Materialism Across the Disciplines, Seminar, Rice
University, 2014), and for re-inscripting the binaries and silos of disciplinarity it seeks to overturn
(Willey, ), as well as for neglecting former feminist scholarship of science and the body (Ahmed,
2008) and for claiming what isn’t to be ‘new’ (Sand, forthcoming). While there is credence to all
these observations, none of theses criticisms constitute grounds for overlooking or rejecting the
sense-making energies and political animations of the project altogether. I critique the vitalist
vein of new materialist thinking for inattentiveness to the residual traits that, lodged in its
citations, inflect their discourse. As a result, the work fails to escape the conventions of the
thinking they resist (Grosz, Braidotti, Hird, complete). These citational problems could have been
avoided by Braidotti were she to have not felt an obligation to legitimize her philosophy with
former deductive thinking traditions. Her methods cannot support an ethics that claims to produce
an alternate ontology; Spinozist monism and vital materiality hail the very universalizing
traditions that new material feminisms debunk. Inadequate historical vigilance sabotages the
project. This intellectual strategy is unfortunate, because this, that undermines an otherwise
persuasive project of ethical desires for contemporary conditions, is superfluous to the project
anyway. Absent the methodological problems, Braidotti’s qualitative cartographies would not
invite the critical standards imposed by those who represent the thought-styles to which her work
deliberately does not conform. In the end, held captive by her referential ontologies, Braidotti
can’t deliver on her claims.
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That said, I am sympathetic to the problem of having to use old words to write new ideas,
and so I read generously. Overlooking her citational choices allows me to see Braidotti’s (and

Figure 31. Labyrinthula. Double click to on image to play the video.

Varela’s) concept of ethical subjectivity metaphorically, I imagine them as analogous to the
microbe labyrinthula. This bacteria lays down new paths on the fly, never complete, a motile
structuring sentience that, in a strange becoming of filamentous social networks, embodies the
infrastructure of its entangled environment.
Braidotti’s vision of ethical nomadic subjectivity works well as a cognitive,
transcorporeal figuration, autopoietically situated by a matter-realist, onto-epistemological
natureculture.59 Her most compelling voice, though, comes through in her affirmative politics of
hope that takes shape around her drive for an ethical accountability of the future perfect, for a
future that will have been. Nomadic theory puts forth a compassionate ethics committed to a
secular, nonunitary vision of the subject, ecophilosophicallly hopeful for living this Earth in a
collective becoming of life beyond panic and mourning. Were her position argued from a more
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scientific base, her arguments would support her transformative theory of subjectivity in a time of
advanced techno-capitalism. Rosi’s vision moves the subject imaginary a long way toward
ethicality, and contrary to her claims, her work doesn’t translate from theoretical inspiration to
embodied praxis. Were there more clarity and attention given the political role of the imaginary
than Rosi and new materialists offer (though gesture at), feminist analyses and theorization might
broach this impasse creatively, and persuasively argue the dynamic immediacies of materiality,
subjectivity, ethicality, and enactive politics.
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Notes
1 J.K. Gibson-Graham focus on community practices of specifically economic
subjectivity, and Alaimo focuses on environmental practices.
2 A common nomenclature of our current time is the ‘Anthropocene’, but remaining
faithful to official international chronostratigraphic standards, the Holocene is still, officially, our
epoch. There is currently no ‘golden spike’ for the Anthropocene, nor a determination whether
the Anthropocene constitutes an epoch or an age in stratigraphical terms. For more information,
see: http://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/workinggroups/anthropocene/
3 Others, of many, include J.K. Gibson-Graham and Elizabeth Grosz.
4 For the parameters I use, I include Chilean Francisco Varela in this group, and though
Lynn Margulis rejected feminism, she had little understanding of it and was much more feminist
than she knew or would have wanted to admit. It could also include John Protevi, William
Connolly, and Brian Massumi.
5 And artists, but I am not getting to them in this iteration of my project.
6 Secular, here, refers to a thinking style and ethical practice that respects difference and
is free of the qualitative traits of monotheistic origins as discussed in Chapter 3. I do not mean it
as that which is not religion, nor in the sense that Joan Scott (2010) argued it as a tool of gendered
power systems that has played a role in the oppression of women. A secularity that does not reify
binary divisions, etc. becomes a tactical tool for a skilled political activism in a time of a global
resurgence of fundamentalism. As explained in Chapter 3, I do not consider the leaders of
Enlightenment thinking as secular, inclusive of Kant and Spinoza, I do consider Bruno, Vico, and
Darwin as secular thinkers, as explained in Chapter 4.
7 Some of whom this includes are: Donna Haraway, Karen Barad, Jane Bennet, Stacy
Alaimo, Claire Colebrook, Elisabeth Lloyd, Moira Gatens, Vicki Kirby, John Protevi, Rosi
Braidotti.
8 In this paper, I have associated this list of properties being disrupted with what I call
the ‘irresistible charismatic of monotheistic thinking’ in Chapter 3.
9 Here is another alignment of Braidotti’s theory of nomadic subjectivity with J.K.
Gibson-Graham’s politics of the post-capitalist economic subject.
10 my insertion
11 Analyzed in literatures by Hubbard, Haraway, Sandra Harding, Ruth Bleier
12 Autonomy for Varela is meant scientifically as the operational closure of an
autopoietic entity that sustains that entity as itself. It does not suggest either cognitive or
informational closure. Autonomy in feminist discourse may apply disparagingly to systems of
power or to conceits of biological purity that entitle anthropocentrism.
13 This is a tenant of autopoiesis, it is also applied philosophically by Hans Jonas in the
Phenomenon of Life, 1966, p. 98.
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14 “Zoe stands for the mindless vitality of Life carrying on independently of and
regardless of rational control. This is the dubious privilege attributed to the non-humans and to all
the ‘others’ of Man, whereas bios refers to the specific social nexus of humans. That these two
competing notions of ‘life’ coincide on the human body turns the issue of embodiment into a
contested space and a political arena” (2006, p. 37). Braidotti’s concept of zoe becomes less
binary by 2013, when she describes it as an affirmative, posthuman life-force with vital and selforganizing powers that undoes clear-cut distinctions between living and dying and extinction. It is
a vital materialism that ‘engenders a transversal relational ethics to counteract the inhuman(e)
aspects of the posthuman predicament” (2013, p. 115). Zoe allows a transversal redefinition of
science and humanistic study as to what counts as the subject [and/or object] of posthuman
scientific practice” (2013,
p. 159).
15 nostalgia, paranoia, euphoria, exaltation, manic-depressive, fear, insecurity,
frustration
16 for example, Margulis’ work on symbiogenesis, endosymbiosis, and Gaia; Humberto
Maturana and Francisco Varela’s early work on autopoiesis, and Varela’s later work on
cognition; ecology. I do not invoke the term posthuman as a specific critique of Humanism,
though that would not be unrelated.
17 Trade winds characterize wind currents and lava flows drive plate tectonics. In
topological terms, they explain but do not cause, the distinction is critical. A topological object is
a dynamic object that is emergent in one sense of the term - it is more than the sum of its parts and in another, the effect of its actualization is novel or heterogeneous. Heterogeneity becomes
quite interesting to philosophical musings on materiality. Chemically, heterogeneity denotes a
process involving substances in different phases, such as gaseous, liquid, or solid.
Mathematically, it means incommensurable, through being of different kinds, degrees, or
dimensions.
18 Nonlinearity is the norm in topological explorations.
19 The poised realm hovers unpredictably between classical and quantum worlds, in the
intersection of continuums between order and chaos, and between quantum coherence and
classicality.
20 By ‘responsible,’ Kauffman means the capacity to make decisions, stemming from
his suggestion that on the quantum level, electrons possibly have the capacity to measure and
make choices. The quantum level exhibits non-independence of electrons, which exhibit
preferences, therefor responsibility.
21 Language gets awkward when it attempts to avoid value-laden terms. Margulis often
used co-operative, but James Shapiro, to avoid the value-systems, prefers coordinates. Kauffman
uses jointly functions.
22 I would prefer the term spontaneous, but that’s a different matter for the next iteration
that connects such concepts to artists’ engagement of structured improvisation as a creative
method.
23 Does he mean all of matter or just living matter? I’ll have to ask him.
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24 Improvised is my term that I substitute for ‘unpredictably emergent’ in order to hone
the concept into something with broader application and accessibility, such as the process familiar
to the construction of performance work by artists. But that is Chapter 6, forthcoming when I get
that book contract.
25 Hold this concept in mind while reading the below, by which Kauffman’s adjacent
possible of future becomings is enriched by Varela’s notions of how temporality and affect
materially play an integral role in the dynamics and processes by which the world, inclusive and
indivisible of selves and others, becomes.
26 Margulis brings to Western light this concept that was first proposed in the 1920s by
Russian biologist Kozo-Polyansky.
27 Francisco Varela mentions that a new word is needed here, he finds emergence
dissatisfying because of its lack of clarity vis a vis parts and wholes. He prefers bringing forth to
suggest that the emergent whole is really an expression of the relations of the self-organizing,
self-maintaining component networks. The emergent entity leaves no parts behind, nor is there
hierarchical privilege given to any level. Varela would not be a Kantian. He preferred the crosscurrents of his work with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, but especially with Buddhism.
Margulis would agree with Varela, but her philosophical allegiance came through Whitehead.
What starts to emerge here are the sympathetic overtones between these scientists and the
feminist new materialists inspired by Deleuze (inspired by Whitehead (inspired by Vico) and
inspiring Braidotti) and Bergson (who inspires Bennett and Grosz and Whitehead). The web
keeps expanding and yet it has a focus and a function. Becoming entraps determinism.
28 Kauffman identifies this stance as positivist science. Kauffman’s subjectivity is
caught in a liminal zone of biology, a poised realm, stretched thin between two worlds, one being
that of the Kantian Enlightenment of his training and the other being that of his research,
complexity. Like Kant and Darwin, he struggles for reconciliation, working in a conflicted place
that at once privileges Rationalist human exceptionalism (‘we the expected’); he stays loyal to
neoDarwinian genetic selection at the level of the individual (1995), while challenging its dogma
as the ‘central directing agency,’ stating that cooperation carries a competitive advantage.
Kauffman later skeptically acknowledges growing arguments for group selection (2009, p. 261),
and also argues for creative emergence, the materiality of possibility, and self-organization.
Kauffman’s reconciliation comes in the form of his call for a reinvention of the sacred, which
serves the ends of both, retaining the traits discussed in Chapter 3 concerning the irresistible
charisma of monotheism that gets relocated in science, while also bringing forth heretical ideas of
the creative becoming of the biosphere.
29 aka ‘qualia’ in Kauffman
30 Specifically, Varela promotes Buddhist meditation.
31 I have not explained here the concepts of quantum coherence and decoherence, a
nice, simple instructional video can be found at: Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_decoherence. An interesting point to bear in mind in the
context of Varela’s work that emphasizes the epistemological limits of an observer, is that
decoherence relates only to the “observation of wave function collapse, as the quantum nature of
the system “leaks” into the environment. That is, components of the wave function are decoupled
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from a coherent system, and acquire phases from their immediate surroundings.” An independent
mathematician tells me that the formula that collapses the wave function into Euclidian form = A
+ 1/A. Coherence still exists, but is subject to its interpretation by an observer’s perception.
(Wikipedia decoherence). Note to self: this decoupling and the decoupling is discussed by Noë of
Humphrey’s work).
32 The butterfly effect is also cited by Kauffman and Gibson-Graham. Very small
changes in initial conditions can lead to profound changes. Kauffman cites this as evidence that
the empirical unknown obviates prediction, Gibson-Graham cite this as a political vision of
possibility for world change. Kauffman explains emergence as a radical principle of science,
Gibson-Graham hopes for it as a radical politics of economic possibility.
33 My term, building off of Barad’s use of ‘re-membering’ drawn from entanglement,
and referring to how history marks the future present, is used here as an adjective of desire to
describe the material-actual temporal/affective inclination, or tendency, that guides expectation
and possibility.
34 “By behavior we mean the changes of a living being’s position or attitude, which an
observer describes as movements or actions in relation to a certain environment” (Maturana &
Varela, 1987, p. 136).
35 We see in Varela another instantiation of wonder, also engaged by Kauffman,
Stengers, and Braidotti.
36 “A phenomenon, in the most original sense of the word, is an appearance, and
therefore something relational. It is what something is for something else; it is a being for, by
opposition to a being in itself, independently of its apprehension by another entity” (Shear &
Varela, 1999, p. 3). Varela makes neural correlates to phenomenological concepts of temporality
and language in explaining consciousness and cognition as a science that bridges mind,
experience, and the co-becoming materiality of subject(s) and world.
37 Symbiogenesis is defined as “an evolutionary change by the inheritance of acquired
gene sets” (Margulis, 1998, p. 9).
38 This echoes Varela’s epistemological stance of the subject.
39 Perhaps it is the fear of the latter that inspires across the board all too many references
to and claims of ontology.
40 For example, two edited volumes on feminist new materialisms stake out different
grounds, Material Feminisms (2008) edited by Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman, stakes out its
ground on explicitly corporeal themes, especially of the human body, while New Materialisms:
Ontology, Agency, and Politics (2010) edited by Diane Coole and Samantha Frost favors
theorists who lean more towards vital materialism. At stake seems to be the relationship to the
linguistic turn which is no longer adequate for making sense of the world’s advancements, is it
outright rejected or does it become incorporated, modified, appended in theoretical shifts?
Arguments to one direction or another seem to hinge on various readings of Deleuze. This project
does not take on the particularities of that philosophical topic.
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41 Yes, Clare Hemmings’ critical sense of the feminist return narrative is appropriately
hailed.
42 as opposed to the unitary ‘ruthless’ neoliberal self, experienced by the subject who is,
in fact, non-unitary, by virtue of the embodied and embedded “ties that bind us to the multiple
‘others’, most of which are not anthropomorphic (Braidotti, 2006, p. 4)
43 I will return to questions of secularity and ‘postsecularity’ later (that might be a note
to self – might not get to it in this draft).
44 I would counter that neither Žižek nor Braidotti can escape charges of theism in their
work, albeit for different reasons and different intents.
45 Though embodiment of knowledge claims are central to Barad, she does not explore
this deeply in her book, Meeting the Universe Halfway. She is well complemented by Rosi’s
thorough attention to embodiment.
46 I do not actually see this in opposition to the topological (properties-based) method I
engage. In this method, properties are significant insofar as they effect and are affected by and in
relations; that is, relations manifest properties and vice versa. In this light, this could be a minor
critique of Barad’s contrast.
47 Endosymbiosis: a relationship in which a member of one species lives not just near or
even permanently on a member of another species, but inside it. Together they (the bionts) form
the symbiont in a holarchy.
48 This is not meant in any way Lacanian, as a negativity, to the contrary, Varela’s sense
of emptiness is affirmative, in Rosi’s sense.
49 Gibson-Graham, too, emphasize diverse non-capiltalist praxes that cultivate new
economic subjectivities. The differentiation is interesting, JKGG are concerned with economic
praxis, which in the context of my inquiry, could be positioned as a form expressive of a more
fundamental level of the role of praxis in the becoming of matter itself. Ethics, as theorized by all
these thinkers, are operational at every level.
50 Turns out Haraway and Barad use this term, too.
51 Braidotti deliberately engages use of the future perfect tense to reflect the temporality
of this transformation.
52 Élan vital is the “informing spirit which, through man, evolves into consciousness and
therefore gives man his favored position as the goal and the apex of creation” (Chiari, Vitalism
and Contemporary Thought, p. 254, as cited in Bennett, 2009, p. 143, n.40).
53 Spinoza’s 17th century, imagination referred to representational, iconographic
picture-thinking and diagrams—inclusive of measurement, time, and motion. The imagination
concerned how ideas affect us, while reason was about ‘reality out there’.
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54 The abstract machine is Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphor for the generativity of
Nature whose pieces and assemblages enter into an infinity of interconnected relations.
55 Bildungstreib “names a nonmaterial, teleological drive that imparts to matter its
functional coherence, its “organic” quality (wherein each part of the whole is both cause and
effect of the others)” (Bennett, 2009, p. 65).
56 De-familiarization refers to strategies of estrangement from hierarchical relations that
had privileged ‘Man’ and from dominant visions of the subject and habits of thought and
representation.
57 Rosi shares this affinity with post-neoDarwinist evolutionists, geneticists, and
complexity theorists; she acknowledges Margulis and Varela but not scholars working in other
fields outside of feminist science.
58 Ubiquitous dispersal of collective non-capitalist micro-political practices is also a
theme of Gibson-Graham’s postcapitalist subjectivity.
59 Consider that sentence a really bad joke when I am up too late to test my reader and
to let me know that I need to take a break. Cognitive=Varela, transcorporeal=Alaimo, matterrealist=Haraway, ontoepistemological=Barad, natureculture=Haraway.
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IN CONCLUSION

For years I labored with the idea of reforming the existing institutions of society,
a little change here, a little change there. Now I feel quite differently.
I think you've got to have a reconstruction of the entire society,
a revolution of values. …We are treading in difficult water,
because it [economic and social justice] really means that
we are saying that something is wrong with capitalism.
(Told to journalist David Halberstam in early 1968
by Dr. Martin Luther King)

The biosphere-geosphere-noösphere that takes shape as planet Earth of the third
millennium, when seen through the lenses shared by new science, posthumanism and feminist
new materialism, is an altogether different natureculture than that celebrated by teleological
Western tales of technocapitalism, progress, and consumption. Material determinism has
morphed into the monster in our midst. After centuries of determinism, mechanistic telos,
individualism, human exceptionalism and dialectical transcendence, – and in spite of these
identitarian logics having been countered scientifically, such patriarchal ‘truths’ and ‘realities’
continue to dominate subject and social imaginaries, having come to represent what is ‘natural’
and ‘normal’. To critique them constitutes an attack on freedoms and capitalism. To challenge
these ‘givens,’ so embedded are they in the fabric of social, economic, and political institutions as
to be invisible, requires a radical act of the imaginary.
This radical act provokes strong, even violent response (Occupy!). Overturning that
applecart, the new materialist political project is not for the feint of heart, nor can it succeed if its
enactions remain safely sequestered within intellectual discourse, or if it remains grounded by
roots that it also wants to cut. That project demands putting at risk what modernity has
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normalized as the self, acknowledging the not-necessarily-human subject instead as community,
hybrid, dispersed and virtual, diffracted across becomings and temporalities, and moving through
uncertainties. This subject fosters conditions for desired becomings, and recognizes that free will
is not a dictator, but, rather, a collaborator, there is no autonomous center of controls. This
challenge at the baseline of subjectivity necessarily confronts the well-educated Western radical
subject--a self-confrontation acknowledged by Gibson-Graham, Braidotti, Darwin, Varela,
myself, and remaining unacknowledged by Kant and Žižek, with problematic critical
consequences.
In the natureculture world as represented by my triptych, Francisco Varela, Karen Barad,
and Rosi Braidotti, the topological qualities and establishing principles of humanism and
Cartesianism simply have no bearing. The paradigms of that thinking are revealed as illusory by
light of the changes to the former science with which they ostensibly identify. Alternate
paradigms, by which the world and lived experience are narrated anew, emerge collectively from
new perspectives in microbiology, evolution, cellular genetics, ecology, and physics. The scientists
from these fields I have considered all bring to their inquiries a systems-thinking approach, one
that reckons with feedback loops, mergers and tangents, uncertainty and complexity. Consistently,
they find a world of becoming materiality, always already in entangled dynamic process, moving
from possibility to the actual and back again, sentient, cognitive, affective, contingent,
indeterminate, and selective in the complex intra-actions taking place at every level, from the cell
to Gaia. The exuberance1 of life performs a radical dance of bodies and environment moving, as in
a structured improvisation, between possibility and actuality. The creation is a pre factum
emergence, 2 neither producible nor deducible, neither aleatory nor a posteriori calculation (1991,
p. 70), and with no outside, there is no inside. This is Barad’s halfway of the universe. In making
this sense of the world, disciplinary divides implode, binaries dissolve, and language strains.
What’s required of the imaginary is a mode of understanding utterly incommensurate at its
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foundations with what it confronts, the Cartesian-Newtonian-capitalist mindset of the
world-that-is.
This new science enacts an academic revolution, liberating ethicality from the narrow
confines of ‘philosophy’ and locating it within the purview of science, as well. In this, the new
science represents a fundamental challenge to the dominant and powerful modes of knowing.
Indeed, science has done this for centuries, as explanations displace the divine and transcendental.
Of course, power is never happy to have its territory challenged. Bruno burns at the stake. Galileo
goes under house-arrest. Edward Snowden seeks asylum in Russia. When the authority of western
Cartesian-style thinking to impose its own patriarchal terms of morality begins to erode, those
whose subjectivity has been constructed on such thinking feel their institutions of power
threatened (and, for example, the National Guard dons riot gear to take to the streets to silence a
Baltimore community). In this context, the fantasy that science is in its nature inoculated against
politics becomes strained: becomings are accountable to their effects, and materiality has no
hidden zones in the actual. My exploration of this shift thus reveals [r]evolutionary patterns of
movement away from telos and toward ethical possibility—toward, as Varela describes it,
“thinking the living being” (Castoriadis, 2011, p. 61).
Challenging disciplinarity in general, this new thinking challenges the disciplinary practices of
science in particular. The quantum subverts the linear and causal, undermining notions of
teleology—structures of thought embedded in the scientific method itself. To make scientific
sense of this different world, then, requires methods that accommodate the unknown and
unknowable, not as realms science has yet to reveal, but as part and parcel to possibility in the
materiality of the universe. To accommodate this fundamentally different perspective, the
practice of science must expand from reductive obsession with proper objects to the primacy of
relations, and hold open the ‘actual’ space of the vague, elusive, and ephemeral enactive gap.
This, then, begs a shift in the languaging of science, for studies of relationality cannot extract
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from their focus spatial and temporal contexts, or the researcher’s positionality from its
narratives. The language would not silence or ‘other’ the unknown. The bounds of scientific
knowledge would be made porous and expandable, in acknowledgment that scientific knowledge
constitutes just one narrative of many using metaphor to make shared sense.
Working in a Continental philosophy and critical theory tradition, Braidotti engages the
same themes of creative becomings based on which Varela, Barad, and other scientists and
critical science scholars re-inscribe the bounds and accountabilities of science and its necessary
implication in the world it interrogates. These themes convene in Braidotti’s theory of
subjectivity (nomadism) to inform a politics that might interrupt current trajectories of
neoliberalism. Though the manner of her engagement of Continental philosophy is somewhat
problematic to the tenets of posthuman feminist new materialisms that she identifies with,
Braidotti also cites the founding principles of Varela’s autopoeisis, Margulis’ endosymbiosis, and
Barad’s agential-realism (2013, pp. 93-4, 158-159 and 2012b, pp. 135-6). The dynamics
constituting her politics for these times, intended to inspire and activate, match those of the
sciences of desire, and she thus brings to the fore of the subject an affirmative affectivity as a
strategy of political resistance. Braidotti understands subjectivity itself as a political imaginary
brought forth by and bringing forth the momentums of all that it connects and processes—the
concatenation of autopoietically material, ethical, ecological, transcorporeal, economic,
involutionary, sociable, and companioned becomings. Such expressions of ethical nomadic
posthuman subjectivity become apparent in, for example, the praxes of Gibson-Graham’s
community economies, in Stacy Alaimo’s ecologies of transcorporeality, in Myra Hird’s bacterial
sociable life, in the ecological intimacies of Natasha Myers’ affective involutions, and in
Haraway’s companion species. Together, the sciences of desire and feminist new materialism
establish a scientifically grounded, non-Kantian political perspective on subjectivity, the world,
and Earth as an entangled, intra-active, ethical natureculture “worthy of the present” (Braidotti,
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2012, p. 189).
Transforming the political imaginary demands embodied training and practice of new
skills appropriate to that vision. Subjects need to train for wrestling multiple, protean monsters.
Accompanying a deeply informed strategy, vigilance against inherited thinking habits is needed,
and a deliberative engagement of history is requisite. But while Varela refers to meditative
practices, and Gibson-Graham refers to diverse economic practices--and while the military, a
variety of fundamentalisms, and perhaps FOX News, model effective modes of training that
cultivate particular subjects--there has been little attention to the significance of skills training
and practices for thinking and doing a ‘radical’ politics, such as occurred in the civil rights
movement of the 1960s and has been being conducted by Mondragon cooperatives for decades.
If, as the new materialisms and sciences of desire tell us, life is a protean energetic force and
subjectivity a delicate matter, then ethical becomings of a different world require the learning and
praxis of new skills and relationalities.
Gabriel Rockhill describes Cornelius Castoriadis’ repudiation of the dominant imaginary
of contemporary unlimited expansion, a dominance leading to “an overall atrophy of the
imagination and a retreat in creativity in all fields (philosophy, art, science, etc.), [as a] …
revolutionary praxis and the struggle to demonstrate that history is not a fatality because a
“break” is always possible”(2011, xvii-xviii).3 For Castoriadis, the “creative capacity of the
anonymous collective” (Castoriadis, 1997b, p. 131 as cited in Castoriadis, 2011, p. xiv) fueling
radical social imagination pushes back against the groundlessness that in his philosophy looms as
a dark threat. He sees the purpose of art, philosophy, and science as to give form to chaos, and by
so doing remind society that it operates at the edge of the abyss. That concept of the edge of
chaos carries less apocalyptic meanings as offered by Vico, by complexity theory, and by
Varela’s theory of groundlessness. In these contexts, the social imaginary4 inhabits the material
gap, and home is the poised realm of possibilities, which is the domain of autopoietic creative
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production—a vision aligning with Castoriadis’ view of the social imaginary as self-instituting
and with his stance on history as creation, and therefore undetermined (though not
unconditioned). Politics for Castoriadis thus belongs within the domain of creative production,
being a “collective activity whose object is the institution of society as such” (Castoriadis, 1997a,
p. 272, in 2011, p. xvi). In sum, Castoriadis presents a view of the social imaginary as inherently
creative such that history (“a past that has never been present, and which never will be, whose
future to come will never be a production or reproduction in the form of presence…” (Derrida, as
quoted by Barad in lecture) preconditions possibilities for revolution against what editor Gabriel
Rockhill describes the “determined world of blind narcissism and hedonism orchestrated by the
Eliatic fatalities of neoliberalism” (Castoriadis, 2011, p. xvii).
In a late 1990s dialogue on the topic of “Life and Creation,” Castoriadis and Varela
explore the relationship between their positions, in light of Varela’s expertise in the biological
phenomena of the origin of life and Castoriadis’ in theorizing the psychological and social
domain.5 They come to this dialogue each having been influenced by the other, Varela by
Castoriadis’ theory that there is an excess of the imaginary sourced in the autopoietic origin of
life, and Castoriadis by Varela’s theory of autopoiesis and autonomy.6 Winding down their
discussion of how autopoietic biological innovation and the creative social imaginary relate, they
fall into questioning whether “one can deduce a politics from a philosophy or from a knowledge”
(2011, p. 71)— the same question that, as I recounted in the Introduction, was posed to Stacy
Alaimo by the scholar of 19th century German naturphilosophie. Though Castoriadis’ objects to
reductionist theories of life (for him as for Varela, “being is creation, the propriety of being is to
make surface new forms” (2011, p. 72)), his style of philosophizing is classical in terms of its
linear determinisms and anthropocentric premises. On the other hand, Varela, rooted in the hard
sciences, is an unconventional process-and-systems thinker. It comes as no surprise, then, that
Castoriadis, whose thought style remains framed by a Newtonian-Enlightenment logic, denies
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that a politics may be deduced, though it may be surmised, from a philosophy or knowledge,
while Varela finds nuance and connection.
Castoriadis asserts that a philosophy of creative becoming “liberates us to think politics.
It liberates us from social determinisms, from the idea that one could never do otherwise…”
(2011, p. 72). He thus contravenes the disciplinary, academic mandate to ‘deduce’ certainty, and
instead recognizes in philosophy and politics a “certain complementarity” (p. 72). Certainly,
complementarity is more than the philosopher of German naturphilosophie would concede to the
feminist new materialism project whose discourse he called “catty and indecorous,” but
Castoriadis’ response does illustrate the difficulty that a thinking cemented in conventional
patterns of rationalist logic has no opening to an altogether other paradigm of thinking. The
former defines ‘right’ thinking as the product of deductive reasoning, the latter supports
observation as the process that yields co-(m)motions of relationality—an impasse that must be
contended with in conceiving strategies for achieving intellectual legitimacy or, of course, for
shaping political and social change.
Varela, outspoken in his political engagements, responds to the question about
philosophy and politics not in terms of what is proper and improper according to deductive logics,
but in terms of his own subjectivity as scientist and as citizen, a non-unitary nomadic subjectivity
in Braidotti’s sense. With only vague reference to his own published work, Varela affirms that
philosophy, science, and politics are multiply and mutually implicated, but that his very active
political engagements arise not from his knowledge as a scientist, but from his intuitions as a
citizen. The pitfall of succumbing to pressures for deductive reasoning, he implies, is that it
signals finality, and thus risks proposing either some sort of utopia (one charge levied against
Spinozist new materialists), or in Žižek’s model, dystopia.
While Varela’s cautions are crucial, I suggest that feminist scholars working in the
posthuman and new materialist vein would meet with better success beyond their own community
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by remaining more vigilant about how the discourse gets constituted. We should avidly resist, that
is, speaking in the language and resorting to the methods of reasoning and thinking, that conform
to monotheistic / humanistic topologies. This does not mean we should ignore history—quite to
the contrary. But it does mean we should err on the side of extreme caution in the resources we
hail and how we engage them, so as to avoid those that conjure the very modes of thought we
seek to indict. No Spinoza. No monism. No Lacan. No transcendent empiricism. No
manipulations of concepts with already established meanings.7 No deduction. Inspiration must be
appended with informed, enactionable strategies. We must work with methods of uncertainty and
unknowing, such as diffraction, (Haraway and Barad), cartography (Braidotti), tactical recitation
(Cummings), topologies and technê (Sand). As we embrace uncertainty, the limits of selfknowledge and of knowledge of the other, emerge as the starting point of political engagement,
enabling “a present and a future with some unpredictability in them” (Hemmings, 2011, p. 226).
What may we hope now? The theories of life and subjectivity presented in this project
continue to be marginalized by an academic establishment whose defensiveness, in the face of the
evidence proffered by scientists and science studies scholars, suggests that feminisms must be
onto something big. Even if we can’t quite know exactly what, something important is happening.
The material and metaphorical powers of the quantum and new biology foster new imaginaries
and political possibility for subject and social transformation. A sea-change in thinking practices
is underway. Yes, there is plenty of hope for our future, in theory, as demonstrated by the
theoretical work of many scholars, but the actualization of these hopes depends on transposing
memory and desire into skilled, collective praxis. This hope keeps optimism in reserve. But
another, deeper strata of hope provide the baseline for all others, and as Margulis and Sagan
remind us, “Nature has not ended, nor does the planet require saving,” (1995, p. 242). From the
perspective of geologic time, Gaian Earth and Life know only ghosts, but no true monsters.
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Notes
1 ‘Exuberance’ is a common descriptor used by Margulis.
2 Varela acknowledges that new words are needed for what he means by emergence,
non-linearity, and he clarifies his meaning of enaction as bringing together the gestures and tasks
that accompany ‘making-something-emerge’, inclusive of its conception and its history that gets
set in motion. Varela’s meaning of emergence is particular, a non-separability between created
phenomenon and the specificity of its locality.
3 An affective vector (passion), and a desire to know and experience, accompany the
imaginary’s self-representation of the world.
4 For Castoriadis, the human subject is by definition social, there is no individual human
subject, so the social imaginary parallels the radical creative imaginary of the individual subject,
and functions collectively to institute society.
5 They are in full agreement on the rootedness of the imaginary in corporeality. They
depart on the exceptionality of the human, which Castoriadis supports and Varela rejects. This
divide maps their ensuing disagreement, Varela objects to the anthropocentricity of Castoriadis’
deterministic ‘indentitarian logics’ that reject non-linear dynamics.
6 Varela objects to Castoriadis’ application of his sense of autonomy beyond biology.
7 e.g. Deleuze’s reworking of autopoiesis and machinic symbiosis; I wish scholars
would not mess with the science but get it right— e.g. Grosz gets Darwin wrong, Hird is shaky on
autopoiesis.
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